THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR

Vol. 9 Summer · 1940 No. 3

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The Monroe Doctrine in Our Own Times — William Spence Robertson
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CRANE BRINTON

A new member of the editorial board, struggling with the galley proofs of the current issue of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR in search of a topic to write upon, finds a challenge on almost every one of the long strips of paper. He would like to comment on President Wriston's passing reference to social security as "a fashion of the hour," or question Mr. Eastman's claim that the English "have a finer taste in mental humor than we have," or try to penetrate farther into Mr. Friedrich's rather surprising remark that the proper field for superior people is "the creative field of activity, and not the regulation of the everyday life of the masses of people." In the end, however, he is most struck by the variety of what lies spread before him—and galley proofs, by the way, always do manage to spread themselves about. This variety is not merely one of topics, like the variety of a well-planned and balanced meal. It is also a variety of points of view, of appreciations, of judgments of value. Some are no doubt at bottom conflicting points of view. The contributors to this issue, isolated on a South Sea island, would no doubt settle down into the kind of cooperation their training and love of wisdom have prepared them for; but one suspects there would be some lively debates, at night, around the campfires.

We have all been brought up to regard this variety of points of view, of tastes and judgments, as desirable and even as natural. We assume that if a man wants a new house, for example, he may have it built like a New England farmhouse or a Spanish villa or a Tudor manor or an Eskimo igloo. If he wants a belief our libraries and lecture platforms

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offer him a much more abundant and bewildering choice than the architect can offer the prospective builder. The point can no doubt be exaggerated. In the freest and most individualistic society men are in many ways alike, do like things, share like views. But this issue of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR could never have appeared in Sparta or 13th-century Europe or the France of Louis XIV. The very thought brings up many and shocking anachronisms; but of them all the most striking is not a matter of printing machines or geography or language but of men's habits of mind. At most times in the past men have built their houses in one style, furnished them in one style—and furnished their minds in one style as well. Today, in many parts of the world, a determined effort is being made to restore among men something like unanimity of belief in fundamentals, to furnish their minds for them neatly, efficiently, identically. THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR could not appear in Stalin's Russia or in Hitler's Germany.

Prophets of doom have long been insisting that we cannot maintain what they like to describe as the anarchy of our habits, tastes and beliefs. They insist we must come together on fundamentals—go back to Plato or to the Scholastics or distill the best that has been thought and written in this world into some sort of final essence, easily bottled and distributed. They have had their say even in these pages and will continue to have it. This is the often-noted paradox of freedom: that freedom means freedom also for those who would destroy it. But there is another, and more helpful way of putting what is at bottom the same paradox: that men may agree to disagree. Even more hopefully, it may be said that under certain conditions men have found pleasure and profit in mutual disagreement. No doubt such conditions have been rare on this earth, hard to understand and hard to maintain. Let us at any rate be grateful that for THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR and its public there seems to be no end of such profitable disagreement in prospect.

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Coalesce or Collide

HANS KOHN

THE nineteenth century offers the apparent paradox of an unparalleled intensity of cultural intercourse between peoples—sometimes between those most widely separated geographically—and at the same time a completely novel bitterness in conflicts between nations. The development of science and of communication brought about not only a complete change in economic relationships but a growing approximation of all civilized life on the five continents to a similar pattern; a unified humanity with a common cultural design seemed to emerge at the beginning of the twentieth century; at the same time the divisions within mankind became more pronounced than ever before, conflicts between them spread over wider areas, stirred deeper emotions. Cultural contact had engendered and intensified conflict between nationalities.

On the European continent political life in the modern sense of the word began with the French Revolution. This carried a great and generous message of new liberty and dignity to all individuals and to all peoples. Using propaganda and the force of arms it spread the universal message with missionary zeal; but it spread it as a French message establishing the superiority of French civilization as the most rational, enlightened and humane type of civilization. The new and deeper renaissance to which all Europe aspired in the eighteenth century was first realized in France. The eyes of Europe were turned toward the source from which the light came; it was contact with the ideas of the French Revolution which awakened the then dormant political life and thought in other European countries, especially in Germany and Italy. French nationalism set the example for the unification of a nation; in Italy and Germany French armies swept away most of the feudal encumbrances

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which impeded the process of national unification. But the combination of cosmopolitan individualism with French nationalism, which appeared natural to the French, could not be accepted by the non-French peoples who came under the influence of the French Revolution. Within twenty-five years the French Revolution transformed the intellectual and social life of Germany and Italy. The idea that a tyrant might be expelled, the cult of liberty, the aspiration toward nationhood one and indivisible, the longing for a new national cohesion and a new national spirit, the idea of a state rooted in popular consent and enthusiasm—all these concepts of the French Revolution spread to Italy and Germany, were eagerly learned from France. But the emphasis shifted; the tyrants to be expelled were French influence and French armies of occupation; the liberty worshipped was not so much individual freedom from authoritarian government as national freedom from foreign governments. The great Italian nationalist of this period, Vincenzo Cuoco, summed up this shift in attitude in his *Saggio Storico* of the Neapolitan revolution of 1799. "Strange character of all the peoples of this earth!" he exclaimed. "The desire to give them an exaggerated liberty awakens in them a longing for freedom from the liberators themselves."

The new feeling of nationalism and of national pride spreading throughout Europe was, naturally, opposed to the French nationalism from which it had received its great impulse. Each new nationalism looked for its justification to its own national heritage and strove for its glorification. Fighting against the preponderant influence of French authors, each extolled the beauty of its own language and literature in contrast to that of the French. Out of the myths of the past and out of dreams of the future German and Italian authors created an ideal fatherland long before it became a political reality. The process of building a nation was reversed. In France, as in Great Britain and the United States, the struggle for a new political and social reality had preceded or at least accompanied the cultural rejuvenation of the nation; in Germany and Italy the cultural

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rejuvenation preceded, and was separated from, the political and social transformation. The nationalism of the French Revolution was indissolubly linked with individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism. Nationalism in Germany and Italy, born under the influence of and in the struggle against, France, necessarily tended for its own self-preservation and development to emphasize elements diametrically contrary to the very essence of French nationalism. This nationalism thus became not only anti-French, but a revolt against rationalism and cosmopolitan tendencies. The contact between cultures not only generated and deepened a conflict between nations but produced a cultural conflict which invested the struggle between nations with the halo of a semi-religious crusade.

In the main the cultural intercourse followed the line of the cultural gradient and moved from centers of greater cultural intensity to those of lesser. In a dialectic process of action and counteraction the French Revolution, at once political and cultural, rejuvenated Germany and Italy. Similarly German literature in the time of Herder and of romanticism rejuvenated the intellectual life of the western Slavs. Herder had drawn a picture of the pacific and democratic Slavs as victims of feudal warrior nations like the German. "They were charitable," he says of the Slavs, "prodigally hospitable, lovers of rural freedom, but subservient and obedient, enemies of robbing and plundering. All that did not help them against oppression. On the contrary, it contributed to bring it about. Thus several nations, especially the German, sinned against them." He deplored the unhappiness of the Slavs of his day and he foresaw for them a glorious future of quiet industry, once they were awakened from their long slumber and liberated from their chains. And he insistently expressed the desire to see them cultivate their own language and their traditional arts. Slavic students who came to German universities or read German books received from German sources the inspiration for their own nationalism, for their own efforts to revive the Slavic languages and civilization. They were filled with a new sense of the

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future greatness of the Slav race. This new conviction gave them a deep sense of obligation to liberate Slavic life from the cultural, and later on from the political, impact of Germany. By expanding Herder's characterization of the relationship between Slavs and Germans the great Czech historian, František Palacký, arrived at a construction of Czech history which could serve as a foundation for their nationalism and as a justification of their opposition to Germany's cultural and political domination. Over against the aggressive and conquering-warrior spirit of German feudal society he set the idyllic picture of the pacific and democratic Slav community. According to him its anti-authoritarian and liberty-loving spirit had asserted itself throughout Czech civilization, especially in the Hussite movement and in the Bohemian Brethren. In Bohemia had been sown the first seeds of liberalism and enlightenment which were later on carried to western Europe. The struggle of the Czechs against the Germans was therefore not only a conflict between national groups but a struggle between opposing ideals of civilization, the ideals of democracy and authoritarianism. Thomas Masaryk, in this respect a disciple of Palacký, built upon this concept his interpretation of history and applied it to contemporary politics. The cultural contact between Germans and Slavs had aroused Slavic nationalism. This in turn rebelled against Germanic influences and sought its justification in a reconstruction of the past that would oppose German with Slavic ideas.

When Thomas Macaulay in 1835 presented his Memorandum on education in India, contact between the civilizations of Europe and Asia had for centuries been slight and superficial. In this Memorandum he proposed to spread a knowledge of European literature and science amongst the Indians and to promote English education and English ideals for India. The reform following on the Memorandum created a new India and its effects were felt all over Asia. Through contact with England a generation of Indian intellectuals imbued with English ideas of freedom and self-government grew up. Under the impact of English ideas and in imitation of English political

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methods these intellectuals, with the help of English liberals, in 1885 created the Indian National Congress, the first representative organization of public opinion in Asiatic lands. The intellectual and moral stir in India, known as the Indian National Movement, was entirely a product of the cultural contact of India with Great Britain. The application of English ideas to Indian life awakened an Indian desire for nationhood, led to an agitation against the continuation of British domination over India. And soon Indian nationalism, a product of British influence, was bound to object not only to Britain's political domination but to her cultural influence. India's self-realization as a nation, in order to be Indian, had to be different from that of England. Indian nationalism, which had originally been an insistence upon the right to revolt and to demand constitutional liberties (in the wake of and as a product of English constitutional liberalism), was transformed into a moral obligation to protect national customs and the destiny of the country from foreign influence, and in particular from an imitation of English liberalism. Legends of the past and dreams of the future combined to create a vision of India's peculiar and unique task in the service of mankind. A mission was discovered for India: to set Indian spiritualism and metaphysical profundity over against Western materialism and physical (superficial) comfort. Indian religiosity was to save Europe from its permanent strife and chaos. And this goal was set before Indian youth, sometimes with extravagant exuberance:

> You shall help to create a nation, to spiritualize an epoch, to Aryanize the world. And that nation is your own, that epoch belongs to you and your children, and that world is no mere tract of land, but the whole earth with its teeming millions.

Many students have referred to the difference in the character of nationalism in Western Europe and elsewhere. This difference can be partly explained by the fact that the growth to nationhood in England and France was to a large extent a process of internal or immanent growth, a product of indigenous social and political forces, whereas nationalism in Cen-

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tral and Eastern Europe and in Asia began its development under outside influence. This so-to-speak derived nationalism, almost entirely a product of cultural contact, took two different forms, according to the specific reaction to the outside influence. The one accepted the Western form of nationalism with its implications and wished to apply it to the newly awakened nations. It sought in the political form developed by Western nationalism, in British parliamentary institutions and in the French republican tradition, a universally applicable model. The modern industrial order, which had developed simultaneously with modern nationalism in Western Europe, was welcomed and furthered as laying the social foundations for the desired form of nationhood. These nationalists, whom we may call Westerners or liberals, are clearly the product of cultural contact and know themselves as such. They are to be found in Germany as well as in Russia and in India. In Germany Kant, Friedrich Christoph Schlosser, Karl Rotteck, Georg Gottfried Gervinus, Georg Herwegh, to name only a few, represented this tendency, which found its home in southwestern Germany especially. In the left wing of the Frankfurt Parliament it had tried for the first time to shape a Germany according to the Western pattern. It was defeated in the Spring of 1849. It was by no means dead then, but the hope of its renewed strength was cut short by Bismarck's successes and later on by the fact that in the tragic death of Emperor Frederick III the expectations of moderate liberalism were frustrated in Germany. William I was a representative of the Vormärz, William II a product of the Bismarckian empire. It was the tragedy of Germany and Europe that partly through historical accident, certainly not because of any innate trait in the German people, the generation of 1848 never had its day in Germany.

Stronger than this tendency toward Westernism in German nationalism—a tendency which was the direct result of cultural contact and knew itself as such—was the trait which emphasized German peculiarity and uniqueness and which set itself

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outside the influence of cultural contact with alien civilizations. It appealed to the differences in the historical past of Germany and Western Europe rather than to their common development, conditioned by the oneness of human reason. The French historian Michelet, in the spirit of 1848, had expressed the conviction that with the growth of culture man becomes more and more independent of the bonds of nature and the past:

> In this marvellous transformation the spirit has triumphed over matter, the general over the particular and the idea over reality, the barbarian periods represent almost nothing but the local, the particular, the material. Man still clings to the soil, he seems to be part of it. . . . Slowly the strength which is the real essence of man will detach him, will uproot him from this soil. . . . He will need, instead of his native village, instead of his town or his province, a great fatherland. The idea of this fatherland, an abstract idea which owes little to the senses, will carry him through a new effort to the idea of a universal fatherland of the City of Providence.

German historiography, on the contrary, turned to the soil and to the indelible natural character of each people for guidance. No common road for humanity was acknowledged. Liberalism and popular sovereignty, individual rights and modern industrial society, were regarded as products of the West, unsuited to Germany. Germany had to find its own solution for its problems, and had to find it in its own past and its own character. Romantic historiography in Germany, which claimed to go back to the eternal principles and to the unchangeable nature of things, in reality often based its conclusions upon a hasty generalization from insufficient observation of contemporary events. It regarded the French Revolution as mere destructive chaos and the absolutism of Napoleon as characteristic of the persistent character of the French nation. Fichte, in his *Addresses to the German Nation*, defined German statecraft as an education of the individual for liberty, independence, originality; whereas the French, and the Romance peoples in general, according to Fichte, inclined to imitation, uniformity, dependence upon authority and therefore to absolutism and one-man rule. Fichte himself was a liberal, a disciple of Kant and of the

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French Revolution, and in spite of many seeming aberrations he remained fundamentally faithful to the ideas of his youth. But he shared the dominant German tendency to construct an irreconcilable opposition between Germanism and the West—with the latter seen as the principle of superficiality, the former as that of depth. This romantic nationalism glorified the pre-capitalistic political and social order, the municipal guilds, the patrimonial rule of an agrarian nobility, the immobility of the Berufstände. Liberalism and democracy were looked upon as products of alien principles, conducive to revolution and chaos.

It should, however, be pointed out that some of the German Westernizers and liberals also discovered in the German past the basis for their convictions. Gervinus in his introduction to the *History of the Nineteenth Century* declared democracy and federalism products of the Germanic and Protestant spirit. He fully accepted the glorious principles of 1789, but for him they represented the victory of the Germanic striving for individual liberty as over against the uniformity of Rome.

German romantic nationalism, produced by contact with Western modes of thought, bitterly conscious of Germany's inferiority as compared with the West and therefore flaunting its own alleged superiority defiantly and triumphantly, had its counterpart in Russian Slavophilism. Its origin and attitudes corresponded with those of German romantic nationalism; but Germany was included in the West which was rejected. Slavophilism opposed the Westernization of Russia, and saw in Peter the Great a destructive force which had turned Russia away from the strength that springs from a purely indigenous development and had instead opened her up to cultural contact with the West. The Slavophiles rejected liberalism, individualism and modern economic development. They believed the salvation of Russia to lie in strict adherence to its medieval foundations, its orthodox religious life, its autocratic form of government and its traditional agrarian economy. The Slavophiles regarded the Russian as an Urvolk, just as Fichte had regarded the Germans. They exalted the role Russia was to play

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in the salvation of mankind, and especially in that of the decaying West. Magnicky, governmental censor under Alexander I, saw in the Tartar yoke perhaps the greatest blessing of Russian history, for it had kept Russia isolated from Europe and had thus preserved her purity. Russia, which through its strength and faith had liberated Europe from the scourge of Napoleon and the Revolution, needed no cultural contacts with Europe; rather, Europe needed to learn from Russia. Shishkov, Minister of Education, thought capital punishment fitting for anyone who would propose to introduce the Latin script into Russia.

But Slavophilism was opposed in Russia by a long line of Westernizers and reformers—from the Decembrists in 1825 to the liberals in the provisional government of 1917. These saw the salvation of Russia as lying in acceptance of Western ideologies, and Western economic progress and political constitutions—in Russia's adaptation to and participation in the general course of mankind's development. In many ways, and in a rather unexpected form, Leninism led the Westernizing tendencies in Russia to their triumph. Hitlerism on the other hand marked the triumph of a vulgarized exaggeration of romantic nationalism in Germany. Both were adaptations to the imperatives of an age of mass movements.

The reaction to cultural contact, as represented by German romantic nationalism and by Slavophilism, is not a development confined to Germany and Russia. It is found in every part of the earth where national consciousness was aroused by cultural contact with the West. The liberal Westernizers and social reformers in India found themselves opposed by the new nationalism of a Tilak and a Gandhi, for whom the very fact that the Indian people have remained so "uncivilized" is a thing of merit. In the first place Gandhi did not repudiate British political domination; he rejected European civilization. "One effort is required," he said, "and that is to drive out Western civilization. All else will follow." Western civilization seemed to him primarily economic and therefore materialistic. India's salvation lay for him in the revival of traditional Indian forms of

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life. The renaissance of the spinning wheel became the center of Gandhi's hopes. But Gandhi is mistaken when he thinks of his nationalism as an indigenous Indian growth. It would have been unthinkable without the cultural contact with the West; it is not a return to pre-British days; it is very definitely a phenomenon arising out of an acquaintance with certain elements of European civilization—with Ruskin, with Tolstoy, with the European voices raised in protest against the materialism of Western civilization, with the rediscovery and reappraisal of India's past by European scholars.

In the same way German or Russian romantic nationalism, which deepened political and economic competition among the states of the world by introducing an ideological conflict touching upon the ultimate destiny of nations and mankind, was in no way a product of indigenous development, of a unique and exclusive originality, of *Eigenart* and *samobytnost*: it was a product of cultural contact and of an erroneous interpretation of the past. Most of the political ideas of the German romanticists came from the West, from Burke, de Maistre and Bonald. The love for the simple, common people was derived from Rousseau. The racial theory of Richard Wagner and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, to whom Hitler is so much indebted, was inspired by Count Gobineau. The anti-parliamentarian vehemence of the German and Italian nationalists of the right, their predilection for the sword as arbiter, and their anti-economic insistence upon the precedence of political considerations (especially those of foreign policy) over social and economic problems were anticipated by Charles Maurras. Even the famous slogan *Blut und Boden* was foreshadowed in Maurice Barrès' *La terre et les morts*. Barrès, speaking of "*L'acceptation des nécessités de la vie*" and insisting that "the human plant grows vigorously only so long as it remains subject to the conditions which shaped and preserved its species during the centuries," was followed by Hitler—who builds his system upon what he calls the iron logic of nature, and winds up in a complete biological determinism.

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There had been the same dependence of Germany on the West in the past. From its very inception German civilization was molded by its contacts with other ways of life and it grew through a process of continuous cultural contact with other ways of life. This is especially true of the German civilization of the Middle Ages, upon whose national and original character romanticism liked to speculate. Nor was Russian Slavophilism any more unique. In fact it owes most of its ideas to the influence of German romanticism. Even its love for the mujik is only an echo of the myth of the noble savage. Its economic leitmotif, the glorification of the Russian agrarian community, the *mir*, received its directing impetus from a conservative German student of rural conditions, August von Haxthausen, who saw in the *mir*, as did the Slavophiles, an organic development out of the depths of the Russian folk-soul. Later on it was demonstrated that such village communities were in no way confined to the Russians or the Slavs, and that the Russian *mir*, far from being in its present form an early indigenous institution or an expression of basic national ideals, had developed in fairly recent times—either as a governmental measure to facilitate tax collecting or as the result of social and economic forces growing out of the increasing pressure of population.

In modern times the forms taken all over the world by national reactions to cultural contact can be reduced to rather uniform patterns. At one extreme stands the negative pattern, represented by the resistance of the Chinese imperial government to the Westernization of China. This resistance took the form of a complete refusal to allow any intercourse between China and the rest of the world. It was an almost totalitarian isolationism; a rejection of the concept of the family of nations and the cooperation of equal states. This complete isolationism led to a number of conflicts in which the Chinese Empire was the loser. That China did not perish entirely in the process may be attributed, on the one hand, less to its vast area and the size of its population than (as Professor MacNair rightly points out) to the failure of the imperialist nations to agree upon a division

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of the spoils; and on the other hand to the generally enlightened though not unselfish policies of the trader-empires, Great Britain and the United States. At the other extreme stands the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal. Contemporary Turkey eagerly sought and encouraged intercourse with the West. The result was not only a complete Europeanization of all the external forms of life but an acceptance of the basic attitudes underlying the achievements of the West. The past was completely discarded, traditional ties were cut. Without reservation Turkey entered the modern age. The ideological base of the present government—economic reconstruction, democratic equality of rights, international peace and tolerance—implies a full acquiescence in the rational and progressive liberalism of the nineteenth century, which is Europe's legacy from the French Revolution. In spite of its transitional dictatorship, Turkey belongs fundamentally with the democracies. During the nineteenth century Westernism and Orientalism fought a protracted duel in Turkey; in the last twenty years Westernism has definitely gained the upper hand, to the exclusion of all isolationist and romantic elements. So far as we can judge at present, Turkey has drawn new strength from her complete transformation and has entirely changed her status in the family of nations.

Between these two extremes, China and Turkey, we may place the more complex phenomena of contemporary Prussia and Japan. They provide the two most important examples of a voluntary adoption of certain aspects of cultural contact—of an intercourse that has been strictly selective and consciously guided in order to gain new strength for national conflicts. With methodical skill Prussia after 1806, Japan after 1871, adopted (and with a high degree of success) the modern forms of social life and administration whose seeds were germinated by the French Revolution and by industrial civilization. Both countries had resisted until events convinced them that without thoroughgoing internal reforms they would be unable to maintain their position and independence. The speed, energy and

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purposefulness with which the task was carried out in the two nations was remarkable and admirable. But the reforms were undertaken with no thought of changing the core of Prussian and Japanese tradition to bring them in line with the philosophy of the French Revolution and of an industrial society. They were instituted to give a surer protection to traditional habits of thought and to the social and moral values of the past. Cultural contact brought an outward adjustment in national life, but this was accompanied by a hardening of the core under the new protective armor. The maladjustments ensuing from the discrepancy between outward form and inner life have proved in the last few decades to be the most disturbing factor in international relations and one of the deepest sources of the present strife between nations.

Cultural contact in the sense discussed here is, of course, a phenomenon as old as history. But only in the last century has this cultural intercourse become world-wide, drawing all peoples into its orbit and reaching down to the masses in an effort to revolutionize their traditional life. The logical outcome of this process would be the development of a world order and a world civilization. But the irrational forces of history, the vested emotional and social interests surviving from the past, have revolted against this trend. The present great conflict of nations, which has raged now for several years on the battlefields of three continents and has been evident in the moral and mental confusion in all countries, has many different causes. Many purely local factors have contributed to its outbreak and growth. But, if we dare subsume all its different aspects under one general cause, we may regard the conflict as the outcome of the historical process of cultural contact on a world-wide scale. Assuming many masks and seizing upon various pretexts, it is the struggle between the two opposed patterns of reacting to the meeting of cultures—the rational and liberal pattern of cooperation, and the irrational pattern which, spell-bound by the past, stresses isolationism and peculiarities above the growing oneness and common destiny of contemporary mankind.

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Can the English See a Joke?

MAX EASTMAN

THERE are two sides to that famous dispute about the English and American sense of humor. Here, for instance, is the English critic, Mr. St. John Ervine, the very pronunciation of whose name is a great American joke, relieving himself in the *London Observer* after attending a performance of the Marx Brothers' comedy, *Duck Soup*:

> English humour, indeed, is so difficult for many Americans to appreciate that a preposterous legend has arisen in the United States that the English have no sense of humour at all! Myself, having seen the Marx brothers struggling to be funny, I feel that if *they* have a sense of humour, then the rest of us are better without one.

Now that is not at all nice but it does not prove anything except that this mood of asperity between the two nations during playtime does exist. For *Duck Soup*—up to its concluding scenes, which Mr. Ervine doubtless did not wait for—was admittedly pretty bad and was admired only by the extreme "Marxists" over here.

Our own remarks about British humor are, of course, quite as sassy as the above, and they are quite as unperceiving. For an example I will take Mr. J. V. Connolly who as head of the King Features Syndicate used to boast that he distributed more humor over the surface of this planet than was ever before distributed over this, or so far as he knows any other, planet. He was, in brief, the international presiding genius of the comic strip and he told me that he sold "less humor" in England than in any other country of the world, not excepting the plains of Timbuctoo. George MacManus' *Bringing up Father* is, he said, the only comic strip the English like. Mr. Connolly, as he warmed to his subject—and being Irish as well as American he warmed rapidly and to a high temperature—arrived at the

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pronunciamento that the British not only have no humor but do not know what humor is.

"I went over there myself expressly to find out what kind of humor they like, so I could sell them some. I went to a music hall, and sat there with the audience roaring and rocking all around me, and I came away just as ignorant as I went. I positively didn't know what they were laughing at, and neither did they. Once the comedian leaned over the footlights and said to the orchestra leader: 'How's your mother?' and the audience simply went wild. I turned to my neighbor and asked: 'What are they laughing at?' 'Why, he doesn't even know her!' he said. How do you expect to sell humor to a nation like that?"

Now it is quite certain, although it may not be the loftiest thing we can say about the human race, that there is not a country in the civilized world where a comedian has not leaned over the footlights and asked an orchestra leader, "How's your mother?" It is an international gag, and wherever the audience was hilarious and the comedian good has been greeted with loud laughter.

So I think the same thing may be said of Mr. Connolly's diatribe as of the acid remarks of Mr. Ervine. They demonstrate nothing except that this state of coolness between the two nations on the playground does exist. If England fails to find the comic in our comic strips, yet makes a few discriminating exceptions, she has there the support of a leading American critic, Gilbert Seldes, and a brilliant American humorist, J. P. McEvoy, not to mention your humble servant and a number of other humble but not yet entirely asphyxiated Americans. Indeed I have heard George MacManus himself voice a few unhappy comments on the present status of the comic strip. They print them so small, he says, that if you are going to get any humor into them it has to be "about reptiles or hunchbacks" and they jam them up so close together that a page of them is "just about impossible to look at." Mr. MacManus further points out that since his comics are printed simultaneously in practically all the civilized nations, tongues, races, religions—and climates—of the world, he can never indulge in any jokes about beliefs,

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holidays, recreations, mythological characters, political institutions, foodstuffs, snow, ice, cooling drinks, skates, fans or blankets. In fact he is just about limited to the basic biological generalities of hunger and procreation. Thus England's sales resistance to the comic strip can as well be advanced in proof of her humorous maturity as her lack of humor.

Another withering comment on English humor was the caricature of the London comic weekly, *Punch*, printed in the *New Yorker* for January 13, 1934. It made *Punch* look as London taxicabs look to one arriving from New York, antiquated to the point of absurdity. That whole unlumbering and streamlining process which so vastly improved comic journalism—caption-writing, drawing, typography and all—during the first quarter of this century seems to have passed by London altogether. And that is too bad, for it is one of the indubitably good things that this slick and speedy century has done. But again this does not prove that the British do not like humor; it proves that they do not like the 20th century. They cling to the old "he and she" captions and parenthetical explications—and the old taxicabs, and the old unrefrigerated beer—with a distaste for progress that seems stubborn to us, seeing that progress is bound to get them in the end. But they do not cling to them without humor. In the days when we, too, were 19th century—and justified in so being, as we think, by the calendar—our comic papers, *Life* and *Puck* and *Judge*, were far less humorous than *Punch*.

It is necessary to remember that the flow of human laughter, being instinctive and unreasoned like the flow of canine saliva, is easily subject to conditioning. All you have to do is ring a dinner bell every time you tickle a baby and you will eventually produce a learned psychologist who will tell you that laughter is an antegustatory spasm of the epiglottis, and that preprandial tintinnabulations are the objective essence of the comic. This is not quite so true of those reactions which allow of deliberated judgment, the moral and serious esthetic reactions. And for that reason opinions in these spheres differ less absolutely than opinions about what is funny. Josh Billings said, "There are only a

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few judges of humor, and they all differ about it." And I have been able to verify this in my conversations with our leading laugh experts, whose comments on each other hang together like a bunch of lighted firecrackers.

I don't think Benchley is fundamentally a humorist.—*Dorothy Parker.*

Benchley *is* humor.—*Donald Ogden Stewart.*

They play Benchley up—I can't read him.—*George MacManus.*

Benchley is always good, his technique is perfect. He is the humorist's humorist.—*James Thurber.*

Benchley couldn't make a cat meeow. He doesn't give me an itch near the nose.—*David Freedman.*

I don't enjoy Mark Twain.—*Groucho Marx.*

Mark Twain is the best of all.—*W. C. Fields.*

I can't read Wodehouse.—*Dorothy Parker.*

Wodehouse is the purest genius now alive.—*Will Cuppy.*

Don Marquis thought Dicken's *Pickwick Papers* the most delightful of all classic humor but Mark Twain confided to his diary, "I have no sense of humor. In illustration of this fact I will say—by way of confession—that if there is a humorous passage in the *Pickwick Papers* I have never been able to find it."

That being the state of affairs among experts it is clear that ordinary individuals are rarely going to agree on what is funny, even if they live in the same block and take the same exercises every morning. And between whole nations, with their distinct traditions, cultures, ways of life, and disagreements about humor are bound to be intense and steady. Thus, if there exist any other grounds of coolness between two peoples—such as, for instance, the fact that one of them has been queer enough to live on the wrong side of the Atlantic—it is going to be very easy for each one to work up a conviction that the other has no sense of humor at all. I myself dissent more vigorously from English gravy soup than I do from English laughter, but I do not on that account conclude that the English have no sense of taste. I content myself with the more modest opinion that their sense of taste has been hopelessly corrupted in childhood and is misguided probably beyond a chance of redemption. If we could

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approach the humor problem in this same magnanimous spirit it seems to me that some sort of reconciliation might be effected.

If you turn to the great humorists you find very small trace of this play-hostility on either side of the Atlantic. The welcome accorded both to Mark Twain and Artemus Ward by English men of letters was an event in American history. You might almost say that American humor, like the poetry of Walt Whitman, was discovered by certain lively-minded Englishmen. And the tribute paid to England's sense of humor by our great humorists and comedians who have actually gone over there and appealed to it is equally enthusiastic. W. C. Fields' favorite humorist after Mark Twain is W. W. Jacobs, and when I called his attention to the international character of this choice he said, "The British have a finer sense of humor than we have —they don't like wisecracks." Charlie Chaplin, although he regards himself as an American humorist, or says at least that he "feels American," spoke in similar vein, "The British have a healthy, soulful, boisterous humor, very witty too, and never clever." Stephen Leacock in *My Discovery of England* says, "If the English are inferior to the Americans in humor, I, for one, am at a loss to see where it comes in." To which authority we may add that of Mark Twain, who wrote home from London as long ago as 1872:

> My dear Mother and Sisters,— . . . I came here to take notes for a book, but I haven't done much but attend dinners and make speeches. But have had a jolly good time and I do hate to go away from these English folks; they make a stranger feel entirely at home—they laugh so easily that it is a comfort to make after-dinner speeches here. . . .

In the light of these quotations the opinion that the English do not enjoy humor as we do seems merely inexpert. And yet there must be something to account for the persistent cropping up of this opinion. To sweep the whole question out, as Stephen Leacock does, with the dictum that "the humor of the two people is of the same kind and on the same level" does not seem enough. Mr. Leacock himself turned up certain facts during his discovery of England that conflict with this dictum. He tells

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us, for instance, that English humor is prone to put on "high-brow" airs and to regard ours as "cheap" and "slangy." Englishmen on the other hand are "free from that desire to pose as a humorist which haunts the American mind." He wonders also why so many young women in England have a habit of relating incidents which they inform you were "screamingly funny" and just made everybody "roar," and at which they expect you also to "roar" merely on the basis of this information and without any art or effort on their part to make them funny once again. And he confirms the general opinion that "for some reason English people find puns funny—we don't." All of which sounds as though the humor of the two people were not quite of the same kind or on the same level.

The British are by habit less playful than we are—the "cultivated" British at any rate. They are more adult and more watchful of personal dignity and decorum. They would not agree offhand that it is an admirable thing and almost a civic obligation, if you have the gift, to make a fool of yourself for the public good. This is not a difference in the sense of humor but a cultural difference, and one which has to do with caste traditions and the mode of education of people who have to know their place in society and make it known. They are naturally less elastic to the invitation of a joke. Their laughter is more remote from soulfulness, more remote from serious philosophy of life. It is episodic and not woven in, as ours is, with their best wisdom. We are more democratic, closer to the earth. We are more youthful—or, if you view it from the British side, more juvenile. We carry with us to the grave a certain resistance to everything that was imparted to us in the form of lessons, a rebel loyalty to the recess hour, a pious and sublime sense of the necessity of throwing a certain amount of chalk at the teacher.

I am not sure I am saying much more here than Mr. Leacock does when he says "I do not think that, on the whole, the English are quite as fond of humor as we are." But I am trying to expand or ground it in such a way that it will show *why* the English are inclined, when they set out to be funny, to put on

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"high-brow" airs whereas we put on the airs of an illiterate and write our humor in a slam-bang style. Those high-brow airs are a kind of apology for being comic, an assurance to the public that, although humorously disposed, the author is not to be conceived as suffering any loss of dignity or prestige. With us humor itself has so much prestige that we rise higher in the social scale by abandoning ourselves publicly to the extreme expression of it. This explains, too, why many of us are "haunted with the desire to pose as a humorist."

If the English could achieve a tolerant understanding of this trait of ours, viewing us perhaps as curiously limber-jointed but yet not uncouth cousins, and we could see that the Briton anchors his playtime pride in a more polished and restrained dexterity it would be a first step toward some sort of reconciliation.

The second step would also require a two-sided magnanimity; and it would require some understanding of the varieties of humorous experience. The English would have to acknowledge that in imaginative humor, or the cultivation of the comic metaphor, we are their betters and their predecessors. We led the way in laughter back from the prosiness of the genteel tradition to the gorgeous language of the Elizabethans. It is only necessary to name over the English men-of-letters memorable for humor since the translation of Rabelais to establish this: Addison, Fielding, Goldsmith, Sterne, Swift, Charles Lamb—all masters of a classically severe though subtly smiling prose. Swift is spoken of as the absolute master of prose; he is at least the master of absolute prose. Is it not remarkable that the author of the most extravagant legends in English literature should never have let fall anything that could be described as an image from his pen?

Lord Byron, although a poet, was more distinguished by wit than comic imagination. And the big difference between Dickens and Mark Twain is that when Mark Twain wrote humorous stories he wrote them in humorous language. Dickens told about funny things and events but he did not "tell them funny." The same thing is true in large measure of W. W.

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Jacobs, whose stories are so often only genial records of some delicately pointed practical joke. P. G. Wodehouse is the only Englishman who uses comic figures of speech like an American; and Wodehouse, like Charlie Chaplin, represents the very reconciliation we are looking for. He is the first English writer who ever learned the United States language.

If I have exaggerated this difference in the literary humor of the two countries it would be impossible to exaggerate it in their playful slang. There the two national habits of mind are unmistakably revealed. Professor George Philip Krapp in *The English Language in America* remarked that British slang consists merely of using "queer-sounding words like *bally* and *swank* whereas American slang suggests vivid images and pictures." H. L. Mencken, quoting this in his *American Language*, precedes it with a row of names for strong drink which illustrate the thesis: *panther-sweat*, *nose-paint*, *red-eye*, *corn-juice*, *forty-rod*, *mountain-dew*, *coffin-varnish*, *bust-head*, *stagger-soup*, *tonsil-pain*, *squirrel-whiskey*, etc. It is a tiny sample of what is perhaps the richest outburst of colorful language since the Elizabethan poets. And the absence of anything comparable to it in England is well known. As Mencken sums it up: "To match the magnificent American *lounge-lizard* the best the Oxonians can achieve is a *bit of a lad*."

Lounge-lizard is a Shakespearean expression, imaginative and lusty. It contains both poetry and laughing exaggeration. *Bit of a lad* is 18th century; it is prosaic; it has elegance and conveys the smile of understatement. That this is not a difference in the "sense of humor" but a temporary cultural difference is obvious. English poetry awoke out of the 18th-century genteel sleep and English humor did not. However jocular their thoughts or preposterous their inventions these islanders have never in the last three hundred years encouraged their comic imaginations to run riot. Those young women in England who so distressed Mr. Leacock by expecting him to laugh upon being conscientiously informed that something was funny are but a further illustration of this fact. They lack the habit, and the technique, for reviving

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the funniness of things with language. They lack the art of naming things with funny names.

To my mind the greater tolerance of the English toward pointless puns—and their greater intolerance, let us remember, toward maudlin horseplay—are a further evidence of the same difference. Perfunctory punning is the poor stuff with which a mental wit fills up the vacant places in his repertory. Horseplay is the resort of the imaginative humorist when inspiration fails. Our tolerance naturally extends in the direction of our tastes. Silly actions of the tongue, moreover, are less visibly undignified than those of the other members, and therefore punning is less discordant than horseplay with the status and revelation of the perfect lady and gentleman.

What we on our side fail to realize is that together with this greater tolerance toward mental silliness the English have a finer taste in mental humor than we have—a far more delicate enjoyment of the absurd. I have seen this evidenced on shipboard, where a story like the one about the drunken soldier in London who asked "Is this Piccadilly or is it Thursday?" was relished with a philosophical delight by all those in the company who were bred in England, but where the Americans were more at home with a joke like the one about a rooster who showed his hens an ostrich egg and said "I don't want to be disagreeable, but I just want to let you know what others are doing." They were more at home because they had a ludicrous picture to look at.

Exaggeration is inevitable in this picture-painting kind of humor; and understatement as naturally predominates in the finer cultivation of the logically absurd. But that is incidental. It is the predominance of the absurd over the ludicrous, and not of understatement over exaggeration, that gives its character to British humor. And we are as a people often crude, and obtuse, and in a hurry when it comes to savoring absurdities. We are, on the mental side, too much on the hunt for jibes and sexy intimations and "cracks" about some topic of the day. That is what W. C. Fields meant when he said the English had a

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finer sense of humor than we have—"They don't like wisecracks." And that is what led Irvin S. Cobb—the most flagrantly American of American humorists—to say, when I asked him his opinion about English humor, "The English Cockneys are the funniest people on earth. They are the only lower class on earth whose humor is subtle."

I wish that some young student in psychology moved to murder laughter for a Ph.D. would contrive to publish in an English and American newspaper the same list of jokes and get a popular vote upon their merits. Or he might distribute a questionnaire among people of similar place and culture in the two countries. I confidently believe that, if the jokes were selected in such a way as to bring it out, a more mature taste in America for imaginative humor would be revealed and in England a finer discrimination in the humor of the thought process. There is a superiority on either side of this contrast and I do not see why, once it were mutually acknowledged, the two nations might not effect at least a play alliance, and the general disintegration of the planet be attended by a solidly-united, hearty and most memorably-appropriate, Anglo-Saxon laugh.

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The Monroe Doctrine in Our Own Times

WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON

THE Monroe Doctrine has been designated the cardinal feature of our foreign policy. Bismarck stigmatized it as an international impertinence. The Argentine statesman, Roque Sáenz Peña, called it "an india-rubber doctrine."

The elastic mantle of Monroeism has indeed at times been fondly cast over proceedings entirely foreign to that executive pronouncement of policy by which in December 1823 its author evidently intended to meet certain contingencies if they arose. As the years passed it became increasingly the custom for a certain class of American writers to designate features of our foreign policy having absolutely no relation either to European colonization or to intervention in the New World as interpretations or extensions of the Monroe Doctrine. When in 1898 American troops drove Spanish soldiers out of Cuba and Puerto Rico some commentators acclaimed this intervention as an application of the much-abused Doctrine. A policy of nonrecognition by the United States of a Latin-American government brought into power by means of a revolution has been styled the Wilson Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine.

Journalistic writers in the United States who have criticized the foreign policy of their government have often failed to notice that the Monroe Doctrine evoked favorable comment from Latin-American leaders when it was used to check foreign aggression. Years after the throne of the romantic Emperor Maximilian had crumbled President Díaz declared to the Congress of Mexico that his government could not do less than show itself the partisan of a doctrine which condemned as "contrary to the established order any attack of

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monarchical Europe upon the republics of America." A perusal of musty documents in divers European archives indicates that long after the nefarious designs of the Holy Alliance had ceased to trouble the dreams of George Canning, the very existence of the Doctrine of Monroe at times exercised a restraining influence upon the policies of aggressive European powers toward the rising Latin nations of the New World. Indeed an entertaining essay could be composed on the theme "What the New World might have become without the Monroe Doctrine." An Argentine citizen once said that in his judgment this Doctrine should be designated an "Indian Doctrine"—meaning that it had shielded partly or entirely aboriginal communities from the impact of foreign customs and from exploitation by European nations. Without the restraining hand of James Monroe the world might behold a real colony of Germans flourishing in southern Brazil, an English-speaking community dominating the Orinoco Valley and a hybrid French culture blossoming in Mexico instead of Africa.

There is, however, another side to the shield. Theodore Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, formulated in 1904, virtually proposed that the United States should act as a collector of foreign debts in Latin-American countries. Applications of this corollary frequently provoked apprehensions among Latin-American thinkers and statesmen. Though our intervention under the Roosevelt Corollary remedied fiscal and other ills of Caribbean republics, it led to interference with sovereign rights fondly cherished by leading publicists of our southern neighbors. The Brazilian diplomat and littérateur, Manoel de Oliveira Lima, declared that South Americans beheld in Yankee intervention in the Caribbean region a road leading straight toward annexation. "As the Isthmus of Panama has now disappeared," he said to us, "you may make a jump for the other side of the Caribbean Sea and take a seat at the head of our table."

Another major problem involved in the status of the Doctrine of Monroe was precipitated when various Latin-Ameri-

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can states joined the League of Nations. The plan for a Society of Nations appealed strongly to the countries of Latin America whose publicists have often beheld visions of councils, leagues and confederations to promote international arbitration and to protect American republics from foreign aggression. Wilson's original project for a League of Nations contemplated the abrogation of all those international agreements on the part of its members which were inconsistent with the Covenant of the League. After the publication of the first draft of the pact, however, leading American publicists warned the President that without a provision safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine the Constitution of the proposed League of Nations would not satisfy his compatriots. Accordingly, in the hope that a modification of the Charter might win favor, Wilson framed what became Article XXI of the League Constitution:

> Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.

The idea of the covenanters seems to have been that a league of strong nations would undertake to prevent war and that the Monroe Doctrine, especially if it became more of a Pan-American doctrine, would be an active force for peace in the Western Hemisphere. Apparently both European and American League sponsors felt that the United States would champion the Three Americas against any foreign interference.

Even before the Senate had refused to approve the peace settlement a Latin-American statesman had protested against Article XXI of the Covenant because it did not define the Monroe Doctrine. This sentiment of protest became more pronounced when South American statesmen began to play a role in the activities of the League. With ominous apprehensions over the expanding power of the United States (apprehensions enhanced by the failure of our nation to join the Society of Nations) what wonder that occasionally the diplomats of Latin

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America displayed a tendency to submit their disputes to the august tribunal on the shores of Lake Geneva rather than to the American Department of State! Because of the adherence of several Latin-American nations to the League of Nations the role of the United States in the New World was placed in jeopardy. Some important problems which our statesmen might well have expected would be laid exclusively before them for adjudication were also submitted to the League. In 1929 a group of neutral powers composed of Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and the United States undertook to use its good offices for the adjustment of the dispute concerning the Chaco, a region an English writer called "Green Hell." After a clash had taken place between Bolivian and Paraguayan soldiers in that region the Argentine Foreign Minister expressed the opinion that the Commission of Neutrals should allow the League to assume jurisdiction over the Chaco controversy. He said that the League must develop "its action without finding an obstacle in regional or continental doctrines," which he believed had "neither the adhesion of Argentina nor a sanction created by the unanimous will of the countries of the Continent."

Argentina thus appealed to the League in opposition to the attempt of neutral powers, headed by the United States, to maintain the Monroe Doctrine as an instrument for the settlement of controversies in the Western Hemisphere—the concept of the Doctrine held by the founders of the League. Soon afterward the League Council appointed a committee to investigate the dispute. This committee attempted to initiate a policy in cooperation with the Commission of Neutrals. After war was declared between Paraguay and Bolivia the Council recommended the imposition of a world-wide arms embargo on both states. A South-American boundary controversy actually precipitated simultaneous conferences of peacemakers at both Washington and Geneva. If the United States had joined the League she might have been placed in the unenviable position of a Colossus expected to enforce the mandates of the League against a pigmy. Had the League attempted to enforce

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the sanction against Paraguay it would have acted in the face of the virile Argentine nation which has long aimed to establish her hegemony in South America, which had announced her opposition to European interference with Spanish America before news of the Monroe Doctrine reached her.

In the meantime the League Covenant's underlying assumption—that the Monroe Doctrine is a regional understanding—had been bluntly challenged. After Argentina had ceased, for the time being, to be an active member of the League an agent of that government made an iconoclastic interpretation of the famous Doctrine. He declared that although in 1823 the Doctrine of Monroe was helpful to South America, it was incorrect to ascribe to it now the character of a regional understanding. He characterized it as a one-sided political agreement never explicitly approved by Latin-American countries.

At the Ninth Assembly of the Society of Nations, after Costa Rica had presented a solemn statement declaring that under Article XXI of the Covenant "the international legal scope of the Monroe Doctrine was extended," she asked to be informed of the interpretation placed by the League on "the Monroe Doctrine and the scope given to that Doctrine when included in Article XXI." Shortly afterward the Council replied by citing Article XX of the Covenant whereby the members of the League agreed to abrogate all understandings among themselves incompatible with the League Constitution. With respect to Article XXI the Council unanimously declared this mention of the Monroe Doctrine "neither weakens nor limits any of the safeguards provided in the Covenant" and that it cannot have the effect of giving them a "sanction or validity" not previously possessed. The interpretation given by the Council to the moot article would therefore appear to be that its presence in the League Covenant did not give to the Monroe Doctrine any international sanction not possessed in 1919.

Even before the United States entered the World War there were indications that the attitude of Americans toward the Doctrine of Monroe was undergoing a significant change. A

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desire, in part, to promote a fraternal spirit among the American nations impelled President Wilson to suggest a new Monroe Doctrine in his message to Congress on December 7, 1915. He declared the United States no longer cherished a "claim or guardianship or thought of wards" but

> Instead, a full and honorable association, as of partners, in the interest of all America, North and South. Our concern for the independence and prosperity of the states of Central and South America is not altered. We retain unabated the spirit that has inspired us throughout the whole of our government and which was so frankly put into words by President Monroe. We still mean always to make a common cause of national independence and of political liberty in America.

The principles thus formally proclaimed by President Wilson constituted a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine. Influential journals of South America praised his message. *El Comercio* of Lima published an editorial entitled "A Just Concept of the Monroe Doctrine." It interpreted Wilson's message to mean that the policy which had led to a series of interventions in the Caribbean countries had terminated "as a norm of conduct in the international relations of the American states." Notwithstanding such favorable comment Wilson did not translate his Pan-American Monroe Doctrine into action.

Shortly before he left the White House a sympathetic reaction to our foreign policy took place in southern South America. In April 1920 a publicist named Baltasar Brum, who had served as secretary of foreign relations and as president of Uruguay, advocated the formation of an American Society of States which would include the United States and would serve not only as a counterpoise to the League of Nations but also as a protector of the Americas. He added:

> We can affirm that up to the present time European conquests in America have been prevented by the influence of the Monroe Doctrine. Neither in the 19th century nor in the beginning of the 20th century was there a European power strong enough to annex territory in Latin America at the expense of a war with the United States.

Brum reasoned, however, that by declarations of Latin-

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American nations the Monroe Doctrine should be transformed from a unilateral policy of the United States into a Pan-American Doctrine. Obviously this proposal was in harmony with Wilson's Pan-American Doctrine. Included in the agenda prepared for the Pan-American Conference held at Santiago de Chile in 1923 was a proposal advanced by Uruguay for the organization of an American League of Nations and for the transformation of the Monroe Doctrine into a Pan-American Doctrine. But the unfavorable attitude of the delegates from the United States, who made it known that their government considered the Monroe Doctrine unilateral, prevented action.

Signs were not lacking that publicists in the United States were aware the Monroe Doctrine ought to be modified. In 1928 an Under-Secretary of State of the United States named J. Reuben Clark prepared a *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine*. He stated that the views set forth in this booklet were "not authoritative statements, but merely personal expressions of the author." Clark pointed out that European colonization and intervention in America were inhibited by the Monroe Doctrine either because they were a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States "or because they endangered our peace and happiness." In his opinion the Monroe Doctrine was properly concerned with circumstances which challenged our security or self-preservation. He reasoned that this Doctrine was concerned solely with the relations between European states and the American continents. It did not apply to purely inter-American relations.

> The Doctrine states a case of the United States *vs.* Europe, not of the United States *vs.* Latin America. . . . Such arrangements as the United States has made, for example, with Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua, are not within the Doctrine as announced by Monroe.

In fine, he reasoned that the policy outlined in the Roosevelt Corollary was not justified by the terms of the Doctrine itself.

The Clark Memorandum was a strict interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, made by an official of the very government

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which had intervened by force in countries adjacent to the Caribbean Sea. And this interpretation implied that the Doctrine should not be utilized to sanction a multitude of policies —that in particular the mantle of Monroe should not be employed to shield intervention by the United States in Latin America. Clark's views were highly praised in South America as bringing the Monroe Doctrine back to its original form.

In the transformation of the Monroe Doctrine from a unilateral policy Pan-Americanism has had considerable influence. In Latin America the first prominent champion of Pan-Americanism was Bolívar the Liberator. In 1824 he invited certain Latin-American nations to send delegates to a Congress on the Isthmus of Panama. This congress was to serve as a council in great danger, as a faithful interpreter of treaties and as an umpire and conciliator when disputes arose. He wished the states represented to formulate a declaration against European intervention in America similar to the announcement contained in President Monroe's message to Congress of December 2, 1823. The North-American statesman who did most to make the vision of an all-American Congress a reality was Secretary of State Blaine. In Washington in 1889 delegates of Latin-American republics and the United States first undertook to deliberate affairs of interest to the whole American Continent.

In recent international American Congresses intervention by the United States in the affairs of the independent nations of America has been a moot problem, with various proposals introduced by Latin-American nations to curb the United States in applying the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. Not, however, until Franklin D. Roosevelt became President did those propositions receive due consideration. In his inaugural address the President avowed he would "dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor." In his Pan-American Day address on April 12, 1933 the President linked the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism: "The essential qualities of a true Pan-Americanism," he said, "must be the same as those which constitute a good neighbor, namely mutual

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understanding, and through such understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the other's point of view." He declared the Monroe Doctrine was directed "at the maintenance of independence by the peoples of the continent. It was aimed and is aimed against the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non-American power."

At the Seventh International Conference of American states at Montevideo in December 1933 Pan-Americanism was given an economic content, and significant declarations were made concerning the equality of states. A resolution was adopted to the effect that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." At this conference, moreover, Secretary Hull interpreted the President's policy:

> The United States Government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations. . . . No government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt Administration.

These pronouncements were amplified by the President.

> The definite policy of the United States from now on is opposed to armed intervention. The maintenance of constitutional government in other nations is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone, but the concern of each individual nation.

Only when orderly processes failed would the maintenance of constitutional government in an American country become the concern of other nations. Then the situation would become "the joint concern of a whole continent."

In this announcement the President repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. A beginning was soon made in carrying out this self-denying ordinance, for in May 1934 the Senate ratified a treaty with Cuba abrogating the Platt Amendment which had authorized intervention by the United States in that island. Shortly afterward the last detachment of American soldiers left Haiti. On a visit to the United States the President-Elect of Colombia declared pub-

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licly that the sovereignty of no American state was any longer in danger of curtailment.

War and rumors of war recently incited our government to convoke an American Peace Conference. On January 30, 1936 President Roosevelt sent invitations to the presidents of other American republics proposing an extraordinary inter-American conference at Buenos Aires to determine how the maintenance of peace might best be safeguarded. This invitation was cordially welcomed by our southern neighbors. Among the conventions and resolutions framed at Buenos Aires there are two which challenge our serious attention: a Collective Security Pact, and a Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention. Under the terms of the Collective Security Pact the various delegates agreed that their governments should consult together whenever the peace of the American republics was menaced—when war or a state of war existed between American nations; and when an international war which might menace the peace of the New World was being waged outside of America. The purpose of the pact was to determine the manner in which the signatory states might "cooperate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the American Continent." It was decided it should be left to the foreign ministries of these states to determine when consultation should take place. In the opinion of some observers the United States, by signing this pact, actually agreed to the transformation of the unilateral Monroe Doctrine into a Continental doctrine. In essence the Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention provided that intervention by one American nation in the domestic or foreign affairs of another nation of the New World should be deemed a menace sufficient to set the machinery for consultation in operation. Obviously this was directed against such intervention as had taken place under the Roosevelt Corollary.

Among other things the non-intervention agreement prohibited the use of force in the collection of fiscal claims from an American government—a doctrine formulated many years earlier by the South-American jurist Calvo. This agreement

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seems not unconnected with the tendency, recently displayed in certain Latin-American countries, to expropriate on one pretext or another the landed properties of foreign investors without whose capital their natural resources could scarcely have been developed. So long as she remains a party to the non-intervention pact the United States cannot threaten to intervene by force to secure indemnities for those of her citizens or corporations whose agricultural or oil or mining lands have been expropriated. Logically enough, therefore, a journal published in Texas pertinently inquired whether the good neighbor policy had not been carried altogether too far. Capitalists in the United States are alarmed by the prospect that other Latin-American governments may follow Mexico's example.

The international situation is still further complicated by the President's recent promise of protection to our northern neighbor. In the summer of 1938 Roosevelt publicly declared our government would not allow Canada to be dominated by an invader. Reiterated in the autumn of the following year, this pledge by our chief executive apparently places Canada in the unique category of a commonwealth whose territorial integrity is virtually shielded by the Doctrine of Monroe, even though the Commonwealth itself is at war with Germany.

When the war clouds hanging over Europe began to cast a shadow on the New World the representatives of twenty-one American states in solemn conclave at Lima reaffirmed their resolution to defend their sovereignty "against all foreign intervention or activities that may threaten them." In the Declaration of Lima they announced that in case "the peace, security, or territorial integrity" of any American republic should be so threatened, such a menace would become a matter of common concern. They arranged that, at the instance of any one of the American countries, the secretaries of state of all were to assemble to take joint action. The Lima Conference denounced the use of force as an instrument of national policy and reiterated the doctrine that intervention in the affairs of other states is inadmissible. Furthermore, in view of the sup-

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posed fascist threat to the integrity of the Latin republics of America, it issued a warning that the Nazi policy of extending protection to alien factions in a country would not be tolerated in the New World, that foreigners might not collectively exercise political rights conferred upon them by their native countries, and that the American nations would not recognize the acquisition of territory through force or non-pacific means. By the collective action of all the American republics the Doctrine originally directed against the extension of European power or influence in the New World was thus used not only to implement declarations against interference with the sovereign rights of an American nation but also to inhibit any move by European dictators to assert control over their own nationals living under an American flag.

Soon after the outbreak of the present World War, and at the instance of Panama, which had been a party to the Declaration of Lima, a special conference of the secretaries of state of twenty-one nations was held on the Isthmus of Panama. There a remarkable agreement was reached: that the American republics would jointly notify England, France and Germany that around the shores of the independent American republics they had delimited a zone some 300 miles wide within which belligerent activities would be considered dangerous to the peace of the New World. The declaration further provided that the countries lying between Canada and the Strait of Magellan might establish coast patrols to maintain neutrality in the "continental American seas" these countries sought to create. The delegates viewed their decision as a "complement to the Monroe Doctrine."

To certain European belligerents this collective attempt to prohibit the activities of their vessels of war in the high seas of the New World seems most unreasonable. More recently the absorption of Denmark by Germany has precipitated an issue concerning the application of this protean doctrine to Greenland. Indeed the Monroe Doctrine may, not inappropriately, be styled the will-o'-the-wisp of American history.

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In Search of Scientific Method

A Personal Narrative

HOWARD D. ROELOFS

I WAS brought up a Trinitarian. The members of the Trinity were God, my Father and Scientific Method. My responsibilities to each were definite. God I was to worship, my Father I was to obey and Scientific Method I was to use. In these, my chief duties, I was trained according to what I still regard as the right principle for young children: the precept in its simplest form was enunciated first, with ample intimation that coercion would make good whatever deficiency might be found in inclination. Understanding was expected to develop out of practice. The happy outcome of this, for me at least, was that my will accepted without question what it was futile to oppose; my curiosity had complete freedom.

I cannot now remember when first I began to wonder about the members of this Trinity but I do know that quite early I attained an understanding of two of them reasonably sufficient for my needs. To worship God was simple and to understand His nature not difficult. I went to Church regularly and received peppermints during the sermon. Such sermons as pleased me were like an unexpected bonus and the others did not seriously annoy. The prayers, both those I heard and those I had to learn, were beautiful. I loved to sing the hymns. Thus, I worshipped God. For understanding Him—remember this was not obligatory and was left entirely to my own curiosity—the Bible and occasional theological expositions from my Father and later from the minister were fascinating and intelligible. God was both powerful and good, an attractive combination to a lad going to a school with perhaps more than the average number of bullies. Of course God occasionally became angry with the children of Israel. But even then he would listen to reason.

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Obeying my Father was more difficult. It lacked the simple regularity of the worship of God. I early learned that when my Father spoke I was to jump. The problem was, where? I never really knew until after the event. Not that my guesses were always wrong. Silent acceptance of what I did, words of approval, thanks, pennies, thunderous reprimands, remarks to my Mother about "*your* son" and punishments ranging from rapped knuckles to rhythmic applications of the slipper—all these averaged out pretty well in the long run.

Understanding my Father was still more difficult. God was good, my Father was intelligent; and the latter I found more perplexing than the former. Now and then my Father without warning or solicitation would inquire about my studies and frequently if I were in difficulties he helped me. His answers were always right but how he obtained them I rarely could see. This was especially exasperating in mathematics. Whenever I had the courage to say I did not understand, Father replied with the single word, "Think," now and then varied by "Why *don't* you think?" I had no answer. I did not know.

On the whole, however, my responsibilities to my Father did not vex me very much. It was otherwise with the third member of the Trinity, Scientific Method. What Scientific Method was, of course, was no more explained to me, than what my Father and God were. About these last two, however, I learned from daily experience in normal fashion—not all, perhaps, that I wished to know, but enough. Occasionally my curiosity about Scientific Method was aroused but not with any persistence. Once when some of my playfellows and I were talking about God, for in those days children did talk about such things, I ventured a question about Scientific Method. No one had ever even heard of it. This startled me, and after thinking it over I decided Scientific Method must be a peculiar and private possession of our family. That made me proud but not for long. A girl asked me what I was going to do when I grew up. Wishing to make an impression I replied without hesitation, "Use Scientific Method." The girl blushed furiously and stalked off. That

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gave me a new idea. Perhaps Scientific Method was one of those things reserved for grown-ups, not to be mentioned by nice children. I had better leave it alone. And for a while I did.

Then I acquired a conscience, and Scientific Method became the bane of my life. I realized one day that I not only did not know what Scientific Method was but that to my knowledge I had never used it. That was serious. Not to know what it was did not greatly matter; in my creed there was no requirement that I should know. But I was to use it. Yet I had lived all my twelve or thirteen years worshipping God, obeying my Father, and doing countless thousands of other things without, so far as I knew, ever using Scientific Method. I went over all things I could do; the number astonished me. More astonishing was the realization that I could do all these without Scientific Method. Clearly there must be something else in whose doing I would use Scientific Method. My conscience gave me no rest.

I considered putting to my Father the direct question, "What is Scientific Method and how am I to use it?" But I knew too well what his reply would be. "Think," he would say, "Why don't you think?" Luckily my Father began himself to converse with me more frequently and often he would refer to Scientific Method. Inefficiency in government and stupidity in education were favorite themes. The remedy was to use Scientific Method. Also I heard about the miracles of science, the telephone, the electric light and so on. All these came from Scientific Method. This to me was terribly shocking. Miracles in religion I had long known about. They were wonderful; I often wished I had seen some of them; and they were also understandable. For God to have been unable to perform miracles would have been ridiculous. But these scientific miracles were different. They came not from God but from Scientific Method, and what that was I did not know.

At last my chance came. Father was talking as usual about progress and Scientific Method. He told me about Mr. Edison and the electric light. I mustered up all my courage and asked, "Father, how did Mr. Edison invent the electric light? Did

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he just think?" "Just think?" replied my Father with some scorn, "Of course not, he used—." There Father was interrupted by a visitor or something. But I had heard enough and was fired with a new hope. I knew what Father was about to say. Edison used Scientific Method. That was easy. But the great point to me, as I understood it, was that thinking and Scientific Method were different. I had long since abandoned any ambition I might have had to think myself. Now I resolved that my life's aim should be to use Scientific Method. Inability to think was no longer a barrier.

Fired with this resolve I entered High School. It is no small credit to the firmness of my youthful character that my enthusiasm and determination persisted through the postponement those four years brought. I had enough sense to guess there might be a connection between science and Scientific Method, and the sanguine inexperience of youth made me confident that if I studied the former I should also learn the latter. But my Father, whom I still obeyed, ordered my studies otherwise. Latin, English, mathematics, German and a little history filled my program. I was to go to college. Science, philosophy and other mysteries I should study there.

I entered college and heaven seemed to open. At once, in my first year, a course in science was required—not this particular science or that, but any science. The college did not concern itself with whether a student learned chemistry or botany; it did undertake to teach every student Scientific Method and the study of any laboratory science would do that. Eager and grateful I made my choice and entered, as I thought, the fulfillment of my dreams. Happy freshman! Innocent freshman! I omit the details of my college years. My persistence, however, deserves mention. I chose not merely one science the first year but another the next, then another and still another. Even as a graduate student I continued steadfast in my quest. Yet this persistence failed of its end—I did not learn what was Scientific Method. Did I not learn about measuring and counting, about observation, experiment and verification? Of course.

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The familiar elements just mentioned, from measuring to verification, were early offered me as constituting Scientific Method. I never questioned their importance or truth. The importance of measurement, for example, had early been impressed upon me by my Father. I was helping him with some plumbing and had cut a length of pipe on a guess. The pipe was too short. "Measure before you cut," said my Father. "Think, and if you can't think, use common sense."

Observe that he said "common sense" and not "Scientific Method." Still, common sense, like Scientific Method on another occasion, was differentiated from thinking and for some time I was plagued with the suspicion that after all Scientific Method was just common sense. But reflection and experience soon provided sound reasons for rejecting the method based on counting etc. as being either the genuine Scientific Method or identical with common sense. I did not know what the real Scientific Method was but I did know what it could do. It worked miracles. These, I readily proved to my own satisfaction, were beyond the power of counting and measuring. I tried them both. I counted marbles, the cracks in the sidewalk, the trees on the campus. I measured the length, breadth and height of my room and various other things. Discoveries of a sort I made, but I worked no miracles. I tried offering my discoveries to my science instructor. "Mr. Brown," I said, "by Scientific Method I have discovered there are 329 cracks in the sidewalk between Chapel and this laboratory." "Tell it to the Building and Grounds Department" was his reply. I then considered attempting observation and experiment but, distrusting my own powers, I hit upon the sounder device of considering discoveries already made.

I began with bread. Bread is made by mixing flour, milk or water, shortening, salt and yeast and subjecting the whole to a complex process of kneading, letting stand and baking. You are so familiar with bread you have probably never regarded its discovery as a miracle. Imagine, however, as I did, a world without bread, but filled not only with flour, milk etc. but with

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the thousands of other things whose mixing will not make bread, and the tens of thousands of processes which even less will transform mixtures of any sort into bread. Was I to believe that a process of just measuring and counting, of observing and experimenting, discovered that flour, milk etc. and nothing else were the ingredients of bread; and that kneading, letting rise and baking, and nothing else, produced bread?

Then of a sudden I remembered my logic. I took as a major premise: Scientific Method works miracles. To this I added the minor premise: counting etc. does not work miracles. Thus I obtained the conclusion: counting etc. is not Scientific Method.

I presented this syllogism to a friend of mine, a devotee of Scientific Method, and he laughed it to scorn. It was only a syllogism and syllogisms had been out of date since the discovery of Scientific Method. Further, I was wrong in my data. I had overlooked the crucial role of hypothesis. Had I not heard of that triumph of Scientific Method, the discovery of the planet Neptune? I admitted my ignorance and set out to correct it. I learned more than was expected. I learned also about the discovery of Vulcan. The same hypothesis and method which determined the size, orbit and position of an undiscovered planet to account for the perturbations of Uranus determined the size, orbit and position of Vulcan, to account for the perturbations of Mercury. But Vulcan isn't where the method says it is. In fact the received opinion today is that there is no such planet.

So strange a dénouement puzzled me greatly and my bewilderment was increased by certain professors of science. These able, intelligent men told me not to let devotion to Scientific Method make me lose my common sense and they warned me against scientific bigotry. According to one of them it was worse then Scholasticism. Eventually, I discovered what they had referred to and I learned also the difference between common sense and what was offered me as Scientific Method. To weigh what can be weighed, to count the countable and measure the measurable is common sense. But I discovered to my astonishment that some men, in the name of what they said was Scien-

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tific Method, held that what they could not measure did not exist; and that others, balked at measuring something whose reality they were not yet ready to deny, measured a cause, a product or a process and then asserted that what they had measured was the genuine reality. I had read that Heraclitus, an intelligent though ancient Greek, had said he had considered his soul and could not determine its limits. I was now told that this failure in measuring proved there was no soul. Thought however, was real. According to the behaviorists it was the measurable movements of the muscles used in subvocal speech. Other things suffered diverse fates. Colors, for example, were neither real nor unreal—they were subjective. There was ether in the sky, there were waves in the ether and there was color in me. By the same criterion, of course, there wasn't any "me" for the colors to be in. The ether too, I later learned, did not exist. But the waves were real for they had been measured. All this and much more I was told. Some people believed it. Not I. Common sense was not in me so easily put down. I despaired.

In the end it was a logician who came to my aid. He told me a fable. "Imagine," said he, " a man living in a city surrounded by an extensive countryside. City and country are familiar and well known. There are also other cities and villages to which one can go by direct, well-charted roads. This man is a student of geography and one day he finds himself possessed with the idea that there exists a city no one has ever seen, one not on any map. He determines to discover it. He restudies the best maps and the best guidebooks, for by these he can determine where he need not go. Then he starts out." Here I interposed a question, "In what direction does he go?" "In a direction other than that taken by any road." "But how choose out of the infinite?" "You forget," said the logician, "this man has ideas. One of them is to go in a certain direction and he goes. As he proceeds he keeps careful record of his direction, the distance covered, the things seen. Often he finds he is in a city which his guidebook tells him is already known; occasionally he finds he has returned to his original starting point. All this he care-

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fully enters on his map. Frequently he studies his results, learning more and more what not to do and producing new ideas of what to attempt. At length he enters a new and wonderful city. He has made his discovery. Observe the benefits of his careful measurements and records. From these he can determine where the city is, now that he has found it. More, he can work out a new route back to his starting point, shorter, more direct than the devious wanderings of his search. On his return to his native city he prepares a map showing both his many wanderings and his final, direct route. Unfortunately the publication of this map is managed by a publicity department and when the map is issued all the wanderings are suppressed. Only the single, direct route is shown. There is also much advertising of this new triumph of Scientific Method. And all the people when they see the map with its single, direct line shout and make a great noise, crying, 'A Miracle! A Miracle!' This gratifies the publicity department but the people are deceived, not knowing what Scientific Method really is."

"But what really is?" said I, not grasping the fable's point.

"How dull you are," said the logician. "The whole procedure, barring, of course, the work of the publicity department, is Scientific Method. You have been looking for a single, neat Method with a capital M, a thing which out of nothing and in the hands of anyone will work miracles. There is no such thing. Recall the fable. The hero lived in a country already well known. This knowledge came from many sources, not one, let alone from one method. Chance, inspiration, revelation, genius and above all what we can only call the general intelligence and experience of the race—all these contributed. Without the great fund of existing knowledge Scientific Method would be impotent. Scientific Method is a wonderful instrument for the increase of knowledge—not the original source of all knowledge. To think the latter confuses it with intelligence, the servant with the master. You will also remember that the hero of the fable had ideas. They were not the ideas anyone might have. They came to him because he possessed information,

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intelligence and imagination. These three are the source of what are commonly called hypotheses. Without information the imagination is sterile or it produces irrelevant fancies; without imagination a man is a slave to what is already known; without intelligence he cannot discipline his imagination or judge what is significant and what is not. Each of these three is needed. That is why genuine Scientific Method cannot be taught. Information can be taught; imagination and intelligence can only be cultivated. Hence when it is assumed that Scientific Method can be taught to anyone and everyone by a year's course in a laboratory science, all too often only measuring and counting are learned. These can be taught. It is useful that men know their importance and the wide range of their application. But when they are regarded as constituting Scientific Method, one or both of two delusions are frequently produced. The one is that what can't be measured is not real; the other, that what can be measured is *ipso facto* important. Both, I repeat, are delusions. Further, devotion to verification, without which scientific integrity is lost, is a function of moral character. It springs from love of truth for its own sake and not from knowing how to count. In fact, although accurate measurement is an essential tool in the verification of any hypothesis about what is quantitative, there is much that is not quantitative yet verifiable. The moral law is constantly being verified, as our consciences, not our yardsticks, can testify."

"Do you mean to say that there is no substitute for intelligence?" "Precisely." "No substitute for imagination?" "No." "And no method which will work independently of moral character?" "If by working you include the production of folly, yes; otherwise, no."

"What then of my Father?" The logician surveyed me with a smile. "As I recall your story, your Father brought you up a Trinitarian. Along with using Scientific Method there was mention of obedience and the worship of God. Are you now to succumb to the Arian heresy? 'Think,' as your Father said, and 'if you can't think, use common sense.' "

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Farmers and Miners and Group-Health Plans

T. SWANN HARDING

WHENEVER attention is directed to inadequacies in the provision of medical service for people in the United States so-called "organized medicine" invariably makes a stereotyped reply. (The term "organized medicine" refers not to the rank and file of doctors but rather to those who direct the American Medical Association and its branches.) This unvarying reply is given both in the columns of the medical journals representing the association and its branches, and also whenever this group of doctors is called upon to give public expression to its views—as for instance in the Senate hearings on the Wagner Health Bill in 1939. The replies to adverse criticism can be summarized as follows:

America has already developed incomparably the best system of medical service in the world. It is possible for anyone, whether in funds or not, to secure adequate medical care quickly. We do not need additional hospitals or public diagnostic clinics or treatment centers. Any interference with the manner in which organized medicine wishes medical service to be rendered jeopardizes medical research and education, the place of the physician in our society and the public health. Since we already have the best medical system why tamper with it?

This attitude deserves analysis. According to a recent report from the Rockefeller Foundation ("Review for 1938") medical research in this country is laggard, ill-organized, haphazard and under-financed. The recent book, *Medicine at the Crossroads*, by Dr. Bertram M. Bernheim, a Johns Hopkins surgeon, furnishes proof that both American surgery and American hospitals are, as a whole, poorly regulated and standardized. The

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New England Journal of Medicine has also stigmatized editorially what it calls the surgical "racket" and has indicated how some unscrupulous doctors and hospitals team up to mulct and even kill patients. But for the moment ignoring these broad general charges, which can be well sustained, let us look into two specific evidences of inadequate medical service covering broad fields. The first concerns miners; the second farmers.

On March 1, 1939 the Bureau of Cooperative Medicine submitted to Walter N. Polakov, Director of Engineering Research for the United Mine Workers of America, a report, "Medical Care in Selected Areas of the Appalachian Bituminous Coal Fields." Conditions were labeled as deplorable in 157 mining camps in West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia and dissatisfaction was expressed with the medical setup.

In the region surveyed there were 122,000 union members who paid from $1.30 to $1.80 each per month, deductible from their paychecks, to cover the service of 1,000 doctors and 40 hospitals. Obviously at this rate of payment a camp of 200 to 300 could readily support a good doctor the year around. But the doctors connived with the operators in taking a rake-off from the payments and in giving inferior and grudging medical service. No accounting was made of the checkoff money. Some doctors who lived at the expense of the region did not reside there but took a contract and then farmed their work out cheaply and pocketed the difference. One such doctor received $2,400 a month and paid $1,200 to have his work done by others; another received $1,500 and paid out $500 a month. And these physicians were part of "organized medicine." In other instances the operating companies received the money, hired the doctors and nurses, bought the drugs and appropriated the difference—and made that difference as great as possible. One company made $1,300 per month profit from a $4,000 checkoff. A "profit" of one half to one fourth was usual. In such cases the company controlled the doctor. Consequently its threats to fire him intimidated him, made him furnish fictitious medical-examination findings to justify the discharge of em-

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ployees not desired, and led him to deny medical services and nurses to other miners who needed them. Moreover, whereas the United States as a whole has one doctor per 815 inhabitants, the ratio in one of the mining towns was 4 to 15,000 and in another 2 to 5,000. The doctor had rare vacations, no chance to improve himself, few opportunities to increase his income; he had always to use the cheapest medicine; and he rarely tried to coordinate his work with that of other physicians. Incompetence and neglect were the rule.

While organized medicine continually harps on the danger of having a middleman between physician and patient, in the area covered by the survey the very situation so lamented was to be found in its most monstrous form—for the patient's money really paid the doctor's salary but the company controlled the doctor. And there was no reported investigation, no protest.

In addition to the regular monthly payment many extra charges were exacted from miners—for maternity cases, for venereal-disease treatments, for serums and for special medicines which cost at the least an additional $10 a year. One hundred miners paid nearly $3,000 a year (a total for the region of around $3,500,000) for inadequate medical treatment, with nothing for preventive medicine or for attempts at even a rudimentary medical education of the layman. For hospitalization privileges the men paid an additional $1.25 per month.

The companies took this fee also as a checkoff, gave the hospitals what they pleased, and if the hospital supervision became inquisitive the hospital was removed from the list of institutions to which patients were sent. Whereas there should be 4.5 hospital beds per 1,000 of the population there were only 2.5 beds in this region and rates were exorbitant. Each hospital contracted to care for a population group much larger than it could efficiently handle—one hospital of 75 beds, for example, agreed to care for from 50,000 to 60,000 people. Hospitals used bribes on various coal company officials, cut costs, sent out salesmen to procure lists of patients from the companies, discharged patients before they were well in order to accommo-

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date others who were even sicker, and in many cases endangered the life and health of their patients. Extra charges brought total hospital costs up to about $2,000 a year per 100 miners—twice the necessary cost. Thus the miners paid a total of about $2,500,000 for shamefully inadequate hospitalization—and organized medicine made no protest.

The companies even arranged matters so that the miners indirectly paid much of the expense for injuries that should, under law, have been paid for under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Physicians were reluctant to send bills collectable under this act, for if they did so too often they were fired. If at all possible they judged the injury noncompensable and in that case the miner had to pay for his own care; furthermore, he had little or no choice of either doctor or hospital—and this again without protest from organized medicine. If the miner refused the treatment offered he became ineligible for compensation. Men were sometimes deliberately permitted to die because death benefits cost only $4,000 whereas compensation in total disability might run to $6,000.

Here is a picture of waste, inadequacy, incompetence, graft and medical neglect. Not once did the duly accredited representatives of organized medicine protest in the face of these gross abuses. Yet the men could, for the same money they were paying, have set up their own group medical units to give them and their families complete medical and hospital service the year round, including preventive medicine, public health work, hospital and home treatment (without the extra charges to which they have been subjected) and rudimentary education in hygiene and in medical matters impinging on the layman. This would have been an effective use of funds diverted to nonmedical uses. Obviously organized medicine should have undertaken a basic reorganization of the medical care available to this entire region. The A.M.A. has often opposed contract practice. In fact, one of its soundest arguments against prepayment and insurance plans for medical services is based on its fear that business interests of one kind or another will insist on

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making a substantial profit, at the expense of both physician and patient. Yet the A.M.A. did nothing.

We turn now to agricultural America, another medically neglected portion of our people. Something has been done for it—but not by organized medicine.

In rural districts throughout the United States, doctors and hospitals are poorly distributed and, partly for reasons beyond the individual physician's control, medical attention is shockingly expensive. This is no new thing. As long ago as 1929 the *Farmer's Wife* reported that adequate medical care took too much time and money, the doctor took too long to arrive where he was needed and charged $1 per mile for doing so; the cost of getting the nearest doctor averaged $7.63 per visit in 860 farm homes and varied from $1 to $75. The average annual cost per farm family for medical and hospital care was then $104.94, and one eighth of the families paid $15 per visit from the nearest doctor. Ten years later Harold Maslow was discussing the problem of rural medical care in *Rural America* (February 1939). In the poorer regions farmers could not obtain necessary medical care if on relief. But the medically-indigent farmer not on relief simply could not pay his doctor's bills. Some form of governmental subsidy was urgently needed to provide more hospitals, laboratories, clinical centers and public health nurses on a free or part-free basis. This would raise standards of medical care and, if combined with some form of health insurance, would also give doctors economic security.

The Wagner Health Bill was framed to remedy this situation. Yet the officers of the American Medical Association who appeared before the Senate hearings on the bill declared that no further provision of medical care was needed, that our population receives all the medical service it needs and that any such law would institute Federal dictatorship over the states. The Chairman of the Board of Trustees actually read a long statement denouncing the Wagner Bill provision by provision —and confessed afterward that he had not troubled to read it!

In *Farmers' Bulletin* 1792, issued by the Department of

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Agriculture in November 1937, we find additional information regarding "Hospitals for Rural Communities." About 5,000,000 farm families pay from 15 to 20 per cent of their incomes for medical care and about one in 20 of them needs hospital care in any given year. Yet in many states 70 to 85 per cent of the people live in the country, where, on the average, there is but one doctor per 1,000 or 1,500 people as compared with one doctor for every 400 to 600 in large cities. Doctors naturally tend to congregate in cities where they can find the medical equipment essential to good medical practice.

Less than two thirds of our counties have any general hospital. About one half of all hospital patients are completely nonpaying or have their way paid by the government. From one quarter to one half of all borrowers from private and governmental lending agencies asked for their loans because of medical bills. Meanwhile the occupancy of hospital beds is constantly increasing, for the modern trend in scientific medical practice is to advise hospitalization for many ailments formerly treated in the home. What has organized medicine done about these conditions? Nothing but protest that conditions are satisfactory as they are. In the *Farmers' Bulletin* just mentioned it was declared that more rural medical and clinical centers, more nurses and doctors and better ambulance service are urgently needed. Good rural hospitals would attract physicians to rural communities and enable country doctors to see more patients more easily and to do better work; and the hospitals' laboratory facilities would promote quicker diagnosis and better treatment. But this is a government agency's plea—not an effort of organized medicine to better conditions.

On June 8, 1939 W. W. Alexander, head of the Farm Security Administration (a unit largely concerned with making "character" loans to farmers who lack collateral and repay loans on a long-term instalment plan) reported upon a health study of 100 Southeastern farm families from the lowest-income strata. These 557 men, women and children were found suffering from 1,373 ailments which included 132 cases of

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rickets in children and many other diseases, like pellagra and tuberculosis, directly attributable to malnutrition. The "shiftlessness" of these people very often proved to be due to disease. Cured, they worked steadily, paid off their loans promptly.

At the time the report was made, low-income farm families to the number of 700,000 were being aided by what were essentially "character" loans averaging $300 each. But because of ill health half the families failed to meet their obligations. It should be added that in 1936 more than 1,690,000 farm families had annual gross incomes of $500 or less—that is, millions of our citizens sought to live on $1 a week. The suggestion that these people could pay their medical bills is obviously absurd. Something had to be done, and since organized medicine neglected to do it the federal government stepped in.

In 1937 the *Utah Farmer* (for January 10) announced that the old Resettlement Administration, predecessor of the Farm Security Administration, had tried a novel experiment in San Gabriel, southern California. It had approved a loan that would provide doctors and hospital facilities for a group of 25 farm families. This association of families was to sign a contract with the Ross-Loos Medical Group of Los Angeles. Under the terms of this contract the farmers would be provided medical services at a cost of $2 per farmer per month, and members of their families were entitled to receive services at reduced cost. Despite repeated efforts of the American Medical Association to put it out of business this well-known clinic, which now maintains 10 conveniently-located substations of the central clinic and a staff of full-time physicians and surgeons, is responsible for the entire health needs of over 60,000 people. Members pay $2.50 per month. Their dependents are treated at reduced rates while they themselves receive all the hospital and medical and surgical service they need at no extra cost. The group flourishes; the doctors are well paid, have economic security and periods of leisure; the members are satisfied.

On October 14, 1938 the Farm Security Administration announced that it was operating health plans in 16 states, was

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helping 58,000 low-income farm families and that it would be helping 80,000 by the following November 1. It had found that families in good health were better credit risks than those with uncertain health, and to cover medical treatment for one year it regularly added $16 to the loans it made. Preventive medicine was encouraged and since the local doctors found they no longer needed to give free service they quite generally approved. For years the local associations of doctors had alternately deplored and gloried in the fact that doctors were forced to give so much free service. But they had never thought of the plan successfully initiated by the government, whereby low-income groups were enabled to pay for medical care themselves.

The *Utah Farmer* for January 10, 1939 told the story of the San Juan County Medical Association, a cooperative in a county of 8,000 square miles and 3,400 inhabitants. In May 1938 the cooperative was organized because the county residents could not finance individual medical care and there was not a doctor in the entire county. But 100 families promised to pay $25 a year to a general fund, and a doctor who would hire an assistant and give medical service to every member of these families for that sum was found. For an additional $10 a year the nearby Grand County Hospital offered to provide full hospital care for the contracting members. Very soon 211 families, some of whom borrowed their fees from the Farm Security Administration, had joined the cooperative.

The idea spread. The *Consumers' Guide* for June 1939 (issued by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration) tells how. The medical director of the Farm Security Administration investigated individual communities, sought the cooperation of local doctors and medical societies, got an incomplete group health plan into operation and proved to the local doctors that they were now being paid for services they had formerly dispensed gratis. Farm families paid from $1.50 to $2.50 per month for complete service: regular examinations, obstetrical care, child clinics and so on. Although in putting its health plans into operation the government's primary concern

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was for the health of our farm populace, the doctors have benefited thereby, for they have gained some economic security. All doctors who cared to participate in the program were listed and the farmers were given as much freedom of choice of physicians as possible. Local, county and state medical societies supervised, passed on the fees to be charged and out of the pooled funds allotted the amounts to be paid to the participating doctors. Some 130,000 farm families in 23 states now receive some medical care through such an organization. The program will be extended to 700,000 low-income and destitute families.

If there is enough money in the pool, all doctors are paid for all services monthly; if there is a surplus it is carried over; if there is a deficit the doctors reduce their charges proportionately. Their own committee arranges all such adjustments. No single group-health scheme is imposed on all localities. The particular plan adopted by a local community is fashioned to fit its peculiar needs. State-wide programs in the Dakotas cover 45,000 farm families; in California and Arizona a health association has been formed to take care of migratory families. In 1938 the Coffee County Health Association of Alabama paid 74 per cent of all doctors' bills presented under its plan—for services to families who had usually paid nothing for a doctor's care. The doctors in the County received over $10,000 in one year. Naturally they approved. At Tygert Valley Homesteads in West Virginia over 120 farm families voluntarily paid $2.25 per month for the maintenance of their clinic and for the hospital and medical care rendered by their health association.

It cannot be too much emphasized that the idea of providing medical care to farm families through some form of voluntary group insurance was evolved and worked out by a government lending agency seeking to protect its loans—and that doctors as well as farmers profit from this government activity.

Gradually the local and state medical societies are throwing their support behind the various types of group-health cooperatives which the government has been so largely instrumental in organizing.

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An editorial in the *New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal* for November 1938 asked members of the Louisiana Medical Society to study the medical care program of the Farm Security Administration, an analysis of which it published as a supplement in that issue. The editorial called the program a very wise method of enabling the indigent to meet their medical bills while at the same time providing them with full medical care. It praised the understanding arrived at between the physicians and the government agency. It said this government program had been responsible for the distribution of about $200,000 a year to physicians for services rendered to a group of people from whom the doctor had undoubtedly never before received compensation. It continued: "The arrangement as far as can be judged is not bound by red tape and, what is extremely important, is to be conducted in conjunction with committees from the several parish medical societies." In other words the doctors ran the scheme, free choice of physician was provided, the patients were served.

The *Pacific Rural Press* for November 26, 1938 noted editorially that the California Medical Association proposed to set up a service to provide citizens with medical and surgical service at a flat monthly rate and that 90 per cent of the leading doctors in the State were participating. They would be reimbursed from the State insurance fund—the very form of health insurance which the American Medical Association has fought bitterly as rendered possible under the Wagner Bill. Farmers had waged a campaign for medical insurance and the new service was planned to meet their request. In 1934 the California State Medical Society expelled Drs. Donald E. Ross and H. Clifford Loos for unethical practice in starting their monthly-payment medical plan. In 1939 the California Physicians Service, backed by the same Medical Society was extending low-cost medical care to 19,000 members of the California State Employees Association paid $3,000 a year or less.

The Farm Security Administration never for a moment assumes it has solved the problem of rural medical care. It says

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it is experimenting with various plans which must meet with the approval of the local physicians before they go into effect. The plans are elastic. And the experimentation in applied social science is itself of untold value. It demonstrates, for one thing, that professional men and laymen can cooperate voluntarily for their mutual good. Unfortunately, by assuming a reactionary and obstructive attitude, the American Medical Association, the central association of the professional men involved, renders such cooperation more difficult.

Today about 90 per cent of the volume of agricultural products sent to market comes from one half of the farms. This means that 50 per cent of our farmers share only 10 per cent of our gross agricultural income. The number of farm workers, furthermore, is increasing most rapidly in our poorest counties. In "prosperous" 1929 some 1,500,000 farm-tenant families lived in houses valued at $475 or less, and in the South half of all the farm owners had homes worth $560 or less. Today these indigent farmers are being rehabilitated by loans which include a provision for medical care. These loans they are repaying—they have already repaid 135 per cent more on them than they were required to have paid by this time. Ultimately more than 80 per cent of these loans will be repaid. At the end of the last crop year 232,947 typical farm families aided by the Farm Security Administration program had increased their net worth (over and above all their outstanding debts, including those to the government) by an average of $265. It used to cost $200 per capita per year to keep them on relief. They have tripled their production of food for home consumption.

The Farm Security Administration's health program is an active demonstration of one way in which medical science can be put profitably to work. There are others. But unless organized medicine becomes socially wiser they must be operated by government agencies, and by those among the medical profession who are ready to go farther than we have in the past toward making adequate medical care available to our entire population.

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When Democracy Was Young

GEORGE P. SCHMIDT

IF IT is good for nothing else the European war has served to intensify the current crusade for a revival of faith in American democracy. The leaders of this movement, a distinguished company of preachers and playwrights, columnists and commentators, are mobilizing the forces of democratic patriotism for a firm if belated stand against totalitarian thinking and behavior. The American way of life is being rediscovered; the Fourth-of-July oration is regaining favor; even Frank Merriwell is taking a hand. The peerless juvenile, it is reported, will resume his spectacular career and throw the weight of his influence against the "isms." All in all such a concerted effort to exalt the nation has not been attempted since the founding days, when democracy was young.

At that time too there was voluble discussion, but with a difference. Today the sponsors of democracy are trying to vindicate an institution which has developed serious weaknesses in a century and a half of experience and which may conceivably be outmoded. One hundred and fifty years ago these sponsors were revealing an apocalyptic vision, the ultimate product of man's intelligence and the final answer to the riddle of the universe. Arising auspiciously in a new world free from hampering traditions and supported by reason and virtue, there was nothing democracy might not accomplish. Partisan spoils and unemployment and mob intolerance—none of these hobgoblins had yet distorted democracy's young dream; instead decadent and tyrant-ridden Europe stood in horrible contrast to the glorious destiny of young America.

So it seemed to the reading public in Washington's day; at any rate that is the impression one carries away from a study of the periodical literature of the first decade or two following the

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Revolution. Stimulated by the winning of independence and carried along on a wave of republican idealism, a small but significant group of "quality magazines" undertook to give the American dream its literary expression. Most of them were short-lived, for the tardiness of the subscribers in paying their bills and the dearth of contributors combined with the whims of the postal authorities to make for an uncertain existence. Though the contents were often stuffy enough, what with reprints and fillers and stock material shamelessly copied, there was nevertheless much solid matter of a political and social nature. In an age of journalistic violence the better magazines managed to rise above the scurrility of rough-and-tumble factionalism, for the editors generally refused to print "the ordinary effusions of party-politics"; their more thoughtful and dignified pages reflected the considered opinions of many of the leaders of American thought. From their pens emerges a composite picture of the America of their dreams.

The American experiment—on this point editors and contributors were agreed—could hardly have been undertaken in more favorable circumstances. The mere size of the country, its vast reaches and limitless resources, continued to impress them as they did so many European observers. In such a setting pettifogging parochialisms were in poor taste and it seemed more natural to think in terms of an "American empire." So chaplain Timothy Dwight conceived of it in a commencement address at Yale which Noah Webster later reprinted in the first issue of his *American Magazine*:

> That part of this vast continent, called North America, extends from the 8th degree of north latitude to the Pole; and, according to the latest discoveries, from the 50th degree of west longitude, almost to the eastern shore of Asia. . . . It is as healthy, serene, and delightful, as any country of the same magnitude of the earth. . . . All that the wish of an epicure, the pride of a beauty, or the curious mind of a naturalist can ask . . . is showered in profusion on this, the favorite land of heaven.

A similar address made at the College of Philadelphia and pub-

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lished in the *Columbian Magazine* called up the same picture of America, the exhaustless granary of the world, with its pure atmosphere and moderate seasons, pitted against the stale Eastern hemisphere. Here were the Delaware and the Schuylkill, soon to rival the Thames and Tiber in fame as they already did in volume. As might be expected, the controversial issue of climate was always settled in favor of the new country, although not always with the learned finality of the writer in the *Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* who ascribed its vigor to the greater quantities of dephlogisticated air hovering over this virgin continent.

Even doggerel verse served the cause. In a rhymed narrative of a fictitious literary dinner in Edinburgh at which English and Scottish intellectuals belittled all American achievement, the lone American guest finally burst out in exasperation:

> Why Sir, we in America have *Pools*
> In which we might douse Britain's Island whole,
> And though your ablest navigating Squires
> With steady diligence, and patience meek
> Might seek the wandering realm of their desires,
> They would not find it in a week!

That stopped them. With the same high purpose Elkanah Watson, Boston merchant, philanthropist and traveler, declared:

> What are called mountains, in Europe, are hills in America; rivers are reduced to brooks; trees, to bushes; and lakes, to ponds. . . . What may not be expected from such a people!

Others agreed with Watson on the unlimited possibilities in this direction and made fearless predictions. In a survey of national achievement in the *American Register* Charles Brockden Brown predicted a population of 300,000,000 by 1900.

But the patriotic literature went beyond idle boasting to offer positive programs of action and behavior. In endlessly varied phrase it restated the political philosophies of the age. Ringing the changes on the great themes suggested by the Declaration and the Constitution, the writers thoroughly familiarized their

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readers (if that were necessary) with the concepts of personal rights, popular government and national union—the stock-in-trade of patriotic addresses and political harangues from that day to this. The Independence Day address came into its own. Hardly had the Continental troops disbanded when the army of Fourth-of-July orators mobilized to sing of men and deeds and to preserve for future generations the memory of the drama of the Revolution with its impressive object lesson. So thoroughly was this theme exploited that it soon became hackneyed. As early as 1791 the editor of the *Universal Asylum* felt it necessary to apologize for including several patriotic addresses in a current issue. There had been so many of them, he complained, that it was becoming "a difficult task to infuse any tolerable share of novelty into compositions of this kind. We generally find a sameness in all."

But they went on saying it and the editors went on printing it. Not only local celebrities but national figures such as Franklin, Adams, Noah Webster, Benjamin Rush, Tench Coxe and others found the magazine a convenient vehicle for their views. Exhortations to civic duty, warnings against indifference in the defense of liberty and cautions to keep clear of European defilement appeared with monotonous repetition. With such sentiments everywhere common coin it was natural enough for editors to print approving notices of patriotic organizations like the "Democratick Society" of Philadelphia, whose avowed design it was "to fan the rising flame of Liberty in Europe, and to preserve the sacred fire from extinction in America." Had this society and others like it been successful, European governments might well have complained of the importation of foreign "isms" to their shores.

Political essays abounded, perhaps because editors found it easier to stimulate this type of writing than any other. Varying in quality, they formed part of that voluminous and often able body of political literature of which the *Federalist* papers are the best-known example. Seldom sharply controversial, and rarely descending to scurrilous denunciation, these political

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essays preached a mildly conservative, Federalist doctrine. This was natural enough, for the articulate part of the American public which might be expected to contribute and subscribe to periodical literature was drawn from the business and professional classes and in general represented the vested interests. Such a clientele would agree with Noah Webster, writing in the *New York Magazine*, that elected representatives should remain uninstructed and free to follow their own judgments and that the executive and judicial branches ought to be far removed from direct popular control. They would approve the views of the writer in the *Columbian Phenix* who recognized three parties in the country: the constitutionalists, who were the real Americans, the monarchists or old tories, and the democrats, who favored France.

While an air of pleasant instruction predominated, the belligerent editor who dipped his pen in vitriol was not entirely unknown. The fiery Joseph Dennie of the Philadelphia *Port Folio* was a journalistic bull in a china shop. Defiantly anti-democratic, he bellowed his political theme song in the prospectus (1801) of the first issue:

> He will not strive to please the populace . . . by infusing into every ill-balanced and weak mind . . . the reveries of liberty, equality, and the rights of man. . . . He will not calumniate Talents and Authority. . . . He will not repeat to "hewers of wood and drawers of water" the Fairy-tales of France, that *all* men are kings and emperors, and nobles, and judges, and statesmen.

Equally violent, and equally exceptional, was the *National Magazine* of Richmond on the other side of the political fence. Its editor, James Lyon, denounced Adams and the aristocrats generally as swindlers and traitors who had killed the freedom of the press in New England, and he called on the middle and southern states to make a last stand in its defense. But Lyon, like Dennie, was an extremist.

Property and its importance to a free people was a favorite theme. As its opening number the *American Museum* presented Franklin's "Consolation for America," in which the aging phil-

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osopher, half visionary and half salesman, painted the picture, so often retouched since, of America the land of plenty, with its rising land values, its respect for honest labor and its opportunities for the hustler. The "happy mediocrity" of life in the new world made it in Franklin's eyes far more desirable than England, France or Spain with their extremes of luxury and misery and their "wasteful and plundering" governments. Of similar import were the substantial papers of the competent economist, Tench Coxe. Although he agreed with Franklin on the primary position of agriculture, Coxe was at pains to stress the interdependence of farmer, business man and manufacturer; in his writings the home market argument took form a generation before Henry Clay. A moderate duty, he felt, ought to satisfy the manufacturers, for:

> they are a judicious body of men, and love their country. . . . When they see a substantial advantage . . . in favor of their goods . . . they will desire that the government should refrain from further duties and prohibitions.

It will be apparent by this time that most of the writers were concerned not so much with things as they were but as they ought to be. The didactic note has always been strong in our literature and the magazines of the early Republic were no exception. If anything the emphasis then was stronger, for the Puritan sense of duty was merging with the new desire to justify the republican way of life. America was "on the spot" and must prove to the world that civilization could reach hitherto unattained heights in the beneficent atmosphere of personal liberty and popular institutions. The new nation was pathetically eager to make good before the world and to offer proof that American standards of living, American science, education, literature and morals were really superior, as of course they were bound to be, to those of decadent Europe. In this effort the magazines were the torchbearers; scarcely an issue that did not spread the light and point the way. Their missionary zeal resembled nothing so much as that of Russia of the past two decades. The same moral purpose was evident, the same dedication to a cause, the same

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lofty contempt for older forms. There were even comprehensive plans; not grandiose five-year plans to be sure, government-inspired and controlled, but plans nevertheless, born of the enthusiastic acceptance of a new ideology and designed to bring forth a new heaven and a new earth.

To serve as worthy instruments in such a cause the magazines themselves had to be conducted on a plane of conscious rectitude. The editors felt this. Though ready to accept almost anything that might amuse or instruct they were determined to unite virtue with science—"Nothing incompatible with pure morality, nor adverse to the grand principles of religion" could expect to pass their censorship. Yet it was not an age of prudery; delicacy did not prevent the *American Museum*, for example, from printing Franklin's "Defense of Polly Baker," and most of the journals carried curious little melodramatic "fragments" —high-powered versions of the "boy-meets-girl" theme which always ended inconclusively in a string of asterisks. But while bowing to the fashion in such matters they were in dead earnest when discussing the disintegrating effects of strong drink, the need for a standard American spelling, the merits of republican institutions or the best method of preserving turnips.

Nature's ingenious way of linking virtue with prosperity never failed to rouse the warmest admiration of editors and contributors alike. The object lesson furnished by the great continent before them was too compelling for any doubts. In his commencement address Timothy Dwight[1] closed with a plea for high ethical standards in all the professions to which the young gentlemen of Yale would soon be aspiring and through which they would be influencing the national life, for, he insisted, the only true greatness of a nation was moral greatness. Above all, by general agreement, it was essential to preserve the old native virtues of thrift and simplicity. Once let European luxury gain admission to this happy land and European tyranny and decay would soon follow. The creator of *Poor Richard* had long since sung the praises of frugal living and a host of disciples took up

[1] Dwight's was not the first, and certainly not the last, admonition of this kind in a graduation speech; but in America in 1776 the advice sounded crisp and fresh.

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the refrain. It appeared to Tench Coxe that the extravagant importation of fine cloths, buttons, buckles, and pins was unsettling our moral as well as our economic life. If the people could be induced to confine themselves patriotically to articles of home manufacture "our dresses, furniture and carriages would be fashionable, because they were American." For the same reason "a regard for the republican manners of our country renders it a duty to warn the manufacturers of very fine, superfluous, and luxurious articles, not to emigrate to these states." With the same disciplinary end in view an editor noted approvingly the case of a farmer who grew richer and more contented so long as he held his expenditures for all purposes down to ten dollars a year, but fell into debt and poverty when his wife and daughter succumbed to the lures of silk, tea, vinegar and "ribands." Webster's *American Magazine* made simplicity of dress a test of patriotism as well as a conventional virtue. Enormous headdresses, yards of silk and conspicuous shoe-buckles were not only in poor taste but un-American. If worthy citizens consulted their own sound taste they would not run into such absurdities. "It is the authority of foreign manners which keeps us in subjection, and gives a kind of sanction to follies, which are pardonable in Europe, but inexcusable in America." Borrowing foreign manners was as silly as transplanting oranges to Canada. The protean concept of un-American behavior has had a long history.

If thrift was necessary to preserve the nation's wealth, science and invention must increase it. Any scientific demonstration or suggestion of a practical nature was certain of sympathetic consideration by editors and publishers. Perhaps the foremost effort in this field was that of the American Philosophical Society, whose *Transactions* bristle with descriptions of inventions, designs and projects of all kinds. Most of their papers dealt with practical problems but the intellectual energies of the membership refused to be bound by too limited a definition of the term philosophy, and instead took the whole range of human endeavor and cultural interests for its legitimate scope of investi-

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gation. By no means narrowly nationalistic, the Society prided itself upon its liberal cosmopolitan outlook; and yet the main spur to its energies was, after all, the new country with its infinite possibilities. Typical of this attitude was the essay read before the members by Dr. Nicholas Collin, rector of the Swedish churches in Pennsylvania. Speaking in the month of Washington's inauguration Dr. Collin chose for his topic "Those Inquiries in Natural Philosophy, which at present are most beneficial to the United States of North America." He began, as behooved a *philosophe* of the Enlightenment, with the observation that he was a citizen of the world but qualified this:

> It is the philosophers' duty to cultivate with peculiar attention those parts of science, which are most beneficial to that country in which Providence has appointed their earthly stations. Patriotic affections are . . . conducive to the general happiness of mankind.

The body of the lecture was a series of suggestions for the improvement of health, farming methods and technology. Improper clothing, intemperance in eating and drinking, and nervous strain induced by political and economic uncertainties were singled out as contributory causes of ill-health. The last-named, the speaker hoped, would "under Providence be forever prevented by the new confederation of the United States." Science, too, could help by dispelling the gloom disseminated by ignorant and illiberal preachers. Teeth deserved special attention. Americans, he found, had bad teeth, a matter of concern in a republic where every man should be trained as a public speaker. Among the agricultural needs Collin mentioned contour plowing, forest conservation and control of insect pests. The final part of the essay urged the application of native ingenuity to the construction of all manner of labor-saving machinery. Throughout, he drew parallels with European conditions and, anticipating some modern publicists, held up Swedish achievements in particular as models for the United States.

While the Philosophical Society busied itself with scientific progress others writers urged the wider cultural life as a means of fostering sound Americanism. Literature and art were to be

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laid under contribution. For, contrary to European notions, said the *Columbian Phenix*, the United States are not illiterate or without cultured tastes; but ours is a republican science and literature whose achievements are not the jealously-guarded prerogative of a favored few but are widely diffused among the many. Charles Brockden Brown too, now that independence was won and a livelihood insured for all, expected his compatriots to pay increasing attention to the arts, and he foresaw the emergence of "a race of artists and authors purely indigenous, and who may vie with those of Europe." But there was also a note of warning. Eloquence and belles-lettres were all very good in their way, if they were kept duly subordinated to practical needs and were not allowed to become too refined for the simple needs of honest citizens. Many agreed with Franklin that, just as there was no demand here for jewelers and silk weavers, so in the intellectual sphere "men of useful, rather than critical, literature, of sound, rather than subtle, understandings, and of sincere, rather than refined, manners" could serve their country best. It was perhaps in keeping with this tradition that the heroes of the first American plays concealed their hearts of gold under coats of homespun.

An occasional publicist held out for aristocratic excellence as preferable to republican mediocrity—among them, as might be expected, Dennie of the *Port Folio*, who lashed out against "that hoodwinked patriotism which will not look at error, because it is native." Something more than patriotism was necessary, he believed, to distinguish between genuine merit and mountebank pretension. But once again Dennie was in the minority. Most of his contemporaries seemed to feel that they were capable of literature equal to the world's greatest and some, like the Connecticut Wits, set out to produce it.

No group of writers showed greater eagerness to scrap tradition and gain new intellectual frontiers than the educational theorists. Rush, Webster and others deluged the journals with plans and systems. Following Franklin's lead Rush insisted that schools in a republic subordinate the classics and stress useful

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subjects. Webster, with a finger in every pie, was bent on creating an American language as distinguished from the British. He also urged the education of girls—in practical subjects, to be sure, and not in frills, for "no man ever marries a woman for her performance on a harpsichord, or her figure in a minuet." Webster also warned against a foreign education which would develop manners not suited to this country and which might even attach the younger generation to European forms of government and society. With similar ends in view the American Philosophical Society offered a prize for the best system of liberal education adapted to the genius of the United States. The two comprehensive plans which shared the award make interesting reading even today; among other things they called for a degree of national control of education from the elementary school through the university far beyond anything ever attempted in this country in the past—and far beyond what would be acceptable even now.

A national character, distinctive and worthy, was clearly the goal of the patriotic seers of the founding days. In their periodical literature the ideal republic of the American intellectual was gradually taking shape. It was to be a land of unfailing plenty, with a secure living for every one willing to work for it. Its citizens, while wholly free in thought and action, would voluntarily accept legal restraints and respect private property and enterprise. Patriotic zeal and a sense of responsibility for the success of the first large-scale experiment in self-government would stimulate creative achievement in science and art and thereby strengthen the young nation for its destined role as the glowing beacon and last hope of mankind. An Independence Day speaker in 1791 stated the case in a nutshell:

> The cause of liberty is continually gathering strength. The advocates of despotic rule must fail. . . . May we not indulge the pleasing thought, that the time is not far distant, when tyranny everywhere shall be destroyed; when mankind shall be the slaves of monsters and idiots no more, but recover the true dignity of their nature!

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Art under Five Years of Federal Patronage

GEORGE BIDDLE

FOR over a century France has been considered the artistic center of the world. Paris was and is the workshop and audience of this national culture. Paris has rightly boasted that it had hundreds of creative artists and other hundreds of thousands who were interested in art. Today *Life Magazine* has an estimated audience of about fifteen millions a week. By polling their readers the editors of the magazine—who are not in the publishing business out of charity or for the promotion of higher education—have determined that an intelligent presentation of the best classical and liberal contemporary American art forms a drawing feature for the magazine. *Life Magazine* is one out of several periodicals that feature art to step up their circulation. The estimated yearly attendance at museums throughout the country is about twenty millions. The attendance at W.P.A. Art Project exhibitions is about five millions. The most successful concession at the San Francisco Fair was not the strip-tease dancing but the collection of old Italian masters, which recently drew record crowds at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City. Facts like these tempt one to believe there is perhaps a greater curiosity—if not a more intelligent interest—in art here today than anywhere in Europe during the past four or five hundred years.

A widespread curiosity about art is not even a minor renascence but it is highly symptomatic of the art swing in America today. This swing is away from the influence of that movement which dominated liberal American art from 1913 until 1930—French Modernism. It differs from the latter in that it is democratic, social and anonymous rather than aristocratic,

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esthetic and snobbish. I am not concerned with moral values but curious about the art trend in America.

This trend is generally conceded to be an established fact. It became clearly marked during the early years of the depression. The mere circumstance of the federal art program becomes, then, a dramatic coincidence. If it had not sprung up by chance —or through President Roosevelt's encouragement—in 1933, the drift of the American art movement would have necessitated it. Yet no force has as strongly influenced this drift as the government program. Taken together—for there are three art projects—it is my belief that they are the healthiest art influence alive in America today. Each of the three projects fulfills a different governmental aim and has therefore a different philosophic conception of its own functions. The general public is aware of the existence of federal art subsidies but even artists are often ignorant of or mistaken as to their specific aims and organizational setup. And we are all blissfully unaware of the Sword of Damocles which hangs over the entire program, or much of it—a sword inherent in the conception of democracy —the caprice by which Congress in a burst of erratic emotionalism, weak nerves or more frequently of vindictive political crap-shooting can with a stroke of the pen put an end to the soundest, most democratic and intelligent art program that we have ever had in America.

For the sake of clarity I shall briefly analyze the political origin and the aims and achievements of these three federal arts projects.

The Section of Fine Arts, originally the Section of Painting and Sculpture, was organized by Edward Bruce in 1934 under the Procurement Division of the Treasury. The Section was under the administrative control of the Supervising Architect's office in the Public Buildings Branch. The specific job of the Section was to decorate those buildings—under construction by the building program of the Procurement Division—with mural paintings and sculpture. The Section handled other jobs, and with the ability and distinction—notably the first Public

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Works of Art (relief) Project; but for the sake of clarification of origin and aims it is fair to say that the work of the Section is to spend one percent of the building program allocations of the Public Buildings Administration—now under the Federal Works Agency—on the decoration of those buildings, through the wisest selection—artistically and politically—of the best artists of the country.

What has been the policy of the Section? its accomplishment? its effect on American art? its shortcomings?

To date it has actually completed or is completing 951 mural or sculptural decorations in 821 buildings, scattered through 777 different cities. Six hundred artists have been employed on the 743 completed jobs. Two hundred and eight artists are working today under contracts for the Section. Upon these contracts the government has spent $1,367,714.16. This averages $1,438 per mural or sculptural decoration. The bald statement of these figures is to date the most complete and dramatic justification of the success of the Section's program, but one further comment is in order. This employment of over 600 artists in almost 800 American cities has not cost the taxpayer one additional cent of money. It has been financed through the earmarked use of a Congressionally-voted building allocation. If the money had not been spent on paintings and sculpture it would nevertheless have been spent—on marble trimmings, limestone pedestals, aluminum water-closet fixtures or whatever other architectural embellishments might seem most elegant and appropriate to the somewhat myopic gaze of the Supervising Architect, that arbiter of taste in our federal buildings,

> Where rest on the resplendent floors
> The necessary cuspidors.

With the exception of some 28 mural and sculpture projects, originally commissioned by direct appointment in the Justice, Post Office and Interior buildings in Washington, practically all these commissions are the result of anonymous competitions.

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This policy of selecting by open competitions, coupled with the decentralization (inherent in the fact that the building program itself is located almost entirely in small towns) is in my mind the greatest contribution and the healthiest influence of the Section. Anyone who had the opportunity to compare the recent exhibition of prize-winning mural sketches for 48 states at the Whitney Museum in New York with the mural exhibition organized by the Museum of Modern Art in 1932 from an invited list of our supposedly most interesting muralists, will realize the vast improvement in mural understanding and technical skill evidence all over the country. If for nothing else, the mural education given through these competitions justifies the wisdom of the project. The effect of this policy of competition is continually to unearth new talent and younger artists who have not had the opportunity to prove themselves. Another equally important result of this method of selection is the assurance to the taxpayer and artist alike that the choice of artists is not governed by log-rolling, bureaucratic nepotism or artistic prejudice, which have hitherto vitiated national attempts to foster the fine arts.

But in qualitative reckoning what is the achievement of the Section? Before attempting to answer this question I shall beg it in its entirety. We Americans, who sometimes lack humility, are too often needlessly preoccupied in a search for genius and the hidden Michelangelos. Let us first lay a broad foundation. That is all we can do. Geniuses may and may not follow. This broad foundation, this cultivation of a healthy American soil, lies in the honest study of this difficult medium, in technical experiments, in the artist's knowledge of his American background, and his preoccupation in it, in the fostering of regional schools and local traditions. The laying of this foundation is, I believe, the policy of the Section.

Until last June, when it was transferred to the Federal Works Agency, the Section was under the Procurement Division, that amorphous governmental department one of whose functions it is to buy for the government—rubber tires, blankets, inkwells,

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blotting-paper and toilet fixtures. Obviously the Procurement Division has the outlook of a grocer. Its mentality is embedded in performance bonds, vouchers in triplicate and red tape. It handled artists with the same delicacy with which it handled political building contractors and drygoods salesmen. Its guiding moral principle was the *quid pro quo*. It was in a continual night-sweat lest it be short-changed in a bargain. I am not saying that the Section had this mentality; but for five years the Section was under the Procurement Division and that was unfortunate. Now it is under the Public Buildings Administration of the Federal Works Agency, an almost equally bureaucratic governmental department.

Like every governmental bureau the Section fulfills a specific function, and for the adequate performance thereof is at all times subject to Congressional investigation. Now the purported function of the Section is not to foster American art—it is not, mind you, a Department of Education or even a Department of Fine Arts, despite its names—but to purchase for our government buildings, at a very adequate price, the finest mural decorations and sculpture. In justifying such purchases in the light of possible Congressional investigations the Section has to reckon with the not-always-infallible esthetic taste of Congressmen and local postmasters. And therefore, often stupidly, it censors its artists. The result is that it never gets cheated in its purchase of murals; it never gets an artist's worst work; but my own belief is that it rarely gets the best that an artist is capable of. So far the Section has produced perhaps half a dozen really noble works and a great body of honest, technically able and unimaginative murals. Someone—Secretary Ickes or a local postmaster—is always bearing down because a shoulder strap has the wrong insignia or the lettering on a postcard is misleading; and there is too much insistency on delivery of mail by air, rail and pony express. Perhaps American artists are not yet mature enough or sufficiently inspired to produce a noble and transcendent expression of our civilization. We are stepping here on very uncertain ground. My own belief is that when we

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have such talent it will not express itself most comfortably through the dusty atmosphere of the performance bonds and the vouchers in triplicate of the Public Buildings Administration. My criticism is not laid at the door of the personnel of the Section. Bruce is himself an artist of distinction and I doubt that he is often in sympathy with a narrow censorship of art. My criticism is one of organizational setup. The Section of Fine Arts should be a separate bureau, removed from departmental bureaucracy and not accountable to the esthetic whims of Congressmen, Secretary Ickes and local postmasters.

Apart from the question of censorship and organizational setup there is a further serious criticism of the Section (although it is a small detail in a broad program). I have stated that the Section's method of selection through competition is the healthiest feature of its program. It avoids political pressure and encourages new talent. But it does not secure the best artists or the best murals. There are a good many reasons for this failure and they are not sufficiently understood. First of all the competitions are not won by the best artists. They are won by the best sketches, and the ability to make a winning sketch has nothing to do with the ability to paint a great mural. The analogy with architectural competitions does not hold water. Moreover, with a jury there is always the element of chance. Consequently many of the best artists do not enter the large competitions—because the element of chance is increasingly against them, because they cannot afford the time as easily as the younger artists and because they may lack the perfectly unessential ability to "cook up" a convincing sketch. The Section is aware of this but is unwilling to appoint artists directly on the basis of their accomplished work because such appointments would open the floodgates of political pressure for favorite-son appointments. The Section gets around the dilemma by also appointing on the basis of outstanding work done in former competitions. In other words an artist does not have to win a competition but he must have entered a competition to secure a contract. The Section usually reserves non-

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competitive appointments for unimportant murals. I believe this policy should be reversed—that the Section should reserve the smaller jobs for competitions, and commission directly for the few important jobs on the basis of outstanding mural accomplishment and a favorable showing in former competitions.

The political origin and therefore the philosophic tenets of the W.P.A. Art Project, formerly the Federal Art Project, are very different from those of the Section of Fine Arts. Since it is an agency of the Work Projects Administration its function —for which it is accountable to Congress and the taxpayers—is not to discover Michelangelos but to put needy artists intelligently to work. Its emphasis and its criterion of success are not therefore so much a high standard of art as the social value of the work to the community. Its credo is that if one creates a cultural background, art will follow. It wasn't Michelangelo who created the 15th century but the 15th century that created Michelangelo.

The accomplishment of the Federal Art Project is even more dramatic than that of the Section of Fine Arts. In both cases the accomplishment is due to the ability, intelligence and honesty of the directors. The artists of America can never repay what they owe to Edward Bruce and Holger Cahill, director of the W.P.A. Art Project. God knows what these projects might have been in other hands. With its broad social aims what have been the material achievements of the Project? its effect on American art? its shortcomings?

At its peak the Project employed as many as 5,300 and today it employs about 5,280 artists. It has completed over 1,400 murals, including frescoes, mosaics and photomurals, in public buildings throughout the country. Over 50,000 of the oil paintings done by the Project have been allocated on permanent loans to schools, libraries, hospitals, community centers and other public agencies. Some of the 90,000 prints have won recognition in national and international exhibitions and yearbooks. Among the 3,700 pieces of sculpture the work ranges from small ceramic figures for public schools to large sculp-

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tural groups for public parks and monuments for historic battlefields. Over 950,000 reproductions of 30,000 posters have been used in campaigns for public health, child guidance and safety insurance, and for concert announcements. Technical experimental work has been done in fields in which it could not otherwise have been accomplished; notably in the execution of mosaic murals and enamel paintings for subways; in the development of the inexpensive carborundum print by workers on the Philadelphia Graphic Project and on the silk-screen process as a fine print medium; and in the work of the paint-testing laboratory of the Massachusetts Project, which has brought about a definite improvement in the standards of manufactured color throughout the country. A total of 975 dioramas and models, 43,000 map drawings and diagrams, 675,000 documentary photographs and 17,000 lantern slides have been produced by Project artists. Perhaps the most notable and distinctive accomplishment of the Project—because it has deep social significance, because it could not have been undertaken by any other agency in America and because it is in itself a work of rare beauty and permanent value—is the Index of American Design. The collection when complete will consist of illustrative plates, in color or in black and white, of American crafts and textiles over a period of 250 years. Ultimate publication has been arranged for and already over 18,000 plates from 35 states have been completed.

Notwithstanding the wealth and variety of its achievements in the field of created art, the Project's initiation of the community art center program, its art teaching and its extensive program of travelling exhibitions are in a way even more significant of the orientation of the Project. Since December 1935 over 72 community art centers have been established in the Southern, Middle and Western states where the people had theretofore had few opportunities to enjoy art. The interest in the art center movement is attested by the more than $750,000 contributed toward the program by the communities themselves and by the approximately seven million persons who

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participated in the activities of the centers. Classes in painting, modelling and the crafts are conducted in the community art centers; and in the larger cities such as New York, Chicago and San Francisco as many as 80,000 underprivileged children and adults have received instruction.

Lastly, the Project has initiated an extensive exhibition program which has reached all sections of the country. Over 500 exhibitions have been circuited in 3,000 individual showings to museums, department stores, colleges, libraries and community art centers. During the Golden Gate Exposition in 1939 over a half million people visited the Project exhibition, "Frontiers of American Art," at the De Young Museum. At a three weeks' exhibition in a Utah art center there was an attendance of 3,017 in a village with a population of 2,700!

I have stated at some length these dry and unemotional figures in order to indicate the democratic, human and social aspect of the W.P.A. Art Project. The conclusion that in any well-rounded art program the Project is the necessary complement to the Section of Fine Arts is the briefest understatement of its life-breathing influence on American art.

The W.P.A. Art Project rarely censors its artists. It has fewer bureaucratic facilities than the Section of Fine Arts to do so. Occasionally, therefore, the Project gets very bad pictures —and occasionally the best an artist is capable of. But for the first time in history many thousands of artists are working for the government almost without censorship. I believe this is the most quickening impulse in America today. And I believe it will form a record of the deepest value to the psychologist or art critic of future generations.

The most serious threat to the success of life of the Project is the high emotional level and the low mental caliber of our Congressmen. Last summer in a catch-as-catch-can they killed the Theater Project. Even the professional actors protested in a body. It was thought that Congress had wrecked the Art Project. "It will be the next to go," shouted one member of the Relief Appropriations Committee.

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The two sticks of dynamite thrown into the works were the "eighteen months" ruling and the "local sponsorship" ruling. The first took off relief all those who had been on for eighteen months. Its obvious and immediate effect was of course to eliminate from the Project all the best-trained men. Such a policy in private business would not be considered sabotage. It would be considered lunacy. The justification for the policy was that eventually the whole relief program would be liquidated and that the liquidation would be most easily cushioned by gradualism. How many seriously believe our government should liquidate work-relief? The "local sponsorship" ruling has an ambiguous implication inasmuch as local sponsorships were always necessary. On the assumption that relief money must be spent exclusively on wages it had always been necessary to secure local funds to pay for equipment. Now 25 per cent of the cost must be secured from local sponsors before any project can be started. But the ruling terminating the federal character of the program constitutes the most serious change in the character of the program. Since September 1, 1939 all activities have been continued as a series of local, statewide art projects under state Works Project Administrations—not as programs under a central art Project. This would be, let us say, like taking all the state postal agencies away from federal control and regulating their activities through 48 different state agencies, such agencies not being necessarily postal in character!

Apart from the obvious loss in efficiency the Project suffered through a loss of personnel. In September 1939 employment dropped from 5,300 to a low point of about 3,000. Now, however, owing to such factors as the reemployment of people dropped because of the 18 months regulation, the growing interest which local sponsors have aroused for the Project in certain sections, and the extension of the community art center program, employment is almost back to its former peak. Despite the administration of the Project as 48 separate units, most of them under the direction of non-artists, it shows a steadily-growing vitality and fulfills an ever-growing social need.

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I have mentioned three federal art programs. It is not generally known that the National Youth Administration employs over 4,000 workers on arts and crafts and music. The W.P.A. and the N.Y.A. have somewhat different philosophies. The purpose of the W.P.A. is to find useful work for men out of jobs. It is a relief program. The purpose of N.Y.A. is to teach new crafts to young people. It is an educational program. The crafts taught include basketry, ceramics, metal work, embroidery, hooked rugs, tapestry, puppet making, mosaics, posters, linoleum block painting, cartoons, weaving, leather tooling, wood working, dye making, fresco painting, clay modelling and many others.

It is a tragic pity that these federal agencies, which have done such splendid work in subsidizing art, operate under different departments. Jealousy exists between the Section and the Project and between the artists working on the two programs. Artists are continually moving from one section to another. An Artist on relief will win a Section competition and later will be put back on the relief program. There should be some way, for instance, of giving a relief artist a mural commission on the basis of outstanding work done on the Project. There is another example of the incongruity of the present set up: the Federal Art Project can of course employ an artist to decorate any building partly supported by public taxes. Consequently it can employ an artist to decorate the Capitol or the White House. At present it is employing an artist to decorate the Public Library of New York City. But the Project can never employ an artist for such important jobs unless he happens to be on relief. The Section of Fine Arts, supposedly commissioning the best artists in the country at generous salaries, can put them to work only on small, local post-offices if for the moment such buildings are the only ones under construction by the Treasury. This separation of functions is patently absurd and wasteful.

Many art programs, such for instance as the design and execution of mosaics, stained glass, stone carving, graffito decorations etc. can be executed only by using a master designer and

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by placing trained craftsmen at his disposal. Under the present separation of the two art agencies such important work is prohibited. To facilitate such programs the Administrator should be authorized to pool a part of the one per cent earmarked for the decoration of specific buildings. This pooled fund could be used at the discretion of the Administrator to commission artists to decorate any government building, preferably in conjunction with relief workers—to commission for instance, an artist to design mosaics for the Capitol, to be executed by relief workers.

I hope I have made it clear that as long as we have work relief, and consequently one or more art relief projects, the latter are an essential part of any well-rounded federal art program. At present the Section of Fine Arts and the W.P.A. Project are under one governmental agency but they are not integrated as an art program and the art project of the N.Y.A. is under the Social Securities Agency. Skeptics shrug their shoulders and argue: "This integration is impossible. It can't be done." The answer is that it was done most efficiently in 1933-34 by the Public Works of Art Project. It can be brought about now partly through an executive order of Administrator John Carmody, partly by Congressional fiat.

American artists owe much to the intelligent direction of the three federal art agencies by Edward Bruce, Holger Cahill and Aubrey Williams, Administrator of the N.Y.A. Minor criticisms and changes are in order. The unfortunate separation of organizational functions and the political crap-playing indulged in on the Hill are responsible for the only major criticisms that can be justifiably levelled. Our Congressmen alone have it in their power to wreck the entire program.

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Academic Tenure

HENRY M. WRISTON

THE problem of academic tenure has become acute within American universities and colleges. The slowing down of growth in student bodies after abnormal periods of expansion, the slackening of the flow of gifts after extraordinary periods of philanthropy, the fashion of the hour for "social" security, the curtailment of academic freedom and the destruction of tenure in other nations make this a lively question.

These factors explain the incidence of the problem, not its substance. The source of tenure is its relationship to academic freedom. Tenure is regarded as a major guarantee of freedom because it puts the instructor beyond the easy reach of administrative tyranny or the quixotism of governing boards. That there has been tyranny needs no demonstration. College administrators are human, and they hold power. Wherever humans hold power there is a temptation to tyranny; and where there is temptation there is yielding. The quixotism of boards of control likewise rests upon basic human traits and needs neither argument nor demonstration. Anyone who has been long in the land must have seen enough instances without having his memory needlessly prodded. It suffices to say that the most common form of this quixotism appears in the irrational position that one bad man can do more harm than many good men can offset. The old saw about the bad apple in the barrel is one of those insinuating but desperately untrue analogies, for it is built upon the monstrous proposition that good people exercise no influence at all while bad people are dominant. It is a defeatist parable that makes utter nonsense of education but it has had a profound influence upon the generation now in control of colleges.

The curse of freedom from the point of view of governing

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boards and administrative officers is that it means freedom for the fool as well as the wise man. Unfortunately presidents and boards (and the public) cannot always distinguish the wise man from the fool. Indeed, the cup of hemlock is more likely to be pressed upon Socrates than upon Babbitt. The crowd usually will shriek for the crucifixion of one who raises awkward issues but will let the scribes and pharisees pass quietly through their midst. Wisdom and folly are relative terms and the appraisal comes best long after the wise man and the fool are both dead. If by some process of relativity in time and space presidents and boards could now decide effectively what should have been done a century ago we might better trust their judgment concerning the wise and the foolish.

Since we must deal with men and situations here and now we need to set controls upon our judgments, following the procedure with which the Constitution has made us familiar —limitations upon the governing power. Life tenure for judges has kept many a poor judge on the bench but it has protected many more just judges from removal. Tenure for teachers rests upon the same foundation.

There is a second reason why tenure is associated with freedom. Not only do we imperfectly distinguish the wise man from the fool, but it is unsafe to limit freedom by insistence upon established canons. This is peculiarly true in the university, which exists not alone to transmit but to explore. The fact that a canon is "established" puts it beyond the exploratory stage. The essence of research is to destroy established ideas by substituting better ones. During the last thirty years the most completely revolutionary thinking has been that of the physicists. It makes the radical doctrines of the Marxists pale by comparison. One might even argue that over the long pull the revolutionary thought of the physicists and their fellow scientists may affect human life much more profoundly. Yet the demand for a holiday in science is not taken seriously, whereas the Red hunt makes its periodic headlines. The revolutionary character of thought can be currently identified no more readily than the

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distinction between a wise man and a fool. For research "safety first" is a wholly inappropriate slogan. The object is change, change as rapid and as fundamental as possible, so long as it is upon a basis of scientific integrity.

As in research, so in creative work; canons of good taste do not offer safe limitations upon freedom. What is at one moment in good taste is abominable at the next. Watches that drip off tables would not have appealed to Rembrandt. Houses that look like box cars would not have seemed esthetic to Wren or Bulfinch. The conscious crudities of Gauguin and the congregated dissonances of Hindemith would in other times and to other eyes and other ears seem in bad taste. Good taste is established by prevailing opinion, often transient. Though a majority vote is a useful way of determining upon action it has never been pretended, even by its most ardent advocates, that it is a measure of wisdom or good taste. Whether we are now in the midst of a revolution in our conception of art, whether we are in the midst of a period of arid and foolish experimentalism, whether our collective leg is being pulled, I do not know. As an individual I have a right to an opinion; as an administrative officer my opinion is irrelevant as a basis for displacing an "artist" member of the faculty.

Even when we pass from research and "creative" work to the subject of teaching we must protect the revolutionary. If minds are to be wakened and intellects sharpened there must be a challenge. How sharp that challenge is to be depends upon the teacher's method, upon the fixity of the student's prejudices, the profundity of his ignorance, the keenness of his mind and many other factors. One of my professors was displaced for a statement I had heard him utter many times. It was a provocative statement about the church; it never stirred me out of my rut and I never heard one of my fellow students refer even remotely to his remark as "radical" or "subversive." Indeed it influenced, so far as I could judge, only the president.

Among all the instances wherein I have seen the tenure of a teacher impaired or destroyed on an issue which involved free-

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dom of opinion within his field of teaching and research I have never known one where the merits were all on one side. Usually the man was asking for trouble. Usually, on the other hand, the institutional representatives handled the issue ineptly or unfairly—and in every instance the gains resulting from his displacement were more than offset by the losses.

Tenure which assures freedom is a gesture of strength. It is said that we want to protect that which we hold dear, but it is much more to the point to say we do not betray nervousness over positions we regard as impregnable.

The pressures upon freedom are often evidences of doubt as to the essential strength of our citadel. Religion has frequently offered a barrier to freedom. However, perspective alters opinion. We now laugh at the qualms of the church over the ideas and demonstrations of Galileo. At his grave in the church of Santa Croce I once heard a guide make sport of the issue. We are contemptuous of the more recent uproar over the impact of "Darwinism" upon faith and make mockery of the "Bible belt" states where legislation still attempts to protect education from subversive scientific attacks upon faith. It has been common to assert that this was an indication of the great importance of religion in the life of earlier times and to argue that the legislation is now a protection for religion in those "backward" areas where it is still regarded as vital. But another interpretation seems to me infinitely superior—namely, that men of science and men of faith are both occupying stronger positions than before and realize there is no essential conflict between them. Science has altered its hypotheses radically; its boundaries and potentialities have been surveyed more realistically; it describes life but does not answer its riddle. Physics sets metes and bounds upon its work; then yields to metaphysics. Religion on its part no longer regards some of its old positions as religious at all, and having abandoned them finds itself not weakened but freed of embarrassments. Science and religion are each ready further to modify its position as knowledge of itself and its old opponent grows richer. Tolerance is a gesture of assurance.

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We should keep that point firmly in mind as we turn from consideration of an old controversy to a current issue. The zone of freedom which tenure seeks to protect today is in writing and teaching about things economic and political. It is usually said that the reason for difficulty is the greater importance of the social structure in the life of today, the greater degree of interdependence in the modern age, which must inevitably limit the freedom of the individual.

This is a variant of the argument we confronted in the historic clash between science and religion and involves a like misinterpretation of the facts. Interdependence has reduced the pressure upon individuals. Engineering has limited the effectiveness of the state. No longer may the spoken word be censored as it flies through the ether, save by means more drastic, more difficult and less effective than ever before. Censorship, inhibitions upon freedom are not manifestations of power; they are essentially defensive. They reflect doubt—lurking, deep-seated, profound, and devastating doubt—as to the strength, even the reality, of the things they seek to protect. Limitations upon freedom do not come because economics and politics are more vital than at earlier times but because they are less effective. Ideologists put hard shells about the soft cores of their doctrines. The urgency of indoctrination and the destruction of tenure (the swiftest pressure upon teachers) are the clearest evidence of internal weakness.

We have come, it seems to me, to the heart of the problem of academic freedom as it affects tenure. It is not imperiled by strength but by weakness; it is not menaced by confidence but by doubt. And what is true of academic freedom in general is true of freedom within particular universities and colleges. Difficulties are rare in institutions which are sure of their mission and intent upon the pursuit and exposition of truth. Only where expansion of material assets is more important than widening intellectual horizons do freedom and tenure suffer. The sense of insecurity within an institution must be very serious indeed if its foundations can be shaken by the breath of a

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public speaker. The fears so often expressed that an institution may be damaged by the incautious or unwise utterance of some professor reveal the want of faith in the solidity and reality of the institutional structure.

If freedom is the mark of strength, tenure is its symbol. For tenure is the guarantee to the individual that his freedom is real and not a shadow. However, it should never be mistaken for the substance of freedom. Some people have personalities so vibrant and ideas so lucid and appealing that they may be effectively free even in prison. The power of their teaching conquers every obstacle. Death itself may add potency to their ideas. They rise above the protection of tenure. At the other end of the scale are men with so little soul force and so poverty-stricken in their gift of expression that with a worldwide radio broadcast at their disposal they would make no impact. Tenure is no protection for what one is incapable of using.

That statement gives the cue to the most important limitation upon tenure. The term "academic tenure" is seldom precisely defined but it is never absolute. It is not "life" tenure, for it is usually subject to retirement rules. It is always dependent upon the solvency or fiscal exigencies of the institution. It does not give protection against punishment by civil or military authorities for illegal acts. Overt acts of immorality furnish a basis for displacement. Finally, and most important, tenure does not preserve the position of a negligent or incompetent teacher. Its only effect in such cases is to put the burden of proof upon those who seek to displace him. If he has had a period of probation and no substantial change in the conduct of his work can be shown, that burden of proof is very heavy indeed. But if deterioration in the quality of his teaching can be shown, the burden is not so severe. Admittedly proof of ineffectiveness is difficult, and fear of facing the issue on the part of administrative officers has made academic tenure appear to protect shoddy work. The real protection of poor teaching is not tenure, however, but lack of skill or want of courage on the part of the responsible officers of the institution.

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There is one other aspect of the relationship of tenure to freedom which receives far too little attention yet it is of first-class importance. As the symbol of freedom, tenure is effective only if it represents the free grant of the governing board as a voluntary restriction of its own freedom of action and as a gesture of confidence. Sometimes the source of formal rules of tenure defeats their essential purpose. If they are wrung as unwilling concessions from a reluctant board, jobs may be protected but not freedom. There are dozens of ways of persecuting, nagging and harassing the teacher which can sap the substance of the protection tenure is designed to give. Pressure group techniques are not sound procedures in any government, and in an institution devoted to the search for truth and its exposition such techniques destroy the kernel even when they salvage the shell.

The spirit which animates the institution is vastly more significant than the forms of its procedure. I have known institutions which clung to the absurd procedure of annual contracts where faculty tenure was really as secure as in any institution in America. On the other hand the most elaborately devised and safeguarded legislation regarding tenure was sent me by an institution only a few weeks before a group of its faculty was suddenly deprived of its positions, upon grounds which were transparently flimsy. Both these cases were exceptional and extreme but they serve to remind us that the characteristic American faith in legislative enactment is even more badly misplaced in this matter than in most others.

The problem of tenure has become unusually acute because the times are out of joint. The market situation in the teaching profession has had a profound effect. Just before the World War, and again just afterward, there was a surge of students; colleges and universities grew rapidly and junior colleges sprang up like weeds. Consequently there was an intense demand for teachers and jobs were plentiful. Standardizing agencies, like the Association of American Universities, and the great regional associations, like the North Central Association of Colleges and

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Secondary Schools, published "approved lists" of institutions and virtually required advanced degrees. This broadened the market for trained scholars even more. At the same time the great foundations were pouring out money to the capital funds of institutions and private philanthropy made all previous periods of beneficence seem puny. Furthermore the public showed such a lively interest in improving professorial salaries that state institutions, like privately endowed universities and colleges, added to their faculties and advanced salaries rapidly.

It was at this same period that "research" became a watchword. The miracles of medicine and applied science, the startling suggestions of Einstein and other mathematicians and physicists, the vogue for economic predictions—all these came to a great climax and absorbed public interest. No institution was longer regarded as respectable unless research was a significant part of its program. Industry caught the fever and poured out millions annually, establishing projects, institutes and research foundations.

All these factors combined to make for great mobility in the teaching profession. The problem was not so much how an individual should find a job but of a choice among those available. Institutions were harassed to fill the places of those drained off by industry and by other institutions. Tenure was readily granted in order to make posts attractive but was held rather lightly by young scholars who expected to move to better posts.

The aftermath of 1929 had its first effect upon industry. Industrial enterprises rapidly demobilized immature research organizations. They had not produced the expected miracles; merely enlarging them had not brought commensurate improvements in products or the anticipated multiplication in number. Financial stringency and disillusionment combined to throw on the market scientists, economists and statisticians in considerable numbers. These then sought to return to teaching.

This rush back to teaching occurred at the same moment that graduates who had no economic opportunity decided to go to graduate school to be ready when prosperity returned. Institu-

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tions, likewise, had entered upon graduate instruction when the pressure was greatest and now encouraged it for the revenue it provided during lean years.

The combined effect was an oversupply of degree holders as great as the excess of openings had been only a few years earlier. Budgets of state institutions were cut, income from endowments fell, enrollments no longer mounted rapidly and salaries were cut. Public faith reacted violently. Technological unemployment became a catch phrase; there was talk of a scientific holiday; education was put under severe criticism from within and without. Naturally these factors united to produce widespread academic unemployment.

The effect upon tenure would not have been so marked if public morale had remained firm. But superabundance of optimism was followed by public pessimism of the deepest dye. It went to extremes as foolish as optimism had previously. Experience was regarded as a poor guide. Economic and political nostrums became both more irresponsible and more potent. "Social security" became a slogan that evolved into a program. Political and economic issues became passionate, so that quarrels about freedom were more frequent and tenure was sought as a protection. The coming of refugees who could be employed at bargain prices by hard-pressed institutions threatened the posts of some teachers. Earnest seekers for jobs, who made no salary demands, gave administrative officers an opportunity to displace some of those members of the faculty who had been accepted when trained people were scarce and salaries relatively high, but who had not proved equal to their tasks. There were efforts to economize in unwise ways, or to use pretended economy as a stalking horse for callousness or tyranny. All these things combined with the rising sense of panic to increase the pressure for "security" through tenure, just when shrinking income made institutions hesitate to accept long-term commitments of any kind.

Only an atmosphere bordering upon hysteria could possibly have furnished the setting for some of the things we have wit-

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nessed. Relatively minor episodes have been the occasion for severe breaks in academic morale. Full-dress investigations have reviewed the procedures of individual institutions with particular care to keep no domestic laundry for the private daily rinse. Associations have bid for members on the promise of fighting for quick tenure. Two results have been exceedingly bad. The first, and by far the most important, has been the serious impairment of morale in many institutions. A reign of terror is not a good atmosphere in which to conduct an educational program. The second has been to make administrative officers even more conspicuously wanting in courage than before. There is a profound temptation to accept poor teaching rather than run the risk of an uproar if the teacher is displaced. Actions tend to be overcautious and then rash—the typical unevenness of a nervous and excited person.

The great pressure for rapid acquisition of tenure is a self-defeating move. If the period of probation is long, department chairmen, deans and presidents are prone to give the beginner the benefit of the doubt, hoping that with experience and maturity he may improve. Indeed, so prone are they to what from one point of view may be described as patience and from another as indecision that many an incompetent has acquired an equity in his job by adverse possession. Frequently the personal sympathies were too great during the protracted depression, when officials hesitated to turn into unemployment a teacher whom they were clear should not be kept "permanently." For a time they were as optimistic as the business community that prosperity would turn the corner and separation would then be easy. But as the years went on the problem became more difficult.

On the other hand, if the period of probation is too short officials are forced to a decision. Hating to make a decision that involves a long-term commitment, they give the institution rather than the teacher the benefit of the doubt and refuse the appointment that carries premature tenure. Into this course of action they are encouraged also by the fact that any vacancy is certain to have many applicants, and reasonable industry and

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luck assure at least as good a man as the one under immediate review. Moreover, in a short probation he will not have established ties of property or of personal acquaintance which make separation difficult for college officers to contemplate. Their sense of responsibility on that point mounts rapidly if given time to mature.

The moment at which the teacher should acquire tenure is a matter of practical judgment. Any attempt to establish a theory which fixes an optimum period for probation is certain to fail. Rules, therefore, rest upon empirical bases, not upon any inherent validity. Each teacher should be given tenure whenever it is clear that he is a success. The grant of tenure does not fix him in the post. He is always free to leave and may even be encouraged to do so. But it is a wholly different thing to advise a man to leave if you have deprived yourself of the authority to dismiss him. The difference is not merely one of power; there is an important psychological difference also. He can leave with better grace, and other institutions are vastly less suspicious of his availability. A man may be a success, and entitled to this recognition, even though the road to advancement is closed by too many senior departmental colleagues, by restricted institutional funds—or for many other reasons.

The habits of our speech often betray our thoughts. When we speak of a problem we always think of a solution. But "problems" of the dimensions of academic freedom and tenure do not have neat, simple and final "solutions." Rather they must be in perpetual process of solution, and they assume fresh forms as we reach new stages. The aspects of tenure which make it at the moment a peculiarly acute issue will pass. In time the number of candidates and the number of openings will come again into some rough kind of balance. Or it may be that there will again be a surplus of openings. When and if either of those stages arrives the issue of tenure will decline in momentary importance. But as long as men seek freedom, the problem of protecting academic freedom will remain; and as long as that problem remains, tenure will be one of its symbols.

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Belief in the Common Man[1]

CARL J. FRIEDRICH

THE belief in the common man is central to the democratic creed. The idea of a people sovereign over its own destiny is meaningless without it. And yet it is a rather extraordinary belief. In the history of mankind the times and places where that belief has prevailed are few and far between. Even if dissociated from the belief in the equality of man (with which it is usually joined) it appears to be contrary to much common experience. For long ages before the modern democratic era the common man was looked upon by political philosophers and men of practical experience alike as nothing more than the raw material out of which the statesman might with skill mold an obedient people. Throughout the 17th and well into the 18th century the mass of the people were castigated as mob whenever they showed signs of speaking and moving by themselves, and those who encouraged them to such independence were denounced as demagogues. Even so "enlightened" a mind as Voltaire built his hope essentially upon the benevolence of the superior despot. Carl Becker has pointed out how the belief in the perfectibility of man by no means entailed a belief in the common man as later generations held it.[2] On the contrary, their belief in reason at first most emphatically implied a belief in "the philosopher."

But with the flowering of sentimentalism the belief in the common man, at times pushed to the belief in the savage, struck root. Rousseau spoke for many "enlightened" minds when he expounded the virtue of the common man. Paine

[1] Throughout this essay the word "man" is taken to mean "human being." Everything applies equally to women.

[2] In his delightful *Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* see Chapter 2.

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and Jefferson in America, and many others were to voice the new faith in ever more uncompromising form. In concluding his *Age of Reason* Paine wrote, "Certain I am that when opinions are free, either in matters of government or religion, truth will finally and powerfully prevail." Here, then, we have the new gospel. Give the unspoiled mind of the ordinary man the facts and he will see the rational solution, and having recognized the way to act, he will follow it. Upon this rationalist premise are built all utilitarian arguments with their formulas about the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

But in the course of time the scientific development during the 19th century made short shrift of the psychological basis of this faith. Darwinism, economic determinism and more recently the various psychological schools have undermined the notions implicit in the belief in the common man. The notion that most ordinary men, when confronted with a problem or a situation, will work hard to get at the "facts" and when given the facts will reach rational conclusions as to how to act—such a view will seem highly optimistic if not Utopian today. This is even more true of the related notion that the ordinary man will, when aware of such rational conclusions, act in accordance with them. For even if we discard the more extreme anti-rationalist positions, there remains enough incontrovertible evidence to suggest the continuous impact of subrational, emotional forces or drives upon men's reaction and behavior.

Nowhere is the problematic nature of our inherited belief in the judgment of the common man more evident than in the attitude we have developed toward propaganda. The rising tide of scepticism found vivid expression in Lowell's and Lippmann's well-known studies.[3] Lippmann finally proclaimed the public a phantom and the judgment of the common man just barely up to the rudimentary task of selecting a leader. While it would be absurd to call Lippmann a fascist (he is an old-time liberal in fact) his inclination to doubt the judgment of the

[3] Lowell, A. L., *Public Opinion in War and Peace*, 1923. Lippmann, Walter, *Public Opinion*, 1924; and *The Phantom Public*, 1926.

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common man (which he shares with such eminent liberals as Macaulay[4]) can have fatal implication for the future of democracy unless it is squarely faced and met. The contemporary obsession about propaganda is revealing because it stems on the one hand from the assumption that we are all more or less dolts—propageese ready to fall into the trap of one crafty propagandist or another—while on the other hand it feeds upon the lingering conviction that we should do the right and sensible thing if only we could get at the facts. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis calls its *Monthly Bulletin* "A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda". There is no reason to believe that the directors mean to suggest any exclusive quality. The "intelligent citizen" is the common man. This notion of reaching him by an educational effort (really a propaganda campaign itself) resembles the Marxist position, which regards the "common man" as the dupe of the propaganda of the exploiting class.[5]

The most difficult problems are raised by this Marxist doc-

[4] See Macaulay's famous "Letter to an American Congressman" in which he flays American democracy unmercifully, going so far as to predict: "I have long been convinced that institutions purely democratic must, sooner or later, destroy liberty, or civilization, or both. In Europe, where the population is dense, the effect of such institutions would be almost instantaneous. What happened lately in France is an example. In 1848 a pure democracy was established there. During a short time there was reason to expect a general spoliation, a national bankruptcy, a new partition of the soil, a maximum of prices, a ruinous load of taxation laid on the rich for the purpose of supporting the poor in idleness. Such a system would, in twenty years, have made France as poor and barbarous as the France of the Carlovingians. Happily the danger was averted; and now there is a despotism, a silent tribune, an enslaved press. Liberty is gone, but civilization has been saved. I have not the smallest doubt that, if we had a purely democratic government here, the effect would be the same." Cf. here also Benjamin E. Lippincott's thoughtful volume, *Victorian Critics of Democracy*, 1938.

[5] Two very illuminating volumes have just been published which corroborate the views set forth in this article, as they emphasize the psychological problem: Ellis Freeman, *Conquering the Man in the Street*, and Hadley Cantril *et al.*, *The Invasion from Mars*. The latter significantly concludes his study as follows: Our study of the common man of our times has shown us that his ability to orient himself appropriately in critical situations will be increased if he can be taught to adopt an attitude of readiness to question the interpretations he hears. But when he achieves this healthy skepticism he must have sufficient and relevant knowledge to be able to evaluate different interpretations. If he is to judge these interpretations intelligently, his knowledge must be grounded in evidence or tested experience. If this skepticism and knowledge are to be spread more widely among common men, they must be provided extensive educational opportunities. And if this final critical ability is to be used more generally by common men, they must be less harassed by the emotional insecurities which stem from underprivileged environments.

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trine. In some respects the most blatantly rationalistic of beliefs, it sees most men as the mere servants of their economic interests. The fact of the matter is that Marx and his orthodox followers built their view of man upon a basic division into the "elite," who are rational enough to perceive the facts, and the mass of men, who are deluded by interest and propaganda. Marx to be sure professed the strongest faith in the common man, but only after the "elite" had had a chance to mold him and his environment. His faith resembles somewhat the kind of faith in the common man which believes in him after he has reached paradise. It cannot be compared with the belief in him here and now which so profoundly animated a leader like Abraham Lincoln: "Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?" This simple individualist credo the communist questioned, and not without good reason. As Eduard Heimann has said:

> In this situation the communists decided to impose by force on the people the uniform pattern which history has refused, but which they believed to be the only solution. They felt that regard for individual liberty led to capitalistic domination and chaos and counted upon the people's preference for security guaranteed by an unassailably strong dictatorship. They supplemented the dictatorship by the somewhat nebulous prospect of a proletarian liberty in a remote future. Their position is doubtless more realistic than that of the true and honest democrats today who exalt spiritual freedom but do not give much thought to physical subsistence. Yet the communists are not realistic enough.

The communists share this lack of realism with all the other anti-rationalist reactions to the simple faith in the common man. Clearly that belief is untenable in its original form. Clearly without it there can be no working democracy, no constitutionalism. We must reconstruct the bases upon which at least a "partial confidence" in the common man might rest. Such confidence can be ours if we abandon the exaggerated hopes which the earlier rationalists entertained.

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Our task, then, is to some extent one of retrenchment. We must restate the belief in the common man, so basic to a belief in democracy, in terms more limited and precise than formerly used. This retrenchment has essentially four aspects: to eliminate all matters of taste, in the narrow sense; to think of the "common man" collectively, not individually; to stress character rather than intellect; and to abandon the notion that such a belief presupposes the idea of infallibility. But before we consider any of these matters we need to state a negative proposition which is as important as any of the others. The findings of modern psychological and sociological research, while undermining the older rationalist basis for a belief in the common man, are even more destructive of any belief in the uncommon man, in the superman or in any sort of elite. The great artists, scholars and saints through their esoteric existence only reflect in extreme form what is likely to be true of all uncommon men: their proper field is the creative realm of activity and not the regulation of the everyday life of the masses of people. Even the "great" men of politics, like Napoleon (to forget about contemporary examples), show so complete a lack of sense for what the French so wisely call *le juste milieu* that all their striving makes not for happiness but for misery. The *aurea mediocritas* of Horace, though evidently an old man's ideal, is more nearly the right yardstick for administrators of the public weal than brilliance and other superhuman excellence. Nietzsche, who cried out so passionately for men of uncommon traits, was not able to manage even the simplest of human relationships nor would the superman he projected in his image have been much more successful.

How to discover the suitable elites, who by natural or acquired superiority will be best fitted to provide leadership, is a millennial problem of great complexity. Clearly enough Plato saw the crucial *political* difficulty, only to shove it aside with undue haste. The well-known challenge addressed to Socrates by Glaukon at the beginning of the fourth book of the *Republic* remains unanswered to this day. "How, Glaukon won-

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dered, are we to discover these men of gold, the guardians who are to direct everything?" Socrates as we all know took refuge in his "royal myth," as have all exponents of rule by an aristocratic elite since, no matter what particular sort of excellence the elite are supposed to possess. Rejecting this "royal myth" as a cloak for pretensions that cannot be substantiated if they are squarely faced, we arrive at the negative premise of a disbelief in the uncommon man. An examination of the four aspects of our more moderate and tenable belief in the common man will further illuminate this disbelief in the uncommon man.

I have already said we must abandon the idea that the common man is infallible. Stated thus, the proposition is obvious enough. And yet, a great many of the objections to the belief in the common man are based upon arguments drawn from one or another of the many instances where he is or has been wrong. Intellectuals, at odds with the rest of the mass on account of their forward march, are particularly liable to be influenced by such specific instances. I myself can think at once of many policy issues on which I radically disagree with the judgment of the common men and women who constitute the American electorate. But when looked at with detachment it is seen readily enough that this is a matter of agreement and disagreement, not of ultimate right or wrong. It always takes for granted, to rise above specific cases to a general contention, that the particular individual has to assume, for himself at least, infallibility and in addition frequently omniscience. I am not prepared to do that; hence I do not expect infallibility from the common man (of whom I am one, whenever I am outside my specialty) nor the capacity to judge ultimate right or wrong.

We must, further, stress character rather than intellect. In believing in the common man I go all the way with the psychologists who insist that man conducts himself rationally only at intervals—varying for different groups and individuals —but I go on to point out that for the determination of com-

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munal policies the possession of character is more important than intellect. Character is the result of sensing values and acting accordingly. This sensing of values may be, and usually is, quite unintellectual and often cannot be phrased articulately. "I do not know why I think so, but I am sure." That is the usual form this attitude takes. At any rate, for an organized society the relative stability derived from a sense of simple values in the mass of men is more important than the exceptional man's brilliant fireworks of statecraft. "Any policy persistently pursued is better than vacillation"—because societal processes are meta-rational. We are never able to say with any degree of scientific certainty that another course of action would have been better (even though we continuously explore such ideas) because we can never traverse the same time-space continuum for a second time. Whether or not to have old-age pensions and if so at what level—this is a question in which the weight of technical knowledge is inferior in importance to whether such a policy is in keeping with the mores of the community. The mass of men and women, firmly fixed in their convictions, are more likely to know what is right than specialists (elites) whose judgment of the values involved is warped by the technical knowledge they possess.

This is not to say that technical considerations are absent. Further, the more detailed the policy issue, the more likely it is that technical considerations will outweigh value judgments. Indeed, most policy problems can be divided into layers of increasing complexity. This the common man readily recognizes, and he accords specialists an increasing measure of authority as we pass from layer to layer. Thus Congress not only legislates on the issue of old-age pensions, which is really decided by the electorate, but in enacting a detailed statute determines at precisely what age "old age" begins, what precisely shall be paid to each class of beneficiaries and so on. But Congress in turn accords respect to its committees (even though legally the committees do not decide anything) as well as to the permanent officials who are charged with the administra-

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tion of the laws. For example, as far back as the twenties the Congressional committees on agriculture would not act on certain types of bills depending upon technical knowledge (such as veterinary science) without positive advice from the specialists in the government service. There may be and often are specialists outside the government. Such groups, whether farmers, workers, doctors or what have you, will form special groups for the purpose of impressing their views upon the legislative and administrative authorities as well as upon the general public. Here we see the constructive and valuable service of the specialized groups; they have been too little appreciated in this role. Their pressure tactics in defending special interests have obscured the dual purpose which they serve. All this is quite well-known. And yet its bearing upon the belief in the common man is not always appreciated. The simple alternative—you know everything or nothing about a given issue—haunts us as our complex modern life baffles us.

It would be too far-fetched to pin one's faith upon the common man's judgment if it were a matter of believing in the *individual* common man as against the individual uncommon man. Yet a good many of the arguments for an elite are cast in some such form as "How can you maintain a belief in the judgment of yonder uninformed, uneducated, rowdyish unemployed as contrasted with this brilliant, well-trained and cultivated high executive?" This way of arguing is an unfortunate hangover from an uncritical individualism. We do not mean the individual common man but the composite picture. I wouldn't hold that worker Jones or farmer Miller are individually right as against a professor, much less could out-argue him and prove their point. I do argue that all the workers, farmers and other common folk in their collective judgments may well pitch their decision on public policy against that of any particular elite in the hope that in the long run their judgment will be more often "right" (which means in consonance with what the community needs) than the judgment of any limited group. Hence in a democracy the common folk can and

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ought to outvote the specialist if they disagree with him.[6] In saying this we admittedly run afoul of the great men of all ages. All have not been as emphatic as Goethe who wrote "*Mehrkeit ist Unsinn; Verstand ist stets bei wenigen nur gewesen*" (majority is nonsense; intelligence has always been possessed by just a few); but on the whole the intellectual tends to be impatient with the slow and moralizing ways of thought characteristic of the common man. Reversely, a democratic society is suspicious of intellectuals, as too volatile.

But there is a profound difference between the essentially negative judgment which decides, "This policy is bad, because it runs counter to our cherished values and beliefs, customs and habits of life," and the essentially positive judgment which decides, "This is a profound truth," or "This is a superb work of art," or "This is a divine or saintly act." Such evaluations, discriminating between the best and the next best, do indeed presuppose high intellectual development. On this ground the soundness of the belief in the common man is sharply questioned. Objections are raised which challenge his judgment in matters of science or of taste, be they moral or esthetic.

It is, of course, obvious that the intrinsic value of a book cannot be determined by how many people buy it; indeed a creative contribution of secular importance in the realms of art, music, literature or philosophy may be rejected by all but a very few enlightened spirits. But the type of value-judgment here involved is fundamentally different from that called into question where communal policies are to be determined. These "novel" departures of the creative spirit are quite unlike norms of conduct which supposedly must regulate the behavior of millions of men. The type of legislation which the AAA represents molds the lives of many people; it deals with ever-recurrent and fairly simple situations. It affects you and me.

The contrast can be put in a rather simple form: nobody has

[6] This argument does not imply a heedless acceptance of radical majoritarianism. See "One Majority Against Another—*Populus Sempervirens*," *Southern Review*, Summer, 1939, Vo. V, No. 1, pp. 42ff.

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even proposed that the people at large should determine whether a given statute is constitutional or not. Such a judgment is one involving complex legal considerations entirely beyond you and me. The "best judge" is a man learned in the law. But what *ought* to be constitutional, i.e. constitutional amendments, is indeed a matter of judgment for the common man. He is collectively the "best judge" as to what is good for him and his like. The various "elites" groups of uncommon men with a particular knowledge or interest or skill, compete in appealing to that collective judgment; but it is up to such groups to make their point.[7] Take a particular illustration. There is a great deal of argument going on concerning the budgeting practices of the federal government. Many "experts" think we are spending too much, that we ought to balance the budget. Others maintain the opposite view. In order to settle the argument without recourse to the judgment of their common fellowmen, they would have to use force. One or another of the groups would have to seize the government and then impose its view upon the other experts and the rest of us. But belief in the common man obliges us to put our technical arguments into such simple form that the fellows in the factories and on the farms can understand us. A public policy is either of such an exact and simple nature that its essentials can be put into understandable terms or it is no good. Most mature men take this position and comprehend it quite readily, when the policy is one where they themselves are part of the mass of common men; they do not wish to be ordered around (though there are the natural slaves who would exclaim, "The leader will take care of everything").

Our contention, then, is that the belief in the common man is still tenable, in spite of modern psychology and industrial technology. It cannot be the exaggerated and unqualified belief which the prophets of the democratic age expounded—the almost incredible belief in the omnicompetence of the com-

[7] At this point the crucial issue of tolerance and dissent in fundamentals arises. My own position is explicitly stated in "Democracy and Dissent," *Political Quarterly*, October-December, 1939.

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mon man—that is to say the omnicompetence of you and me. We need to insist, first of all, in the *limited* competence of every man, be he ever so uncommon. Whether there be an ultimate right or wrong, good or bad, no man knows what it is. To this extent the belief in the common man amounts to a disbelief in the uncommon man. But we can maintain a tempered belief in the common man. The common man is not infallible; far from it. But he perceives more readily than the specialist the bearing of public policies upon the pattern of values cherished by the community. The judgment of the common man is a collective, not an individual judgment. The belief in him is never the belief in the judgment of any particular common man. Judgments of taste and discriminating evaluation of the exceptional achievement are altogether excluded from our belief in the common man. Belief in the common man carried to that extreme results in the "revolt of the masses," and takes the political form of a totalitarian, plebiscitary dictatorship. A popularly acclaimed "leader" supported by a mass party is the final judge of everything. He is the common man run amuck. He poses as the incarnation of Rousseau's general will, the builder of "real" democracy, of "genuine" popular government. Belief in the common man, when limitless and without restraint, destroys rather than maintains constitutionalism and democracy. But if we allow ourselves to be frightened into abandoning the belief in the common man altogether, if we become despondent and lose faith in ourselves, our plight is equally desperate. What we need is a balanced confidence in our power to operate a community of common men, by common judgments upon matters of common concern. Exceptional men, if fellows in such an enterprise, will devote themselves to the exceptional tasks; and the masses, far from revolting, will gratefully acknowledge the achievements of the uncommon man by the time they have become common property—part of the life of common men.

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Whitehead's Philosophy of Adventure

MASON W. GROSS

THE task of evaluating the work of a philosopher is itself, obviously, a philosophical venture. Before we can estimate the value of such a work we must be explicit about our standards of value, and in relation to philosophy this means that we must make clear our general conception of philosophy itself in order to determine what we may expect from a particular philosopher such as Whitehead.

We may distinguish fairly clearly two very different conceptions of philosophy. According to the first, philosophers deal with a more or less fixed group of problems and submit various suggestions towards their solution. The group includes such problems as the relation between the mind and the body, freedom, causality, induction, perception or the status of the objects of perception and so on. Philosophers are classified according to their answers to these problems, and their answers are tested as to logical consistency or as to conformity with the "common sense" of the "plain man." Very seldom is any answer found satisfactory but this seems to cause no distress. Occasionally there is revolt within the ranks, but the rebels usually overstate their case and are promptly subdued.

This discussion of particular philosophical problems has to be carried on within the framework of a more or less consciously accepted general philosophical system. The outline is fixed; the details still have to be supplied. In the case of the problems mentioned above, the framework is that of the Cartesian philosophy. But Descartes himself, it is important to note, did not become a Cartesian until the last few years of his life. When he wrote his major philosophical works his concep-

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tion of philosophy was utterly at variance with the one just presented. He was not arguing within a framework; he was building a new one of his own. He had discovered a few simple ideas in terms of which everything could be explained. Possibly the explanation was not the true one; but had God been presented with materials of certain specific kinds and had his creative activity been limited to certain specific operations he could have created a world identical with the one in which we live.

In this Descartes reminds one of Plato who, in the *Timaeus*, also undertook to give "a likely account" of the creation of the world out of specified materials. And although there are as many differences between Descartes or Plato and Whitehead as there are between Descartes and Plato, nevertheless Whitehead must be classed with them in respect to his general conception of philosophy. Speculative philosophy he defines as "the endeavor to frame a logical, coherent, necessary scheme of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted." Thus we must not expect him to provide Cartesian answers to Cartesian problems. A far more difficult and comprehensive examination is required.

From the definition itself we can derive at least three standards by which we may evaluate philosophies of this second, speculative, sort. The first is that of logical consistency. This is, of course, a prime requisite but of less positive value than it might at first seem to be. Whitehead points out that no philosophy has ever been abandoned solely on grounds of inconsistency. Even if a given system is, like Plato's, hopelessly inconsistent it may still have a far greater value than any merely consistent philosophy, if it serves to illuminate certain hitherto unnoticed aspects of our experience. The other two standards, those of coherence and adequacy, are far better positive tests of the value of a philosophy. Whitehead is concerned to show that the traditional philosophical picture of the world of experience is both incoherent and inadequate. It is inadequate in that there are obvious elements in our experience which cannot be fitted into the picture and which have to be flatly and boldly

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denied. It is incoherent in respect to the "arbitrary disconnection of first principles." It is incoherent in the sense in which some people find modern music incoherent or unintelligible, namely in that there seems to be no intrinsic reason why a given instrument should join in at one point rather than another or why it should be just that instrument and not some other. Rationalism essentially aims at discovering logical coherence.

It must be noticed that adequacy is an ideal towards which philosophers and scientists strive rather than a goal which any philosophy can claim to have attained. We can apparently never be sure that we have provided a scheme of ideas which will enable us to interpret every element of our experience, if only because every great philosophy brings into prominence new elements hitherto unnoticed. But we can and, as philosophers, we must endeavor to secure a greater measure of adequacy and coherence than has previously been exhibited.

Whitehead repeatedly compares his philosophy with the general conception of the world underlying the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and with the cosmology adopted by Descartes, Newton and Hume. Since the latter still dominates much philosophical, scientific and even popular thinking we must test it briefly by reference to our standards of coherence and adequacy. In this way we shall be able to understand more fully the task which Whitehead has set himself and we shall see more clearly the value of his contributions to philosophy.

Incoherence is easily demonstrated in the case of Descartes. Since a substance is that which can exist by itself without the help of anything else, it follows that minds or mental substances do not require corporeal substance and vice versa. They can exist separately and independently. The fact that the world contains both kinds of substance is, from the point of view of either kind, a purely irrational coincidence. Materialists who denied the existence of mental substance, and idealists who denied material substance, can both be shown to have stemmed from Descartes. This radical dualism has provided subsequent philosophy with many of its most characteristic problems.

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But Descartes' system is incoherent in another equally serious way—in his account of change or process. Time is represented as a unique series of instants, and at each instant the world is complete. There is no reason at all, so far as the world is concerned, why there should be any change. A completely static universe is avoided only by the intervention of God, who recreates the world at each instant and reshuffles its component parts.

Hume inherited this Cartesian incoherence and, in drawing some of its more startling consequences, exhibited its glaring inadequacy. Coupling the notion of time as a succession of discrete instants with the Cartesian emphasis on clear and distinct ideas, he adopted a theory of atomic impressions and ideas, sensations and mental images, each of which satisfied the Cartesian definition of substance as that which required nothing but itself in order to exist. From this theory he was forced to draw sceptical conclusions concerning causality, induction and personal identity. If by causality we imply any power which extends from the world at one instant to the world at the next, then causality has already been ruled out by Descartes' account of time and re-creation, and Hume's psychology only serves to make the point more clear. Similarly if by induction we wish to infer from the present instant to the world at some totally distinct instant in the future, we clearly have no ground except custom for so doing. And if by personal identity we mean something which endures continuously throughout a succession of instants we can know a priori that it doesn't exist.

Other elements in Hume's philosophy are less clear. At one point it is said that memory can be identified as consisting of those images which are less vivid than sense-impressions; but Hume apparently abandoned this position without providing a substitute. He also neglected to explain how we observe the succession of impressions if at each instant our minds are constituted entirely by impressions and ideas, the latter being derived from impressions in some unexplained way. In other words no reason at all was given for thinking in terms of past, present and future.

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The conclusion for Hume is that the greater part of human behavior and human thought is irrational, based only on habit and feeling. The conclusion for us is that Hume's initial presuppositions, derived ultimately from Descartes, were inadequate to the interpretation of our experience. For to call experiences, thoughts and behavior irrational is simply to say that they cannot be accounted for in any system of ideas with which one happens to be acquainted. Scepticism of this sort is merely the confession of personal and momentary defeat. Above all, a philosophy which is based on selected elements of our experience cannot be used to refute or disparage other elements in that same experience. The necessary inference from Hume's failure is that we must refuse to admit with Descartes the superior philosophical importance of clear and distinct ideas or images and that, in the hope of discovering a more adequate and coherent account of our experience, we must pay closer attention to certain insistent beliefs, possibly vaguely formed in the back of our minds but implicit in our daily practice.

We shall not be concerned here with the various attempts to patch up the Cartesian philosophy which have kept philosophers busy since the time of Hume. But two consequences of Descartes' failure are important for us. One is the rise to prominence of epistemology or the theory of knowledge, which is primarily concerned with the problem "what can we know?" and not with the question "what do we know?" The epistemologist adopts an attitude of detachment from his total experience at any moment and asks "what can I experience?" He closes his eyes and ponders "what can I see when I open my eyes?" This form of philosophy consists in legislating to experience in terms of a more or less definitely fixed group of philosophical concepts.

A similar detachment characterizes the second important consequence of Descartes' position, the dogma of determinism. The present instant is considered as one instant in a temporal series, past, present and future; and just as the world at each instant in the past can, theoretically, be completely accounted

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for by examining the world at the instant just previous to it, so the contemporary world can be explained in terms of the world an instant ago, and so on into the future. The whole pattern of the future is laid out, waiting for us to catch up with it. This is the so-called mechanistic or cinematographical conception of change. Each instant, with all its contents, is viewed as one square on a moving-picture reel. The whole reel has been developed and merely awaits an operator to turn the crank.

This view merely strengthens Hume's conception of mental activity as irrational and illusory. If we held to it consistently we should admit that all our hopes, fears, desires, plans, purposes, ideals are mere instantaneous psychological states and that we are actually not responsible for what may happen in the future. Moral idealism and plans for social reform are alike sterile. But we are not consistent. The whole of our religious, moral and social structure is built upon the notion of men as self-determining, responsible organisms. In everyday life we simply ignore the deterministic conception just as we neglect epistemological considerations; but in philosophy we detach ourselves from ordinary life and become determinists or epistemologists again and legislate to experience, telling ourselves what experiences we can or ought to have.

It is this detachment, this legislation, this distortion of experience that Whitehead objects to most vehemently. The business of philosophy is not to pronounce experience irrational but to discover its rationality. If one set of concepts won't do, another set must be found. "The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting-point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience." The Cartesians detached certain elements from experience, systematized them and used them to legislate to the best of experience. We must abandon both the system and the detachment and start afresh in the present moment, in our experience here and now, in order to discover all the characteristics of that experience.

"A penny for your thoughts!" Except in exceedingly rare

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cases the reply almost never confines itself to the contemplation of the world at that single instant. Memories, plans, desires, hopes or regrets constantly occupy the greater part of our thoughts. "How can we use what we have to procure what we want?" A sense of derivation from and continuity with the immediate past and the immediate environment, a sense of the incompleteness of the present and of the imminence of the future, a feeling that things are going to happen and that we should try to control them—all these feelings are as much a part of our experience as this red patch or that cubical object. Spinoza recognized this when he insisted that the endeavor towards self-preservation was the basic element in man's emotional life. Plato emphasized the same factor in his doctrine of the soul as the source of motion and of love as its invariable characteristic, love of beauty and the desire for immortality. Aristotle insisted that the essence of man involved his continual struggle to fulfill his destiny.

The one thing we almost never experience is the feeling that we have been pushed this far by the forces of nature and that we are contemplating the contemporary scene idly while waiting to be pushed on again. If we ever have this feeling we recognize it by contrast to our normal experience. Normally we are aware that our mind is considering various possibilities for the immediate future and that our bodies are storing up the energy, derived from the environment or accumulated from the past, which will enable us to follow out the mind's decisions. We know that the possibilities are numbered and that our energy and emotional drive is limited. We must adapt ourselves to the situation and size up the material. We must determine carefully what we want, focus our attention, select our materials and organize our forces. We are individual sources of activity, constructing or helping to construct the future out of materials provided by the past. We feel the limits of our freedom and seek to increase our power.

These few sentences may serve to suggest briefly the content

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of our experience during any and every moment of the day and to contrast it with the strained attitude assumed by Hume. We may discover three main elements in each such moment. First there is the feeling of purpose or aim, of desires, of things to be done. Then there is the feeling of the energy and the emotional drive which will enable us to get these things done—the energy carried over from the immediate past, or the emotional reaction stimulated by our immediate environment in the form of anger or encouragement, fear or invigoration. And there is the feeling that we are reviewing our data, sizing up the situation, analyzing the factors present and adapting our purposes to our materials.

All three factors are present in every situation. Sometimes one and sometimes another is dominant. When we daydream we permit ourselves to be carried along with a minimum of conscious purpose or analysis. We are merely aware vaguely of the ground supporting us and the warm air soothing us. Again, we may be so wrought up with our desires, or so hectic about accomplishing some end, that we ignore the environment and the forces driving us on and neglect to analyze sufficiently our present materials. Finally, we may become so wrapped up in the contemplative analysis or esthetic absorption of our data that we ignore ourselves and forget the original function of analysis. And although this attitude of detachment may be essential to science it is obviously erroneous to select it as the most characteristic state of man as a concrete individual. These three factors Whitehead seizes upon as providing the essential characteristics not merely of any occasion of human experience but of any occasion in the history of any and every real thing in the world. Concentrating our attention upon the happenings of the present moment, we can discover the derivation of energy from the past, not merely as energy in general but as just that quota of energy with its analyzable form, and we discover the pressing urge towards the creation of the next moment. We discover no succession of discrete instants but rather experience shading off indefinitely into the past from which the energy is

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derived and merging indefinitely into the future towards which that energy is directed.

Since this account of an occasion of experience has been prefaced by a long appeal to abandon Humian notions as to the correct method of analysis, it is possible that it may be acceptable as an account of human experience. But the objection is always raised that in generalizing this account to include atoms and cells, we are committing the fallacy of reading peculiarities of human experience back into nature. There are two ways of answering this objection. The first is that we are indulging in an adventure in speculation, and the sole criterion of our success in this respect is the applicability of these concepts to all entities. If physical and biological entities can be so interpreted, then our system is applicable. If the system enables us to include all the known characteristics of these entities, then it is adequate with respect to them. The second answer is that we are aiming at a coherent and unified account of all nature. The fallacy of anthropomorphism in science is surely no worse than the fallacy of de-anthropomorphizing man. Physics and biology formulate laws which apply to man but are inadequate to interpret all his experience. If we wish to give a more adequate account we must utilize all the information we can obtain from the sciences. In pursuit of the ideals of coherence and adequacy, the human organism with all its enormous complexities must be shown to be a natural organism capable of exemplifying natural laws. In rephrasing the accounts given by the special scientists, none of their truth, applicability or adequacy is lost. Anthropomorphism is a methodological fallacy, and we need not be assumed to be giving methodological advice to the special scientists.

Whitehead's cosmology, as worked out in *Process and Reality*, is a detailed attempt to describe the world in terms of the three factors we have discovered to be commonplaces of human experience—the absorption of energy from the immediate past, the awareness of the data now present to us and the creative intent upon the immediate future. It would require the careful

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study of a physicist as competent as Whitehead himself to judge whether such a cosmological description is applicable and adequate at the level of simple physical entities, and the same examination should be performed at each level of increasing complexity. A mere philosopher can do more than judge Whitehead's system to be consistent, coherent and at least plausible on these levels. If it is more than merely plausible, its magnificent applicability to human experience will be strongly confirmed.

The criterion of adequacy is here coupled with the notion of applicability. This notion is central to Whitehead's conception of the function of philosophical and scientific ideas. Frequently an objection is raised to philosophy on the ground that its statements are unverifiable, that is to say that they are not applicable to our experience in any meaningful way. For Whitehead applicability to immediate experience is the sole justification for any philosophical statement, but it should be noticed that unlike scientists his emphasis is not on verification. "It is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true," he declares, adding that, of course, true propositions are more likely to be interesting than false ones. The point is that here and now, in every occasion of experience, we seek information for some purpose. Ideas and concepts, theories and propositions, all enable us to clarify and carry out our purposes more intelligently. Precisely that is their original and their ultimate justification. The more adequate our system of ideas, the more often we can use it to our advantage; the more coherent and unified it is, the more confidence we feel in it. Conversely if our system is inadequate, then in any particular occasion of experience our actions are based on ignorance, prejudice, superstition or emotional blindness. And if it is not coherent we may be pulled in two or more directions at once. We are unable to size up the situation rationally and we lose confidence in our individual abilities. Our capacity for purposive action is weakened by doubts and hesitations.

These final considerations suggest the suitability of the title

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of this paper, "Whitehead's Philosophy of Adventure." The emphasis for Whitehead is always on the actual occasion of experience. Knowledge is relevant in the form of the applicability of concepts to the analysis of the component parts of that experience; and in that occasion is discovered the need for adequate and coherent concepts. These are required to guide and control those forces of energy and emotion which are the defining characteristics of the actual entity undergoing the experience. The very essence of any actual entity is its creative power, derived from the immediate past and striving to create the immediate future. The function of mentality is to analyze the component parts of that power and to consider possibilities of organizing them as the material for future development; and the history of the development of civilization is the story of the way in which ideas have gradually become determining factors in the interplay of physical forces—the story of the adventures of ideas.

Thus Whitehead presents a picture of an individual utilizing all his material, physical and mental, to satisfy his desires and to realize his ideals, in contrast to the deterministic picture of futile, psychopathic robots being pushed willy-nilly along a path which has been laid out since the beginning of time. As against scepticism about causality he presents a doctrine of entities whose very essence it is to construct the future. As against moral resignation and defeatism he pictures man continually and effectively striving towards the attainment of ideals. It is the business of philosophy to discover the rationality of experience in order to give man confidence in his creative power. It is the business of science to analyze for man the materials and the forces which he can employ in the pursuit of his ideal aims. But mere knowledge can only indicate the possibilities of development. In the attainment of his ideals man requires confidence in his own creative ability, his physical strength and his mental vision. He requires the spirit of adventure.

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In the Workshop

Recent Architecture Abroad

DOUGLAS HASKELL

IN REVIEWING recent architecture abroad it seems important to stress the totalitarian states. Theirs is the building program which in the United States has been most generally misunderstood, when, indeed, our own professional press has not completely ignored it. Our natural habit is to think that a dictatorship over the arts must quickly result in manifest inferiority and decay. That is not the case. On the contrary, the first outcome of a dictatorship is that planning and architecture take on the appearance of conspicuous unanimity and startling success. Many who observe this fact are swept off their feet into the belief that in this field the claims of the dictators to superiority are valid after all. But the immediate success has been gained by sacrificing larger, more difficult aims.

So much as introduction to a somewhat difficult descriptive job. In examining recent architecture in Germany and Italy there is another common habit of thought that we must transcend. In our own architectural press there is a controversy under way about the merit of the "traditional" as against the "modern" approach to architectural style. Now the German trend is traditional and the Italian is modern but both are used in basically the same way. In either country a part of what has been given up is the hope that progress can be achieved by the voluntary association of individuals for purposes of production and free exchange. In both countries the leaders have restricted themselves to uniting their followers, destroying those who refuse to unite, and seeking improvement through conquest. Architecture is a tool of such union. It must declare continuity with a glorious past that led to former conquest. It must secure the individual to the group; and, since hope of change in his own status is indefinitely deferred, he must be supplied with a sense of security and unique pride on occupying the

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station where he is. The architectural means of expressing all this are found by instinct as well as choice. Thus German fairy-tales would be inconceivable in a setting of flat roofs. In German folk-lore the high pitched roof is quintessentially Germanic, associated with the prehistoric German forest and later with the castles of medieval knights.

German residential building has, indeed, a medieval cast. At first the theories of "blood" and "soil" led to the building of many subsistence cottages. Later the need of conservation led to more compact and up-to-date constructions albeit with the same cottage-like appearance. The rate of residential construction in Germany, by virtue of strict coordination, has exceeded our own. In 1936-38 the annual production was 300,000 new residential units. The concurrent boom in armaments and, after Munich, the construction of the West Wall, bled industrial materials such as steel away from building. In its turn wood, a handicraft material, became scarce despite the reported decimation of some of the fine German forests, and early in 1939 the rationing of building permits was begun under Dr. Todt. The handicraft approach that had been a matter of choice was now necessity. Somewhat tighter apartments, with far less adequate equipment, were made as *gemütlich* as possible. Handicraft details such as wrought iron fixtures reappeared and often gay designs or bits of folk-lore were painted in *sgraffito* on the outside stucco walls. Decorative dormers attest those attic rooms which it had been the aim of the flat roofs of the Republic to abolish. However, the characteristic site-planning of the Republic was retained; apartment houses were still built by preference in long parallel rows well opened to sunlight, and this arrangement was extended to the many new garrisons. These, built in open country, have a positively hospitable look, with their good simple proportions and medieval castle accents.

The assiduous attention paid to the rural landscape has the aim of keeping the peasant proud of being one. Romantic restudy is bestowed upon the plans of medieval farm courts and their intricate, ritualistic framing. The occurrence in such a plan of a manure pile outside the peasant's living-room window, or the fact that the whole *menage* is labor-devouring rather than labor-saving, brings no challenge, because our own ideal of a progressive, educated, independent population of farmers is not even raised.

The Spartan regimen for workers as well as peasants is compensated for by a coordinated series of paternal recreation centers, especially for youth. More than 600 centers—half-timbered and high-peaked—have been built in small

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villages to hold the young people. The youth-movement castles are but the continuation of a movement begun under the Republic. In providing centers for work forces, church societies and other social groups, or sometimes for whole communities, architects have outdone themselves; and although such groupings as the evangelical *Freizeitenkirche* near Munich by Gustav Gsänger or the community center at Mascherode by the bureau *Schönheit der Arbeit* are not architectural landmarks they are nevertheless picturesque, jolly, and charming.

The rich and powerful for their part tend to cover their weekend houses and hunting lodges with thatch and retain the other favored symbols of Germanic purity and innocence. However, if you will take the trouble to pick out illustrations in a German architectural periodical of new homes for the well-to-do and in each instance cover the roof with your hand you will observe that "modern" planning and urbane amenities have not really been surrendered; some recent houses are unabashedly in the international modern trend.

The highest outlet for German pride is supposed to be found in direct worship of the State; the latest available accounts indicate that not even the war has stopped the vast building program designed to "put the stamp of National Socialism forever" on the larger cities. In Berlin the North-South, East-West Crossing, a scheme so vast that the Kaiser's *Siegesallee* is reduced to a mere appendage, is already well under way. Whether in the exterior of the formidable reinforced concrete Air Ministry, in Hitler's own huge Chancellery, or the enormous new *Tempelhof* airport (with arched wings that will carry 80,000 spectators on their grandstand roofs) the architecture is a congeries of eclecticisms that adds up to the unique neo-classic of the "General Architectural Inspector," Dr. Albert Speer. The size compels awe; but those who have felt the incandescence of 20th-century architecture at its best cannot be deeply impressed by the intellectual approach.

Nazi architecture, in summary, serves the myth of the German race and State. It concentrates upon those emotional symbols that can produce union. Within the picture there is one apparent contradiction that really is none. Factories and workplaces have the most nearly international appearance of any part of the scheme. Indeed, new airplane plants such as those for Henschel or Junkers are sharply functional. They, however, are the tools of conquest and they strictly mean business.

On the surface Italian architecture today differs strongly from German. Mussolini took power earlier and thought of fascism as a logical step of rational evolution. So the "modernist" architects were

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eagerly accepted and told they had nothing to fear from bold innovation. The contemporary Italian architect commands some special resources. The long Italian tradition of art is famous for the largeness of its handling and has apparently not lost its old *grandezza*. The Italian stonemason is capable of making the severest simplicity sing. Crisp fluting or texturing of stone and a beautiful polychromy in marble give distinction to those cubistic shapes which, in Western Europe, have too often been rendered merely aseptic or downright shabby by poor execution. Large public buildings have been the exercise at which Italian architects have excelled. The well-known railroad station at Florence, with the skylight that cascades down the front in two big leaps; the postal building at Naples with its magnificent portal and the wing-like lift that has been given to its heavy curved wall: such monumental structures are unsurpassed in contemporary building for sure-handed dignity and imposing force. Some of the most handsome examples of disciplined Italian modernism are the complete small towns. Sabaudia in the reclaimed Pontine marshes; Rebbio, a satellite industrial suburb, and Guidonia, a garrison of the air force—all are built around the traditional market squares on block plans similar to those described in Germany: but the distinguishing and peculiarly Italian mark of all these towns is that their unity is a plastic unity. They are sculptured on a grand and collective scale. Recreation centers are as typical of fascism as of nazism except that the favored form is more urbane, more like a large seashore or mountain resort.

A good deal of other Italian work invites description; but what especially concerns us here is its present evolution as a whole. The functionalist elements appear to be receding; what is advancing is more nearly functionary. Close study reveals, indeed, that the calm and assurance of Italian modern architecture arose largely from the fact that the individual elements of which it was assembled were taken over, all finished and ready to hand, from the democratic countries of the north. "Modern" Italian architecture employs an elegant vocabulary of smooth *clichés*. The process appears to be related to that which built ancient Rome. And contemporary Italian building, which began by recalling Rome, seems gradually to be imitating it. The situation becomes more clear. From their early role of conveying a sense of progress, Mussolini and his architects are turning to glorification of the past. The purpose is to prepare a psychology of chauvinism and conquest.

This brief review must consciously neglect France and England. But the most direct antithesis

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to the architectural approach of the totalitarian countries is to be found in Scandinavia.

No full inventory is yet to be had of the damage inflicted upon the up-to-date building of Finland. Saarinen's well-known railroad station at Helsinki, a landmark of 20th-century architecture, remains intact; but the beautiful 14th-century glass of the cathedral at Turku (Åbo) is irreparably shattered. Within the Scandinavian frame Finland has stood a little to one side with a tradition perhaps more pronouncedly classical. The monumental buildings of Vipuuri, largely destroyed or heavily damaged, were classical; and so too in essence were such Italianate exercises in modern composition as the handsome school for Marine Officers. Work such as Aalto's (his fine Sunila pulp mill development is now Russian), functional structures such as the Åbo bus station, the charming and democratic weekend facilities built for private owners on the wooded lakes—these hold more nearly to typically Scandinavian standards of democratic unpretentiousness and keen fitness.

The special strength of the Scandinavian countries—and Holland—has been their capacity for collective action without coercion. The Dutch had corporations before Mussolini dreamt of them, and have developed fine tolerance for divergent action without ruining the whole. Stockholm's great housing projects, largely cooperative, hold to an architectural level well above the European average in the straightforward, decent, and often delightful solution of human needs. In recent years no part of the world has given greater evidence of architectural inventiveness than Scandinavia. Wood is a natural material and its treatment, while fresh and ingenious, has gained rather than lost in charm. Such "prefabricated" houses, even, as Eric Friberger's have a quality of quiet individual graciousness that leaves the typical American product very far behind.

The Swedish pavilion at the New York Fair was a fine example of typical advanced Scandinavian design. Its finesse, its affinity with the world of delicately efficient airplanes and radio towers, was achieved with no sense of forcing; but it had qualities far more important than this athletic strength. Although built by a government, this pavilion was wholly devoid of pomp and "representational" pretense; throughout, it spoke only of the human problems: and this direct, untinctured concern with the individual's health, family, shelter, work, and fun, while the pavilion itself gave cheerful shelter, sunlight, and garden view to its visitors, was of the very heart and essence of democracy. Commentators declared that it was "civilized."

This Swedish example is dwelt upon because of its importance to

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America. There is a temptation to be impressed by Italian monumentality and German organization. Both, however, are less than completely human. Neither terror nor pride in status or hope of conquest produces democracy. Our promise was that every individual should have the chance to realize himself in peace. If groups such as the Okies permanently lose hope the chance is gone for democratic architecture as well as democratic life. With Nazi and Communist agents spying out every discontent it is imperative that the effort to supply secure and decent shelter, once begun under the Farm Security Administration, be resumed on a vastly larger scale.

Democratic architecture must not only give every citizen his chance to have an agreeable home but must declare its aims in emotional terms. From this standpoint our recent housing projects under USHA constitute a big advance. Sometimes excessively austere, they nevertheless lay visible stress on open space, playgrounds and the basic amenities of a decent life for all. It is cause for pride that the site-planning has been improved by many variations upon the best German Republican technique that served as point of departure, and that American planning alone in the world makes provision for the use of the automobile.

In private residential work a group of architects has been advancing, along many individual lines, toward the ideal of providing a wide range of contemporary American homes. Especially on the West Coast the work of men such as Wurster, Born, Harris, Schindler, Ain, Neutra, Mayhew, Miller and Pflueger, has freedom and quality. It is contended here that the present reverse trend toward "traditionalism" (really revivalism), although in one way evidence of democratic diversity, represents an emotional retreat into the past and a portentous failure inwardly to affirm the liberal hope of progress.

Most of Washington is under the same dead hand. The rows of columns still being added to other rows are inferior to Hitler's in that they represent not even a bad idea. Our finest single architectural project of the day is perhaps the vast scheme of the TVA, where rugged, honest, clean-cut and beautifully detailed structures proclaim in their forms and arrangement the power of a democratic government, without pomp, to organize conservation for its citizens. TVA is equal or superior to anything Germany or Italy has done, and so too were the buildings for the Government at the San Francisco Fair. If our Government always told its story in terms so charming and fresh and devoted to common welfare, who could help believing in democracy with "heart and head and hand"?

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Discussion

FREE SPEECH AND LIBERAL SPEECHES

To the Editor:

There is so much good sense in Dr. Max Ascoli's plea that we use speech for freedom instead of letting any speech go free, that there is no use belaboring the point. He reminds us that freedom of speech is a privilege and only those worthy of the privilege and respectful of it can claim it as a right. Hence the right needs guardians and this task of guardianship might well be the peculiar job of liberals. An American feels strangely reassured when he hears that now is the time for all good men to fight for liberty; this summons has a mellow, antique quality that makes him feel at home again in a world whose accents had become too foreign. The American scholar will certainly not quarrel with Dr. Ascoli on this score.

But there is a subtle change of emphasis, a slight foreign accent in his plea. I noticed it before I detected it. Having found it out, I shall try to expose it, for it is challenging and important. American liberals, he charges, are too much like good-natured cops, willing to let anybody speak in turn because none of the speakers is as powerful as his nightstick. In reality, the speeches are becoming increasingly dangerous; the liberals, instead of pretending to be benevolent umpires, must get on their own soap-boxes with nightsticks in reserve and take a positive stand in defense of their ideals. According to him the liberals are a party to the conflict and must use their right to free speech to defeat the "friends of tyranny" before it is too late. Freedom must be granted with discrimination by "liberal public opinion, directed and controlled by influential groups of liberal men." Liberalism must be a power, must see that freedom of speech serves its own view.

If freedom of speech is to be administered by one party, the liberals, against another party, "the friends of tyranny," I venture a few words in defense of the cop's philosophy.

There is first of all a dialectical difficulty in Dr. Ascoli's position: he really recommends that free speech be given up as a right and be used as a policy. For it is inconsistent to speak of the *right* of free speech and at the same time to limit free speech to liberals, if liberals are a party. A right is universal or it is not a right, and freedom is either freedom for all citizens or it ceases to be a right. It is intelligible and reasonable to speak of the proper function of speech, to regard free speech as a "social instrument" and to see in it primarily an instrument of discrimination and lie-detection. But a right is not such an instrument; when a right is tied to a "social purpose" and made to serve a point of view it ceases to be a right. Free speech must be granted indiscriminately, if at all; it is a *condition* of freedom for all parties, not an instrument of any.

But I am interested in a more material criticism. The policeman's duty is to see to it that no party has a monopoly on speech, not even liberals. This is an important aspect of freedom and is not necessarily mere "*laissez-faire* in words." It may imply positive intervention in the interests of fair competition. Free speech implies distributed speech, and the policeman has a positive job to see to it that there are enough soap-boxes to go around. When any party, even the most liberal, gets control of the mechanisms of public speech, free speech is gone, whether the right exists or not.

A second duty for the policeman is to protect speech from speeches. Dr. Ascoli is aware of the need for dialogues, when our instruments of publicity and arts of government favor monologues. There is a real danger that his "liberal leaders" will soon become mere leaders, making speeches, influencing people and making friends by rhetoric. Demagogic speech, which seems to be the freest form today, is after all a "friend of tyranny." To quote Dr. Ascoli, "Among all the instruments of tyranny there is none so powerful as the skilful use of words," viz., propaganda. The conscientious policeman might well protect the public from such speech in the interest of *free* speech. Less monologue, more discussion; less skilful speeches, more open speaking. Modern conveniences for speakers have created a new problem; the public needs a little freedom from speeches now and then. This is a policeman's job; an intellectual leader is naturally disqualified.

Lastly, the policeman is there to prevent speech from generating violence. Dr. Ascoli realizes the dangers inherent in speech and rightly criticizes such liberal views as those expressed in the same issue of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR (Winter 1939-40) by J. Herman Randall, Jr., who argues that

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men who blow off steam are not dangerous. Freedom of speech is, according to him, a safety valve for our industrial system. But speech is not so innocent and even blown-off steam burns. When one is dealing with such engines as propaganda-mills, one is dealing with a form of speech which creates more emotion than it vents. When speaking becomes inflammatory, it is the policeman who is normally called in the interests of peace.

For the right to speak has always been held subordinate to the duty to be peaceful. I quote the French Declaration of 1789: "The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man; every citizen then can freely speak, write, and print, subject to responsibility for the abuse of this freedom in the cases determined by law." I readily admit that if the law is illiberal, there is little freedom granted by this declaration. Bills of rights have never amounted to much in practice, except as they become incorporated in judge-made law, and then they more often serve the cause of order than of liberty. Be this as it may, the determination of the "abuse" of liberty "is normally the function of law, not of a party." Here again, the "cop's philosophy" seems more just. Responsible freedom of speech is possible only when predetermined rules for its exercise have been established and where these rules are enforced by a judge or a policeman. The real measure of freedom of speech is the degree to which the policeman can keep the peace among speakers without using the stick. Dr. Ascoli recommends "intransigence toward illiberal ideas and charity toward illiberal men." An intelligent cop adopts the opposite policy—intransigence toward illiberal men and charity toward illiberal ideas. He tries to keep his "good-humor" and leaves it to the liberal to be "aggressive." On the whole, I think the cop is more apt to be "keen-eyed" and, if he is experienced, he is more liberal. Bills of rights and policemen do not have "definite goals"; they establish general conditions for men pursuing conflicting goals. To maintain freedom of speech for all parties and to make small factions and tyrannous majorities respect such freedom implies a faith in speech that transcends liberalism. Without this faith liberalism is futile and when freedom of speech becomes a party platform instead of the foundation for all platforms, it is already too late to talk of freedom.

Freedom of speech is historically associated with freedom of conscience, about which one hears little today. The intellectual liberals to whom Dr. Ascoli appeals have an important task to perform in analyzing speeches to find out how many of them are conscientious. When speech reflects conscience and not merely opinion, it must be taken more seriously. For whether men's consciences are right or wrong, liberal or tyrannical, their consciences are their guides and masters. To defy conscience is to make martyrs, and this is dangerous business. Consciences cannot always be granted freedom, but they demand a respectful hearing and cautious treatment. The cause of freedom would be promoted if we knew when we were dealing with conscientious objectors, when with malice, and when with factional advertising. An analysis of the motives, objectives and contexts of the speeches now prevalent would keep our liberal moralists busy for some time and might serve to free us from some of the more useless kinds of free speech. Liberalism is more likely to be a power when it is not a party seeking power, but a conscientious criticism of illiberal consciences and demagogic speeches among all parties.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER
New York, N. Y.

ON TRADE AGREEMENTS

To the Editor:

"The Trade Agreements Act" by Dr. Arthur Feiler in the Spring issue of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR focuses attention upon an important and timely topic. Our reciprocal trade agreements program has aided in the reduction of barriers to the international movement of commodities and has probably prevented the growth of new restrictions and discriminations against the foreign trade of the United States. Even more striking than the comparison of our trade with agreement and non-agreement countries is a comparison of our trade with agreement countries in concession and non-concession products. When the latter study is made upon the basis of statistics furnished by agreement countries, the fact usually appears that our export trade in concession products to these countries changed more than our trade in non-concession products. The trend of our import trade is not so clear. Usually our imports of concession products increased more than our imports of non-concession products when trade in both increased, and vice versa, although this was not always the case.

These concessions, as the author points out, have been made only after very careful consideration of possible consequences to domestic production. The detailed statistical report prepared on each tentative concession item includes topics such as tariff history of the product, American production and imports, and foreign production and

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trade. A summary of American production as complete as possible is made, with information concerning the number of domestic producers, the size of domestic production units, and domestic exports, if any. With this information at hand conclusions are reached pertaining to competitive conditions. Concessions need not be granted if they promise to entail serious competition for domestic industry.

As soon as concessions are granted, they are extended to other nations with which we have a most-favored-nation agreement. In order to conserve bargaining power after extension of such treatment concessions are based upon the chief supplier principle, according to which a concession is granted a particular country upon the specific tariff paragraph in which that country is the chief source of American imports. Thus, although other countries receive the advantage of the lowered duty on that product, they do not benefit extensively thereby because they do not send large quantities of the commodity to the United States. By thus granting concessions on the products of peculiar interest to the country with which we happen to be negotiating an agreement, we retain material to be used as a bargaining tool in future agreements. If the negotiating country is the chief supplier of our imports under one part of a paragraph only, the paragraph can be reclassified in order to facilitate a reduction in duty on imports under that part alone.

Dr. Feiler mentions the fact that "the United Kingdom, the leading wheat market of the world, has removed its discriminating duty on wheat." In this statement he is undoubtedly referring to the removal of the margin of preference heretofore enjoyed in the United Kingdom market by wheat shipped from producers within the British Empire. Following the Imperial Conference at Ottawa in 1932 wheat imported from areas outside the British Empire entered Great Britain at a duty equivalent to about six cents per bushel; wheat imported from countries within the Empire entered Great Britain free of duty. A very significant feature of our trade agreement with the United Kingdom was the modification of this system of imperial preference.

The reciprocal trade agreements program has made a noteworthy beginning to liberalize international commerce and thereby to gain for us some of the advantages of the interregional division of labor.

GRACE BECKETT
Indiana Central College
Indianapolis, Ind.

A READER CONCENTRATES ON ROMANTICISM

To the Editor:

Had Professor Jacques Barzun inserted the adjective "French" in the caption of his sprightly essay on Romanticism (THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR, Spring 1940), we could have appreciated his *loyauté littéraire* more easily than we can in view of his determination "to concentrate on romanticism by tackling it historically."

As the matter stands, in Dr. Barzun's presentation Romanticism is primarily a French affair with the tincture of an English *entente cordiale*. He mentions 22 French writers or rulers, 14 of whom had not a shred of historical connection with Romanticism once it had got started in France. His study is largely a tribute to Pascal. He mentions 19 English writers or leaders, seven of whom were the conceded standard bearers of the Romanticism that was, to a degree, imported by the British. He mentions 11 German writers or thinkers, not one of whom was at any time registered in the Romantic School as a creative writer.

Dr. Barzun does mention Kant, Schopenhauer and Hegel, admittedly three leaders in the movement of Idealism (the one Emerson and his colleagues took up around 1837), but even this omits the three chiefs: Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher. Nor is he at all right, so far as initial Romanticism is concerned, in putting Spinoza down as "one of the great Romantic finds." The Stolbergs, the Jacobis, Goethe, and even Lessing had found Spinoza and canonized him philosophically before Germany started the original Romantic movement.

Nor is Dr. Barzun fair about the French Revolution. The real and original author of the statement was Friedrich Schlegel, and what he said was: "The three leading influences of the day are Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, and the French Revolution."

The "history" of the matter is simple: Of course there has always been romanticism. But as a concerted literary or spiritual movement, it was Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder more than any other who wrote the original Romanticism. He did it without reference to or familiarity with the term and died 30 years before, in France, Victor Hugo and his *concitoyens* began to wear funny vests and write unbuttoned verses.

Romanticism would probably never have become "popular," spiritual creations would never have been cared for under its aegis, had it not been for a pure accident: Ludwig Tieck was bringing out an edition of those of his works he had written

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since creeping out from under the *Jugendsünden* of his Rationalistic youth. He searched for a title, and found it: *Romantische Dichtungen.* That started the movement, in Germany, in the 18th century. Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis then began to offer the aphoristic definitions, and Heine—himself hardly a Romanticist—used for the first time the word "school" in his *Die Romantische Schule* (1832), intended for the French, and purporting to be an actual history of a great cause.

The soundest sentence in Dr. Barzun's study is "Romanticism was full of *dis*believers in every kind of creed, but it numbered hardly a single *un*believer." In German Romanticism there were absolutely none. Nor is either of Barzun's two "philosopher-kings" an *un*believer. But the inspiration or focus of the belief? Let him locate it and name it who can. I could not possibly preserve the "historical" tradition and make a statement regarding Il Duce's days as a student. Nor do I know whether Der Führer's interest in Wagner is genuine and studied or affected and external. But this much is true: German Romanticism was the sole one of the six leading Romanticisms to have world influence through its music; and Richard Wagner is unthinkable, wholly and utterly, without the Romanticists.

German Romanticism also wins by many heads in philosophy, and is superior in painting and the plastic arts. But the export, import idea? The sole remark that is safe is that Danish Romanticism derived largely from German. Any other thesis sends prejudice on a spree. Of French Romanticism Goethe said, "The Classical is healthy, the Romantic diseased." Precisely what could Goethe (d. 1832) have known of French Romanticism? There are real English scholars who say Yes, the Germans developed a historical novel after 1815; they got it from Scott. German scholars remark, Yes, Scott developed the historical novel right well; he got the idea from his admiration for and translation (awful) of Goethe's historical drama, *Goetz von Berlichingen.* And yet, someone asks whether Naziism and Fascism have not grown out of Romanticism, unmodified and undesignated? Sufficient unto the day is the Realism thereof.

ALLEN PORTERFIELD
New York, N. Y.

AND JACQUES BARZUN RETORTS

To the Editor:

As I understand Mr. Porterfield's objections, my view of Romanticism is inaccurate in detail and unhistorical in spirit, but would be true if applied only to France. Yet Mr. Porterfield finds 14 of my French examples wrong, which certainly suggests that he should deny me proper knowledge of French Romanticism as well. Obviously the trouble is that Mr. Porterfield and I do not mean the same thing by Romanticism. For him—and this partly explains the discontinuity of his remarks—Romanticism is a fad or fashion which can be "imported to a degree by the British," or a phase of which can be "taken up by Emerson around 1837." In this Romanticism, a man either is or is not "registered as a writer"—one checks in and out of it like a hotel.

For me, on the contrary, Romanticism is at once a temper affecting a man's whole being and a way of tackling the problems of life and art. While Mr. Porterfield is talking about "schools" and temporary groups, about an infection which started in Germany and traveled slowly, I am talking about a normally healthy *Zeitgeist* which had no need to travel. That is why my 14 Frenchmen do belong, why Goethe was a romanticist to the end, and why I chose two 17th-century thinkers to expound the attitude of a later age that found them congenial.

As for the historicity of this view, I can assure my critic that I am not unmindful of the place and worth of the writers that he mentions and I omit. My article did not pretend to give a survey, and did not afford space for discussing the would-be genetic accounts which he mistakes for history. Neither have I space now to take up his criticism point by point in the light of these principles. I only submit that the historical sense of a critic who says that "Romanticism would never have become 'popular' had it not been for a pure accident" seems to me either naive or grotesque. And only a regrettable lapse of memory can explain the query "What did Goethe know of French Romanticism?" Goethe knew, besides Rousseau, the work of Chateaubriand, Hugo, Stendhal, Mérimée, Dumas, and Ste Beuve; of Delacroix, David d'Angers, and Berlioz. He got new books by the crate and regularly read *Le Globe.*

I wish indeed I could feel more sympathy for Mr. Porterfield's sense that in my view it is precisely these textbook categories that are disregarded. The fact is that after repeated applications they have yielded nothing but the labeling of persons and the libeling of an age. Repeating the old tags can bring no new understanding, particularly at a time when a caricatured Romanticism is made the scapegoat of political passions.

JACQUES BARZUN
Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

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About Our Authors

Quotation marks usually indicate passages taken directly from autobiographical letters requested from the authors themselves.

CRANE BRINTON, associate professor of history at Harvard and recently added to the Editorial Board of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR, is especially interested as a historian in the intellectual history of the 18th and 19th centuries "and particularly in what the French call '*politique et moraliste*' "; but in his additional role as a human being his concern embraces the intellectual temper of the decade in which we live.

HANS KOHN became a contributor to THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR in the fall of its first year and fortunately for the magazine has been willing to keep that friendship renewed (see Vol. I, No. 4; Vol. III, No. 2; Vol. IV, No. 4; Vol. VI, No. 3; Vol. VIII, No. 3). . . He was born in Prague but has lived in many countries—Russia, Palestine, France, England. . . . "In 1931 I first came to the United States, lectured in many colleges and became convinced that America is the land of human freedom and, notwithstanding some appearances to the contrary, of more humanity (*humanitas*) than the Old World. I am convinced that men are friendlier here, more open-minded, less conceited intellectually; that there is a better past (because it is a short past, rooted in the liberal rationalism of the 18th century) and more future than anywhere else. So America became *meine Wahlheimat*. . . . Since 1934 I have been professor of modern history at Smith College."

MAX EASTMAN, who for three years taught logic at Columbia University, makes intellectual exercise a sheer delight—vide his *The Literary Mind, Its Place in an Age of Science* (which may be read "either hoppingly or at a steady walk according to the taste of the reader," to quote from its Preface), *The Sense of Humor* and *The Enjoyment of Poetry*, a study of the psychology of literature (now in its 19th edition). . . . In 1922 he went to Russia to learn the language and study the "soviet" civilization. While he was there he wrote a series of articles and essays and *Leon Trotsky, The Portrait of a Youth*. Much of his later literary work derives from his years in Russia: his book *Marx and Lenin, The Science of Revolution* (a criticism of Marxian and Bolshevik theory); his edition of the volume of Karl Marx' work, *Capital and Other Writings*, for the Modern Library; and his translation of Trotsky's three-volume *History of the Russian Revolution*.

WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON, head of the department of history, University of Illinois, has been interested in our southern neighbors since his undergraduate days and has studied and traveled extensively in Spain, Portugal, Mexico and South America. . . . As a research worker he discovered in Circoncester, England, "the long-lost memorabilia of the knight-errant of Spanish-American independence, Francisco de Miranda." . . . In recognition of the scholarliness of his books (which include *The Life of Miranda, History of the Latin-American Nations, Hispanic American Relations with the United States* and the translation and editing of Ricardo Levene's *Historia Argentina* as the initial volume in the Inter-American Historical Series) he was awarded the Mitre Medal by the Hispanic Society of America and was decorated with the Order of Liberators by the government of Venezuela.

HOWARD D. ROELOFS is professor of philosophy at the University of Cincinnati. . . . "The academic training which presumably equipped me for becoming a professor of philosophy had in it nothing unusual except that it was broken by a period of several years devoted to farming. I still hear it said it is odd that even in lectures on Kant the illustrations should be so persistently agricultural. Yet personally I am convinced that what I learned from plowing and seeding, from sows farrowing and shoats fattening, helped my understanding of philosophy. . . . I should like to point out that the autobiographical references in my present article, particularly those referring to my father's attitude toward my education, are substantially and for the most part literally true."

T. SWANN HARDING is scientific editor for a department in the federal government; a bulwark of the new publication *Dynamic America*; incorrigibly an author; and in addition to numerous articles contributed to various periodicals has had six books published, five of them written to acquaint the layman with work being done in scientific fields and one of them "a book of nonsense humor." Two of his articles have appeared in THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR (Vol. II, Nos. 2 and 3).

GEORGE P. SCHMIDT insists that "I am not really an author at all but merely an undifferentiated college professor who teaches mostly American history (my title, professor of history, New Jersey College for Women). I have written to date *The Old Time College President*, 'Intellectual Crosscurrents in American Colleges' for the *American Historical Review* and other articles. . . . I like to follow European ideas and institu-

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tions across the water into the new world, where they suffer a sea-change into something rich and strange. . . . In one of my classes a girl was led to write a paper on public land policies after she had examined a title deed given by George I to a farm on which her family still lives; while another girl in the same class insisted on making a study of Lillian Wald's Henry Street Settlement because it was there that her mother had been shown her first kindness in America after her arrival from Russia. There is real satisfaction in teaching the making of America while you see the process going on before your eyes."

GEORGE BIDDLE, sculptor and painter, as soon as he graduated from the Harvard School of Law and was admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar, went to Paris to study art. His autobiography, *An American Artist's Story*, wherein these and many other facts are set down, is the account of a man who has roamed and has relished living. . . . He has held one-man exhibitions in various cities in this country and in Paris; his work is to be found in the permanent collections of a number of the most eminent museums in this country and in Berlin, Mexico City and Venice; and in 1935 he frescoed five panels in the Department of Justice Building. His current account of art under federal patronage is doubly reliable, for he was active in the creation of the Federal Art Project and he has checked and rechecked the figures and facts cited with the meticulous care of a lawyer preparing a brief.

In 1937 the Association of American Colleges selected HENRY MERRITT WRISTON, president of Brown University since 1937, to serve as chairman of its Commission on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure. His prior experience in the academic world had been a long one. He began his work in 1914, as instructor in history at Wesleyan University, was professor of history there from 1919 to 1925 and from 1925 to 1937 was president of Lawrence College. This direct knowledge of the problems of the teacher and of the administrator was broadened by his term as president of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, as president of the Association of American Colleges and as a trustee of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Learning. . . . He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa's Committee on the Status of the Liberal Arts and Sciences.

At the invitation of a group of progressive student organizations CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, now professor of government at Harvard University, first came to the United States fifteen years ago as a lecturer. Like Hans Kohn later, he was deeply attracted by the American scene and in 1926 he left Heidelberg to accept a call to Harvard. . . . His courses there cover a wide range and include political theory, comparative institutions, public opinion and propaganda, and the legislative process. For years he has concerned himself with the training of civil servants and is now on the faculty of the Graduate School of Public Administration. He is also editor of the School's yearbook, *Public Policy*. . . . Proofs of the astonishingly competent job he has done in converting English into his mother tongue are his chapters in *Responsible Bureaucracy*; a general treatise, *Constitutional Government and Politics: Nature and Growth*; and an interpretation of international relations since the war, *Foreign Policy in the Making*.

MASON W. GROSS (instructor in philosophy, Columbia University) learned to love Greek and Latin under a very inspiring teacher of the Taft School. "I went abroad in order to concentrate exclusively on the classics and spent one year in Aberdeen, Scotland, and four years at Cambridge University. Subsequently, as a graduate student at Harvard, I became fascinated by Professor Whitehead's lectures, largely because he seemed to come closest in every way to my first love, Plato. The fascination increases constantly, but I am still trying to figure out just why that should be the case. I flatly refuse to accept the suggested dilemma of being either merely scientific or merely mystical in philosophy, and I firmly believe that there is a point of view properly called philosophical, and that this point of view is important. I hope to persuade others to share this belief."

DOUGLAS HASKELL for a number of years has made a specialty of studying new buildings and writing about them, sometimes for professional magazines such as *Architecture* and the London *Architectural Review* and sometimes for general publications.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER is, among many other things, professor of religion at Columbia University; editor of *Journal of Philosophy* and *Review of Religion*; and author of several books as divergent as *Making the Fascist State*, *The Puritan Mind* and *Meditations in Season*.

The subject of GRACE BECKETT'S recent doctoral thesis was "Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program of the United States: Analysis and Theoretical Implications (with particular reference to the agreement with the United Kingdom)."

ALLEN PORTERFIELD is professor of German at West Virginia University and the author of *Outline of German Romanticism*.

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